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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520

RS/R FILES

Attention MRS MULLETT
Keep this study together.

November 27, 1971

S/S-Borg

File 14 26.22

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INR

SECRET/LIMDIS

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: The Uruguayan Elections

I am attaching a copy of an internal Department memorandum on the Uruguayan election scheduled for November 28, which may be of interest to you.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Elections Memorandum.

SECRET/LIMDIS

Drafted: S/S:PW:Borg:dg
11/27/71

Clearance:

ARA/APU:DCox
INR - Mr. Cline

MICROFILMED
BY S/S-I

Elections Memo drafted by INR:RCJorgenson

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

S/S

NOV 26 1971

SECRET/LINDISThe Uruguayan Elections

Nine presidential candidates from three major parties are contesting the November 28 election. The two traditional parties, President Pacheco's incumbent Colorados and the Blanco Party, are being challenged by the Frente Amplio (Broad Front), a coalition of Marxists and dissidents from the traditional parties. The voters will also elect municipal officials and a new Congress. All evidence points to the defeat of the Frente presidential ticket. However, regardless of which of the traditional middle-of-the-road parties wins, it is likely that the two decade-old economic and social decay will continue to plague Uruguayan politics and create concern among Uruguay's powerful neighbors.

The candidates. Pacheco is running for reelection, but the almost certain defeat of a constitutional amendment to allow him to serve a second term rules him out of serious contention. He has designated 43 year old Juan Bordaberry, the Minister of Agriculture, as his "alternate" candidate. The third Colorado candidate is Jorge Batlle. Of the two Blanco candidates, Senator Wilson Ferreira appears to have the best chance of upsetting the Colorados' hold on the presidency. The Frente's candidate, retired General Liber Seregni, is a moderate leftist who has avoided taking ultra-radical positions or appearing to be controlled by the Communist Party, the Frente's major component.

The electoral system. The electoral system favors the two traditional parties by allowing all factions of a party to run candidates. The effect is to combine primary and general elections in one ballot. The most voted candidate of the most voted party is the winner. Thus all votes for the five Colorado candidates accrue to the one that leads in that party's voting.

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The Issues

Over the years the ideological differences between the two major parties have been blurred; consequently, personalities are a major consideration to the voters. This year the issues have centered around "law and order" and the economy. "Pacheco or Chaos" has been the President's campaign slogan, even though he has suffered some serious setbacks in quelling the disruptive activities of the Tupamaros, Latin America's most active and successful urban terrorists. The Colorados have also concentrated on the Communist and Tupamaros ties of the Frente.

The most important underlying opposition issue is the widespread sense of malaise and lack of national direction. There is a growing disaffection, especially on the part of middle class youth, caused by lack of opportunity. The Tupamaros phenomenon is itself largely a middle class revolution against a system which is seen to offer no hope for meaningful participation. The Blancos, the Frente and Batlle have attacked Pacheco's management of the economy. But the economy is an elusive issue because none of the parties, including the Frente, has been willing to specify actions it would take to correct structural deficiencies, actions which would necessarily call for austerity. The Frente has sought to exploit frustration with the ineffectiveness of the traditional parties and more recently has alleged CIA and Brazilian involvement in right-wing terrorism against the party and its candidate. However, the low level of US investment (some \$90 million) defuses the universally popular campaign issue of foreign exploitation.

Election prospects. The Colorado's Bordaberry is the front runner in a close three party race but Jorge Batlle, also of the Colorados, and the Blancos' Wilson Ferreira have good victory prospects. Embassy estimates and various political polls seem to indicate that the Frente candidate has peaked at about 25 percent of the total expected vote (see attached chart on polls). In past elections Gallup polls have been fairly accurate in measuring voter preferences. However, a major element of uncertainty arises from the large number of voters - about 25 percent - who refuse to indicate preferences or who remain undecided.

The Frente candidate, however, appears to have close to an even chance of winning the mayoralty contest in Montevideo. While his power would be closely controlled by the national government, such a victory would give the Frente a chance to continue as a viable political organization.

The Colorados and Blancos should continue their control of the bicameral Congress.

The New Government

The new administration, which takes office on March 1, 1972, will be saddled with heavy financial obligations and the adverse effects of the short-term, politically motivated economic policies of the past year. There is also a likelihood of increased terrorism by the Tupamaros. In addition to overcoming the immediate difficulties it faces, it will also have to address itself to the underlying psychological climate of long-term economic stagnation. There is little evidence to suggest that any of the candidates could bring about a quick improvement. According to an Embassy assessment, fairly sizeable multilateral assistance through loans to Uruguay has had, with few exceptions, little or no effect on creating better policies or building better institutions. The Embassy also noted that multilateral assistance efforts have done "little to change the disregard for efficiency and good administration, the neglect of careful planning of projects and policies, and the dominance of short-run political considerations characteristic of the GOU for over a decade". In short, the prospect for the future is most likely a continued floundering and stagnation accompanied by an increasing appeal to disaffected youth to violent revolution.

US Interests in Uruguay

Concerned over the possibility of a Frente victory, both Argentina and Brazil have been weighing the advantages and disadvantages of some form of intervention in Uruguayan affairs. Uruguay has served as a traditional buffer between Argentina and Brazil, a buffer in which the actions of either power induces grave suspicions in the other. Neither country could ignore a breakdown in Uruguayan political/economic life nor the unilateral action of the other. Thus the major danger for US interests in the area may well be not the outcome of the Uruguayan election, but rather the latent danger that continued social/economic deterioration may have for the course of relations between these two major Latin American powers.

Attachment:

Polls

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Gallup Projection - Percentage of Vote

Montevideo
Interior
Total

<u>Colorados</u>	<u>Blanco</u>	<u>Frete Amplio</u>	<u>Other</u>
39.3	26.0	33.2	1.5
41.3	40.0	17.1	1.6
<u>40.5</u>	<u>34.0</u>	<u>24.0</u>	

Uruguayan Institute of Applied Social Science Projection

Montevideo
Interior
Total

	(percentages)
40.0	25.7
43.5	45.5
<u>42.8</u>	<u>36.2</u>
	<u>21.0</u>

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ORIGIN/ACTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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TO : Department of State

 INFO: Amembassy BRASILIA
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RS/R

FROM : Amembassy MONTEVIDEO

DATE: May 10, 1972
ANALYSIS BRANCH

SUBJECT: The PCU Looks at the Labor Vote

REF : Montevideo A-32 of March 8, 1972

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

MAY 16 1972

Summary

How labor voted in November 1971 is a question which intrigues most observers of the Uruguayan political scene and not least of all the Communist Party. In an effort to refute the claim that the typical Frente Amplio voter is middle-class, the Communist Party published an analysis of the election results for Montevideo. The CNT, the labor arm of the Communist Party, is particularly sensitive to the criticism that it was unable to deliver the labor vote to the Frente, since the CNT had waged a very hard campaign in favor of the Marxist electoral coalition. Although a review of the PCU study does not enable us definitively to describe how labor voted in November 1971, in the absence of official statistics the study allows us to examine the PCU's maximum case for political influence among the working class.

The study assumes that FIDEL's (the PCU electoral front) electoral performance is an approximate measure of the CNT's political influence. The Montevideo statistics arguably do support the Frente Amplio-FIDEL claim to have won proportionally greater support from wage earners than from other socio-economic groups. However, these same statistics also prove that collectively the traditional parties obtained the over-riding majority of labor's votes. The PCU statistics show that despite its huge investment in the campaign, the CNT was not able to translate its labor position - there are an estimated 250,000 members in the CNT - into votes for the Frente Amplio. Nation-wide, FIDEL polled only 100,211

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1972 MAY 15 AM 7 42

votes. The PCU study confirms our previous understanding that while the majority of organized labor may follow the CNT in trade union matters, CNT members generally will not accept political direction from the Communist confederation. It would be a mistake, however, to consider this an unchangeable truth.

.....

The Communist-controlled CNT labor confederation claims to "represent" over 500,000 workers. Although this figure is highly inflated - - 250,000 is a more accurate estimate - - the CNT is nevertheless the largest organization outside of the political parties which claims to play an important political role. If the CNT had been able to deliver the votes of its 250,000 members, not to speak of their families, the Frente Amplio's presidential candidate, General Liber SEREGNI, would probably be Uruguay's Chief of State today.

This did not happen, but the question still remains as to how successful the CNT was in influencing the vote of the labor force. We had been hopeful that the Government would publish detailed statistics showing a breakdown of the vote in Montevideo by districts. Since voting districts correspond roughly to neighborhoods which tend to be economically and socially homogeneous, this information would be useful in examining the CNT's claim of political influence among workers. Unfortunately, there still are no official statistics of this type, and none appear forthcoming.

Shortly after the final election results were known, commentaries appeared in many papers sarcastically calling into question the CNT's self-proclaimed political muscle. The CNT, it will be recalled, went all out in support of the Frente Amplio (see A-183 of October 27, 1971). On December 17, 1971 the Communist daily, El Popular, published a summary of a study of the election results for Montevideo which attempts to defend the CNT. The complete version of this study has now been published in the January-February 1972 issue of the Communist Party's review, Estudios. While we have no way of judging the authenticity of the statistics given, the study does present the PCU-CNT's maximum claims, and as such is worthy of analysis.

The thrust of the PCU presentation is that the Frente Amplio voted best in working class neighborhoods. This is designed to counter efforts by Blanco and Colorado politicians to characterize Frente voters as predominantly middle-class, professional, and intellectual. Estudio's analysis does show that the four Montevideo districts where the Frente won a plurality of the votes are predominantly working-class neighborhoods. In those districts, the Frente vote varied between 34 and 39.7%.

However, for purposes of defending the CNT, this is not enough. Depending on the point to be proven, the study assumes that the political influence of the CNT among workers is demonstrated by the vote of the Communist Party's electoral coalition, FIDEL.

In the working class districts where the Frente had a plurality of the votes, FIDEL contributed only between 32.2 and 39.4% of the Frente vote. In other words, the combined appeal of other factions within the Frente was greater than that of FIDEL in the most typically working class districts. Stated as a percentage of the total vote, FIDEL won only between 12.8 and 13.5% in the Frente's top four districts.

In the four districts where the Frente voted weakest, obtaining between 21.7 and 24.6% of the total vote, the PCU study attempts to explain the poor results with the observation that these districts are mixed rural-urban with both farms and populated centers. The authors of the study then find themselves faced with the difficult problem of explaining the fact that FIDEL made its best contribution to the Frente's vote (between 43.3 to 48%) in three of the four of the Frente's weakest districts. In an effort to have its cake and eat it too, the study deftly concludes that FIDEL's excellent showing in those districts must be due to the vote from the urban centers and not the more rural areas. No statistical evidence is offered to support this "finding".

The above notwithstanding, FIDEL's best performance was in a working class district, where the Communists won 13.5% of the vote. Their poorest showing was in a middle to upper class district, where they received only 6.16% of the votes. One could thus argue that at least in those two districts FIDEL (read "CNT") did twice as well among workers than among voters of a higher socio-economic status. However, a graph of FIDEL's election results in all of the districts of the capital reveals a bell shaped distribution with the great majority grouped around the average of 10.1% for the entire city. Thus for example, in the area of the port and the "Old City" which are heavily working class, FIDEL polled only 10.02% of the vote or just under their city-wide average.

As we noted at the outset, the CNT has a maximum of 250,000 members. FIDEL's total vote, nation-wide, was only 100,211 or less than half of the CNT membership. Since FIDEL probably also drew votes from groups other than labor, its share of the vote of CNT members was even smaller.

What the Communist Party study does suggest is that the Frente Amplio and FIDEL probably drew proportionately more support from labor than from other groups. This is suggested not only by the statistics from Montevideo, but nation-wide where the Frente performed better in departments with larger urban populations, such as Paysandú. Even in Paysandú, the second most important industrial center in Uruguay, the labor vote is cloudy, as FIDEL won only 2.8% of the vote as compared to its average vote in the interior, 3.1%.

While it can only be argued that the Frente did better among wage earners than among other groups, there is at least one indisputable conclusion from the PCU study. Even in the four predominantly working class districts of the capital where the Frente won a plurality of the votes, the traditional parties collectively obtained at least 60% of the vote. In short, the labor vote cannot be said to be the property of the Frente Amplio, and even less of FIDEL and the CNT.

The November 1971 election therefore provides additional evidence that Uruguayan wage earners are "schizoid" in their attitude toward the Communist Party. A majority of those workers who belong to trade unions allow themselves to be represented by the Party's alter-ego in labor affairs, the CNT. While the CNT's use of veiled and not-so-veiled threats of violence explains some of the CNT's success, the political profile of the Uruguayan worker is very different from his trade union profile. He remains committed to the traditional political parties.

The above observations reflect the results of Uruguay's most recent elections and do not allow one to conclude that the CNT will not in the future be able to translate its labor position into a political position. Our point here is that thus far it has not.

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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

INFO: Amembassy BUENOS AIRES, CINCSO FOR POLAD

FROM : Amembassy MONTEVIDEO

DATE: May 3, 1972

SUBJECT: Inner-Party Conflict Provokes Blanco Convention

REF : A-40^{ARA} of March 15, 1972

1. Background

As noted in the referenced airgram, the Blanco Party coalition led by Senator Wilson FERREIRA Aldunate, which represents two-thirds of the Party's seats in the Legislature, differs substantially from the minority factions of Senator Martin ECHEGOYEN and Alberto HEBER on the extent of cooperation which should be offered by the Party to the Bordaberry Administration. Ferreira successfully led an effort early in March to reject President BORDABERRY's offer of "co-participation" in his Administration in exchange for Blanco political backing. Although pledging legislative support for those Bordaberry initiatives considered "in the national interest", Ferreira has attempted to establish a much more independent stance than Echegoyen and Heber, both of whom favor a closer working relationship with the President's Administration. Despite the Party Directorate's earlier refusal of "co-participation", President Bordaberry has continued to keep Blanco unity under pressure by offers of patronage and governmental positions to the minority Echegoyen and Heber factions in return for their support. A case in point which for a time threatened the delicate fabric of Blanco unity is the Administration's effort to secure a venia, or confirmation from the Senate, for the naming of ex-President Jorge PACHECO as Ambassador to Spain.

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2. The Venia Issue

Although Ferreira and his coalition voted to permit Pacheco to leave the country before the constitutional six month limitation had expired, Ferreira made it vehemently clear that he did so on the basis of his view that the farther Pacheco was from Uruguay, the better it would be for the country. He made several bitter personal attacks upon the ex-President, charging that Pacheco had assumed "dictatorial" powers and declaring his adamant opposition to the confirmation of Pacheco as Ambassador. In mid-March, all Blanco Party legislators met and agreed to oppose the confirmation motion. With the certain opposition by the Frente Amplio coalition, it appeared the ex-President's venia was doomed. Pacheco supporters in Congress were visibly upset by this turn of events and charged that President Bordaberry had "mishandled" the venia request. At this point, however, Vice President Jorge SAPELLI, who as president both of the Senate and General Assembly has been a very active lobbyist for the President in Congress, held several private meetings with representatives of the Heber and Echegoyen factions. According to one report, the Administration offered an important ambassadorship to Heber faction Senator ZORRILLA de San Martin. This would permit faction leader Alberto Heber to enter the Senate as Zorrilla's suplente or substitute. Rumors of similar offers to the Echegoyen faction were also heard, as both Echegoyen and Heber openly began to soften their opposition to Pacheco's confirmation. The venia issue began to take on aspects of a major test of Ferreira's domination and leadership of the Blanco Party. Ferreira's response to the looming defections of Echegoyen and Heber was to seek a meeting of the Directorate of the Blanco Party designed to proclaim opposition to the venia as a "political issue". By Party statute, this would have made it obligatory for Blanco legislators to vote against Pacheco's confirmation. To the surprise and dismay of the Ferreira coalition, the Directorate split 7-7, with Party President Homero MURDOCH refusing to break the tie. An angered and wrathful Ferreira coalition thereupon called for a meeting of the full 600 member Party Convention to consider the issue. Obviously, Ferreira and his supporters, certain of their overwhelming position in the Convention, hoped to use this device as a means of whipping minority dissidents back into line.

3. The Convention

By the time the Convention met on April 19, however, several events had changed Ferreira's prospects. First,

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INFO: Amembassy BUENOS AIRES, CINCSO FOR POLAD

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

MAR 30 8 15 AM 1972

APR 3 1972

FROM : Amembassy MONTEVIDEO

RS DATE: March 22, 1972

ANALYSIS BRANCH

SUBJECT: The Colorado Party: Who's in Charge?

REF : Montevideo's A-40 of March 15, 1972

A current quip making the rounds in Montevideo is that PACHECO won the election, BORDABERRY the Presidency, and Jorge BATLLE the Government. This jest sums up the present situation in the Colorado Party which, in the early days of the Bordaberry Administration, is suffering from a serious lack of leadership at the Congressional level.

The Colorado Party emerged victorious in the November 1971 election by a very narrow margin. The largest Colorado faction, the pro-Pacheco National Reelection Union (UNR) polled nearly 380,000 votes and elected 7 Senators and 28 Deputies. The next largest faction, Jorge Batlle's List 15, trailed with slightly less than 250,000 votes and elected 5 Senators and 12 Deputies. The "Third Colorado Front" of Senator Amilcar VASCONCELLOS won only 57,000 votes and elected 1 Senator and 1 Deputy. While the UNR failed in its effort to reelect President Pacheco, it succeeded in electing his alternate, Juan Maria Bordaberry, as President. UNR leaders naturally expected to play a leading role in the new Bordaberry Administration. To their bitter disappointment, this has not happened.

In setting up his Administration, President Bordaberry has shown a high degree of independence and non-partisanship. Colorado List 15 was given four Ministries (Finance, Public Works, Education and Labor) while the UNR received only two (Transportation and Interior). The President offered Cabinet positions to the Blanco Party Directorate, but

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this offer was rejected. He then filled his remaining Cabinet posts with independent Colorados, one Blanco and a life-long Socialist (Dr. Puriell, Minister of Public Health). Presidential spokesmen have emphasized that this initial Bordaberry Cabinet is temporary and that they still hope to secure wider Blanco Party participation at a later date.

In sharp contrast to his predecessor, President Bordaberry is making a determined effort to secure Congressional approval for his Government's programs and policies. He continues to seek a modus vivendi with Blanco leader Senator FERREIRA Aldunate to secure passage of his most pressing legislative projects. Bordaberry or Vice President SAPELLI are reported to be in almost daily contact with Ferreira to whom Bordaberry has apparently given a limited veto over Government appointments. The first appointment vetoed by Ferreira was that of former Minister of Interior, retired Brig. Danielo SENA, (a favorite of UNR leaders) as Minister of Defense. This arrangement has caused considerable unhappiness among UNR politicians.

Basically, the UNR is a coalition of politicians who joined together to assure their own election by promoting the reelection of President Pacheco. The former President is their leader and commands their loyalty. They have no acknowledged leaders other than Pacheco. Many of them view President Bordaberry as a newcomer and something of an usurper who is in their debt. While UNR leaders tend to be from the conservative wing of the Colorado Party, they have no real political philosophy or program which binds them together.

These men are surprised and disappointed by the independence Bordaberry has shown since his inauguration. They deeply resent their lack of influence in the new Government and are disheartened by their failure to receive a substantial share of the spoils in the new Administration. Thus far, they have supported President Bordaberry in the Congress, but in private they are quite critical of him and of his new policies.

President Bordaberry has as yet been unwilling or unable to assert leadership of the UNR faction. One obstacle to his doing so is the continued presence of Pacheco in the country. Indeed, three weeks after Bordaberry's inauguration, Pacheco is still residing in the Presidential residence and shows every sign of remaining there until Congress confirms his appointment as Ambassador to Spain.

Disgruntled UNR politicians call on him regularly in attempts to induce him to pressure President Bordaberry on specific issues and policies. Before he left office, Pacheco indicated to the Ambassador that he would not interfere in the Bordaberry Administration. However, this may prove more difficult than Pacheco had anticipated as there are increasing indications that he shares the UNR politicians' reservations regarding several of Bordaberry's policies, particularly in the internal security field.

While Colorado List 15 members are in a strong position in the new Government, we have had several indications that Jorge Batlle is not entirely happy with the arrangement. Bordaberry offered key economic positions to List 15 members because he felt they were best qualified to handle this difficult area. We understand that several of them accepted their new positions without first consulting Batlle. Moreover, there are some indications that Batlle himself had hoped for a Cabinet position which apparently was never offered him. Nonetheless, presented with this fait accompli, Batlle acquiesced rather than risk a split in his faction which had already been sharply reduced by the voters in the November election. At this point, Batlle's position in the Colorado Party and within his own faction appears weaker than at any time in the past five years.

The Vasconcellos faction of the Colorado Party is considerably smaller than before the election, but remains as intransigent as ever. It has already voted against the Government on several key issues in the Congress concerning the "emergency security measures".

Thus, one of the Bordaberry Administration's most serious political problems at present appears to be the lack of unity and leadership among Colorado forces in the Congress. Vice President Jorge Sapelli has, to a certain extent, attempted to fill this void. However, his legislative inexperience is a noticeable, if only temporary, handicap. None of the UNR legislators have shown the disposition or ability to present and defend the Government's proposals in the Congress. List 15 has a number of skillful legislators who could fill this role, but any attempt on their part to do so would probably exacerbate existing hard feelings in the UNR.

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Page 4 of A-43
MONTEVIDEO

In contrast to the Colorados, the Blanco Party is relatively unified under the leadership of Ferreira Aldunate, a highly skilled parliamentarian and tactician who is fully capable of exploiting any weakness or division shown on the Colorado side. At the same time, the Government also faces the implacable opposition of the leftist Frente Amplio which will do its obstructive best to demonstrate the inability of the traditional parties to deal with the country's problems.

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TO : Department of State

INFO: Amembassies BUENOS AIRES, CINCSO for POLAD

MAR 16 1 57 PM 1972

DATE: March 15, 1972
ANALYSIS BRANCH

FROM : Amembassy MONTEVIDEO

SUBJECT: Post Election Blanco Attitudes

REF : Montevideo A-22

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

MAR 20 1972

Summary

The narrow victory of the Colorado Party in the November 1971 election left the considerably strengthened Blanco Party with three options for its relationship with the new Government: cooperation, opposition, or a combination of both. The very closeness of the election created strong pressures for a coalition Colorado/Blanco Government. President-elect BORDABERRY, with only minority Colorado support in the Congress, invited the Blancos to join in the formation of a "Government of national unity". His invitation was favorably received by the HEBER faction of the Blanco Party and, to a lesser extent, by the ECHEGOYEN faction. However, Blanco Senator Wilson FERREIRA Aldunate, who won two-thirds of the votes cast for the Blanco Party and out-pollled President Bordaberry by 60,000 votes, rejected the offer in favor of limited cooperation in Congress on an issue-by-issue basis. After a short-lived power struggle within the Party, Ferreira's position prevailed.

* * * * *

The Blanco Party emerged from the November 1971 election only 12,802 votes short of victory. It elected 12 Senators to the Colorados 13 and 40 Deputies to the Colorados 41. The balance of the Congressional seats - 5 Senators and 18

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Deputies - were won by the Marxist Frente Amplio coalition, which made clear it would offer implacable opposition to the new Administration. The narrowness of the Colorado victory created strong pressures for the Blancos to join in a "Government of National Unity" to tackle the serious problems facing the country and, in effect, freeze out the Frente Amplio from effective participation in the political process. It was generally argued that the slight Colorado edge indicated that what the voters really wanted was for the two traditional parties to get together. President-elect Bordaberry shared this view and publicly invited the Blancos to participate in the new Administration on virtually any terms they cared to name.

Bordaberry's offer was well received in some Blanco circles. Alberto Heber, leader of the Heber faction and Vice Presidential running mate of retired General Mario AGUERRONDO, publicly urged the Party to accept the offer. Heber had two reasons for doing so: first, he had advocated a "National Government" in the course of his campaign and second, because his own election bid for the Senate had failed, he saw participation in the Government as a means of maintaining his political visibility. Heber's views were shared, to a lesser extent, by members of Senator Martin Echegoyen's "Alliance" faction of the Party which had also suffered a setback in the November election.

The key to the Blanco position was Senator Wilson Ferreira Aldunate who had received roughly two-thirds of the Blanco vote and elected a proportionate number of legislators. With Ferreira, a National Government would work; without him, it could not even be formed. Within the Ferreira camp, there were conflicting views on the position the Party should adopt. Some Ferreira supporters, including Senator Washington BELTRAN, favored participation in the Government while others, including Senators VAZ and ZABALZA and virtually all the militant Ferreira youth movement, advocated strong opposition to the new Government. The latter group felt that they had been defrauded of victory in the election and hoped to precipitate a political crisis as soon as possible. Ferreira eventually decided to reject the offer of direct participation in the Government and adopt a position of ad hoc support in Congress, while reserving the right to oppose specific Government proposals.

For several weeks, it appeared that the Blanco Party might split on the issue of participation with Heber and perhaps

Echegoyen entering into direct collaboration with the Bordaberry Administration while Ferreira remained on the outside. However, the emotional pull of "Blanco unity" and the strength of Ferreira's position within the Party (Heber and Echegoyen lacked enough votes to give the Government a working majority) eventually resulted in Ferreira's position prevailing.

The test of Ferreira's intra-party strength was expected to come at the Blanco Party Congress held on March 11 to elect a new Party Directorate which would reflect the performance of the various factions in the election. Since two-thirds of the delegates were pledged to Ferreira, there was little doubt that he could dominate the Congress if he chose. However, several weeks before the Congress, Alberto Heber and followers of Blanco leader Alberto GALLINAL let it be known that they were considering constituting a rump directorate, independent of Ferreira. Ferreira met this challenge by first offering the Presidency of the Directorate to Senator Martin Echegoyen, who declined but indicated he would participate in the Congress, and second, by offering the Echegoyen and Heber forces proportionately greater representation on the new Directorate than their November vote warranted. By the time the Congress was held, Ferreira had reached an agreement whereby the 15-man Party Directorate would be composed of eight members who had backed his election, three each from the Echegoyen and Heber factions, and a "neutral" Party President. The man chosen for the Directorate Presidency was retired Naval Captain Homero MURDOCH, a long-time Blanco who was acceptable to all Party factions. (See Enclosure No. 1 for a complete list of the new Party Directorate). By giving up several seats on the Party Directorate, Ferreira was able to maintain the appearance of Party unity without seriously endangering his pre-eminence in the Party.

Concurrent with his maneuvers to maintain Blanco unity, Ferreira had several meetings with President Bordaberry and Vice President Sapelli to work out a form of limited cooperation. We understand he told Bordaberry he would support Government proposals in the Congress which would contribute to the solution of the economic and security problems plaguing the country. However, he would not give the Government a blank check but would amend and, in some cases, oppose legislation. He also indicated that he would support most of the Government's nominees for the

Directorships of the various autonomous state-owned enterprises. He reportedly promised Bordaberry a period of six months' cooperation along these lines. After this term, he would consider himself free to present a more active opposition to the Government. In return, Ferreira asked for, and apparently received, limited veto power over Government appointees. Thus far, he has used this to block Blanco candidates for ministry positions and the nomination of former Minister of Interior, retired Brig. Daniel SENA, as Minister of Defense. Some Blanco leaders, particularly in the Echegoyen and Heber factions, hope Ferreira will be more forthcoming in permitting Blanco participation on the new boards of the autonomous enterprises yet to be named.

Ferreira and his supporters argue that a vigorous but constructive Blanco opposition to the Government is needed to provide dissatisfied voters with a democratic alternative to the Frente Amplio. They are not optimistic that the Bordaberry Government will be able to solve the country's problems and believe their role must be one of "the loyal opposition". Ferreira will apparently seek an independent role somewhere between the expected conservative policies of the Bordaberry Administration and the radical opposition of the Frente Amplio.

In pursuing this strategy, the Blancos know that they can count upon the support of the Frente Amplio whenever they oppose the Government and probably expect the support of the Colorados when they support the Administration. In the first test of this strategy, it worked very well. The Blancos were able partially to lift several executive-decreed "emergency security measures" with the votes of the Frente Amplio, but heeded the Government's request to retain a number of these measures over the opposition of the Frente. However, even the most staunchly anti-Government Blancos recognize the hazard of this course: the possibility that too adamant an opposition will cause them to be lumped together with the Frente Amplio in the public mind. This possibly could seriously undercut Blanco support among the more conservative interior voters who account for over two-thirds of the Party's votes.

For the next few months, we expect Ferreira and the Blanco Party to continue a constructive but critical cooperation with the Bordaberry Administration. A key test of how far he believes he can go with the Government will occur in the next few weeks during congressional consideration

of the Administration's proposed new "National Security Law", designed to strengthen the GOU's anti-terrorist campaign. During this time, Ferreira will attempt to consolidate his control of the Party. He will also attempt to begin publication of a new newspaper to present his views and to organize the youth volunteers who participated in his campaign into a permanent, cohesive force to compete with the Frente youth organizations in the secondary schools and university faculties. It is possible that Blanco legislators may interpellate one or more of the new cabinet ministers to dramatize the sorry condition in which former President Pacheco left the country.

In the longer term, several Blanco legislators and many of the Ferreira youth are talking in terms of forcing new Congressional elections within a year or so. They reason that such elections would greatly strengthen Ferreira at the expense of the Frente Amplio. If that thesis is correct, and it may well be, it would also follow that Ferreira and Bordaberry would both draw votes away from the Heber and Echegoyen factions of the Blanco Party and the Batlle and Vasconcellos factions of the Colorado Party. For that reason, we would expect the Frente Amplio and the smaller factions of the traditional parties to oppose any such move on Ferreira's part.

At the present time, Blancos in general and Ferreira in particular appear to be enjoying greatly their position as the arbiters of Uruguayan politics. How long they can maintain this role will depend both on their own political skill and that of President Bordaberry. With only two weeks in office, it is clearly too soon to assess Bordaberry's political abilities. Nonetheless, he has in this brief period shown an adeptness, flexibility and independence which has surprised most political observers. If he can continue in this manner, he may well be able to seize the initiative away from the Blancos and Ferreira Aldunate.

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BLANCO PARTY DIRECTORATE

1. Retired Captain Homero MURDOCH - Blanco Independent
2. Senator Walter SANTORO - Por la Patria Faction (Ferreira Aldunate)
3. Alberto HEBER Usher - Heber Faction
4. Ramiro LLANO - Rocha Movement (Ferreira Aldunate)
5. Dr. Juan E. PIVEL Devoto - Por la Patria Faction (Ferreira Aldunate)
6. Deputy Bari GONZALEZ - Alliance Faction (Echegoyen)
7. Diego SARAIVIA - Alliance Faction (Echegoyen)
8. Deputy Carlos RODRIGUEZ Labruna - Rocha Movement (Ferreira Aldunate)
9. Deputy Guillermo GARCIA Costa - Por la Patria (Ferreira Aldunate)
10. Senator Alejandro ZORRILLA de San Martin - Heber Faction
11. Dr. Nicolas STORACE Arrosa - Beltran Faction (Ferreira Aldunate)
12. Senator Mario HEBER Usher - Heber Faction
13. Jose Miguel OTEGUI - Por la Patria (Ferreira Aldunate)
14. Senator Pedro ZABALZA - Por la Patria (Ferreira Aldunate)
15. Deputy Ricardo PLANCHON - Alliance Faction (Echegoyen)

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ARMY CIA NAVY

OSO USIA NSA

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FEB 25 8 33 AM 1972

FROM : Amembassy MONTEVIDEO

DATE: February 23, 1972

SUBJECT: 1971 Uruguayan Election Wrap-up

REF :

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

FEB 29 1972

Summary: A coalition of parties of the Left formed the Frente Amplio in early 1971 to challenge the traditional Blanco and Colorado Parties. The Uruguayan election of November 1971 was billed by many observers as the first test of whether the victory of the Unidad Popular in Chile represented a trend in Latin American politics or an isolated case. The Uruguayan Left, united for the first time, hoped to capitalize on the social and political unrest of the past five years. Many expected it to win significant support particularly in Montevideo. After an intensive and amply-financed ten-month campaign, the Frente Amplio finished an overall poor third to the traditional parties. However, it did increase its proportion of the electorate from 14% in 1966 to 18% in 1971 and appears to be established as a viable political force. The traditional Colorado and Blanco parties, which split the remaining vote so closely that the final outcome was not known until February, demonstrated continued vitality. However, the very closeness of the race between them raises the question of whether the new Administration will be able to muster enough political support to govern effectively. This paper examines some of the unique characteristics of the Uruguayan political system and presents a roughly chronological account of the 1971 electoral campaign.

Background: Since independence, Uruguayan politics have been dominated by the Blanco and Colorado Parties. The Colorados governed the country for 93 consecutive years until being

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

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Page 2 of A-22
MONTEVIDEO

turned out by the Blancos in the 1958 election. In the 1930's, the traditional parties introduced the ley de lemas, a complex system of voting which permits parties which have won Congressional representation in the preceding national election to run several lists of Presidential and Congressional candidates and count the votes of all factions toward the overall party total. One effect of this law has been to encourage dissidents to stay within the traditional parties. Over the years, the few Blanco or Colorado politicians who left their parties to strike out on their own fared poorly, and it became generally accepted that the voters' strongest loyalty was to traditional political organizations. This record has led many Uruguayans to conclude that the ley de lemas has enabled Uruguayan democracy to develop free of the proliferation of smaller parties which has hindered democratic development in other countries.

The Blanco Party victory in 1958 coincided with a long downturn in Uruguay's economy. The Blancos were re-elected by a narrow margin in 1962, but the nation's economic decline continued and they were roundly defeated by the Colorados in 1966 when retired General Oscar GESTIDO and Jorge PACHECO ARECO were elected President and Vice President. President Gestido died in November 1967 and Pacheco Areco replaced him.

When he assumed office, Pacheco pledged his strong support for the austerity program announced by Gestido shortly before his death. Pacheco met this pledge with determination until early 1971. In the 1968-70 period, the burden of austerity policies fell most heavily on the middle and lower classes. Deflation brought severe reactions from the most articulate segments of society - intellectuals and students - and from the best organized - the well disciplined Moscow-line Communist Party (PCU) and its CNT labor confederation. To this, starting in early 1969, was added the emergence of the MLN/Tupamaro terrorist organization as a major threat to internal security. The Pacheco Administration met these disturbances and violence with a series of "Emergency Security Measures" which included press censorship and the suspension of constitutional rights and judicial procedures. The prolonged reliance on these special powers resulted in a series of running battles between the President and a hostile Congress which further aggravated the situation.

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Page 3 of A-22
MONTEVIDEO

Formation of the "Frente Amplio"

For many years, the PCU had attempted unsuccessfully to form a "Popular Front" with leftist groups from the traditional parties. In 1962 it succeeded in attracting several small breakaway groups into a new "Leftist Liberation Front" (FIDEL) and increased its vote from 27,000 in 1958 to 40,000 in 1962, and nearly 70,000 in 1966. However, despite these electoral gains, FIDEL was clearly the creature of the Communist Party and was accordingly viewed with suspicion by the non-Communist left.

In late 1970, encouraged by the history of Salvador Allende's Unidad Popular in Chile, the Uruguayan Left formed a similar coalition to challenge the traditional parties. In October 1970, a group of leftist intellectuals issued a call for the formation of a united left to include Communists, Christian Democrats (PDC), Socialists, and "progressive" members of the two traditional parties. PDC leader Juan Pablo TERRA and leftist Colorado Senator Zelmar MICHELINI agreed and formed an electoral alliance called the "People's Front" in early 1971. They then entered negotiations with the PCU and others which led to the formation of the Frente Amplio on February 5, 1971.

At its founding, the Frente included the PCU, the Socialist Party, the PDC, Michelini's Colorado List 99 faction and Blanco Senator Francesco RODRIGUEZ Camusso's small "Blanco Progressive Movement". It represented about 14% of the votes cast in the 1966 election or nearly 170,000 votes. A February Gallup poll showed the Frente tied with the Colorados in Montevideo with 29% of the vote and the Blancos trailing with only 20%. Senator Alba ROBALLO announced her decision to lead her "Pregon" group out of the Colorado Party and join the Frente Amplio in March.

Meanwhile, the coalition set about organizing itself. On February 17, the Frente issued a "Programatic Base" or platform cast in reformist rather than revolutionary language. It proposed general solutions for the country's problems, and was studiously non-Marxist. From the first, all leaders stressed that the Frente would include "Marxists and non-Marxists, believers and non-believers". On March 26, the Frente held its first public rally to announce its candidates for President, Vice President and Mayor of Montevideo. It chose non-political figures: Retired Army

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Page 4 of A-22
MONTEVIDEO

General Liber SEREGNI, 55, headed the Presidential ticket, with Dr. Juan CROTTIGINI, a well-known gynecologist, as his running mate. Dr. Hugo VILLAR, head of the University's Hospital de Clinicas, was picked as the Frente's candidate for Mayor of Montevideo. The rally was preceded by a vigorous publicity campaign which attracted an impressive turnout of 50,000 persons and marked the beginning of the Frente's campaign.

The Frente Amplio received pledges of support from virtually every leftist organization in the country, including the MLN/Tupamaro terrorist group which nonetheless made clear its reservations on the utility of the "peaceful path to power". Frente politicians stressed the anti-imperialist nature of their coalition and their total opposition to President Pacheco. From March forward, the publicity campaign undertaken by the Frente Amplio on radio, television and with wall posters was voluminous. Ample funds were apparently available. In March and April, General Seregni and other coalition leaders traveled extensively throughout the interior of the country attempting to broaden the coalition's narrow base there. However, their reception was cool and their expectations of greatly increasing the approximately 8% of the interior vote received by Frente groups in the previous election were slight.

The major organizational effort of the Frente Amplio from April through June was the establishment of "Base Committees", formed on neighborhood, occupational and even ethnic and religious lines. The purpose of these Committees was to attract independent or previously uncommitted voters into the overall Frente Amplio organization without forcing them into direct affiliation with its ideologically-oriented components. Initially, the task of the Committees was to awaken the "political consciousness" of their recruits. Later, Base Committee militants were mobilized for Frente propaganda activity, rallies, etc. It appeared that the Base Committees succeeded in bringing large numbers of new activists into the Frente Amplio, particularly from among Montevideo youth.

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Page 5 of A-22
MONTEVIDEO

Candidates

By late May, six months before the election, the major candidates and their campaign strategies had become fairly clear, even though the traditional parties had not formally initiated their campaigns. The major candidates broke down as follows:

Frente Amplio: The Frente candidate, General Liber SEREGNI, had retired from the Army in 1968, ostensibly in protest of President Pacheco's tough economic and security measures. As is common with senior Uruguayan military officers, his political affiliation (Colorado) was well known. After his resignation, he actively sought support for his presidential ambitions from the more liberal leaders of the Colorado Party, but with no success. While Senator Zelmar Michelini reacted favorably, Senator Amilcar VASCONCELLOS and other liberal Colorados considered Seregni politically naive. In their judgment, he lacked the personal following, voter recognition, and political experience required of a successful candidate. Therefore, when he was offered the top spot on the Frente Amplio ticket, he quickly agreed. During the campaign, he proved an acceptable, but not outstanding, public speaker who stuck carefully to the guidelines agreed upon by coalition leaders. He projected the image of an intelligent, serious and somewhat cold personality who was slightly uncomfortable in his role as a leader of the masses.

Colorado Party: The formation of a National Reelection Union (UNR) in 1970 to seek a constitutional amendment to permit the reelection of President Pacheco made him the front running candidate in the Colorado Party. While most UNR politicians recognized that the amendment would face great difficulty in obtaining the roughly 800,000 votes needed for voter approval, they hoped to capitalize on Pacheco's popularity to elect an alternate pachequista candidate and a slate of pro-Pacheco senators and deputies. Opinion polls had consistently shown the public regarded Pacheco as the leading Colorado politician. By accepting the reelection campaign, he assured himself of continued political influence and the right to select his heir within the Party. Who this heir would be remained a subject of constant speculation until the surprise choice of Minister of Agriculture Juan Maria BORDABERRY in late October.

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Page 6 of A- 22
MONTEVIDEO

The second strong contender in the Colorado Party was Dr. Jorge BATLLE, 44, son of a former President and leader of the Party's powerful List 15 faction. Batlle had been a presidential candidate in the 1966 election, running a close second to the Gestido-Pacheco ticket. Young, intelligent, and articulate, Batlle headed the Party's best organized political machine. However, he was handicapped by charges of infidencia, rumors that he had used inside knowledge to profit personally from the April 1968 devaluation. When this charge was first made shortly after the devaluation, Batlle chose not to answer it, believing it would blow over with the passage of time. It did not.

The third major Colorado Party candidate was Senator Amilcar Vasconcellos, 56, a "dissident" Colorado and out-spoken critic of the Pacheco Administration. A former member of the National Council of Government and close associate of former President Luis Batlle, Vasconcellos formed a "Third Colorado Front" as a more liberal alternative to the UNR and List 15 within the Colorado Party. He sought the support of other liberal Colorado politicians and reached agreement with Senator Manuel FLORES Mora who became his running mate.

Blanco Party: The first declared Blanco candidate was Senator Wilson FERREIRA Aldunate who formed a ticket with Rocha Movement leader Senator Carlos Julio PEREYRA in early April. Ferreira, 52, a former Minister of Agriculture and large landholder, had built a reputation as the Senate's foremost proponent of honesty in Government by forcing the resignations of several cabinet ministers after successful congressional censure actions in which he exposed questionable or corrupt practices. Intelligent, an outstanding debater and shrewd politician, Ferreira had formed his own, small, Por la Patria faction in 1969 to support his presidential ambitions. He was a vigorous campaigner, who transformed his personal magnetism into genuine charisma.

After unsuccessful efforts to persuade the respected former leader of the Rocha Movement, Alberto GALLINAL, to enter the presidential race, Blanco faction leaders Senator Martin ECHEGOYEN and Alberto HEBER agreed on a second Blanco ticket headed by retired Army General Mario AGUERRONDO, 61, with Heber in the Vice Presidential slot. Aguerrondo, a former

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Page 7 of A-22
MONTEVIDEO

Montevideo Chief of Police, had an outstanding reputation for personal integrity and a good record on law and order issues. A man of distinguished appearance, he proved a somewhat ineffective candidate, particularly on television where he gave the impression of a wooden man reading a script.

URC: A group of breakaway Christian Democrats, who objected to the PDC's entering into the Frente Amplio coalition with the PCU, founded the Union Radical Cristiana (URC) to provide an alternative for PDC members who felt as they did. Presidential candidate of the new party was former National Deputy Daniel PEREZ del Castillo. PDC Deputy Hugo CIGANDA disaffiliated from the PDC to join the URC as its leading candidate for the Chamber of Deputies. The URC's goal was to deny the Frente Amplio as many as 20-25,000 votes.

Campaign Strategies

Frente Amplio: The first task of the Frente Amplio was to convince the voters that it offered a serious alternative to the traditional parties. It also had to establish the bona fides of its little-known candidate, General Seregni. The period from February to June was devoted to these tasks. Efforts to publicize the Frente Amplio as a new political force with original solutions to the country's problems were largely successful. Efforts to picture the traditional parties as moribund were less so. While the traditional parties were inactive, the Frente Amplio got off to a fast start. Having achieved momentum, the Frente's problem was to maintain it once the traditional parties began to campaign in earnest. It sought to do so by implacable opposition to the Government in the Congress and by agitation and "education" in its Base Committees and in the trade unions composing the CNT labor confederation. It also sought high visibility throughout the country. Its expenditures on posters and other propaganda in the interior, for example, far exceeded its expectations of votes from that area. In Montevideo, young Frente militants were mobilized regularly for a series of well-organized, innovative rallies. Frente leaders recognized that they had little chance of winning nationwide, but they had a good chance of winning Montevideo and establishing a beachhead for the 1976 election.

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Page 8 of A-22
MONTEVIDEO

Colorados: Reelection forces knew their strongest asset was President Pacheco and their campaign was designed to take the maximum advantage of his popularity. They ignored the probability that the reelection amendment would not pass and campaigned as though approval were assured. The naming of an alternate candidate was treated as a technical arrangement to meet legal requirements. UNR leaders believed they benefitted from the polarized social situation and sought to maintain it. As elections approached, the Government assumed increasingly tough positions in its dealings with congressional criticism, secondary school disturbances and unauthorized labor demonstrations. Because the President was prohibited by law from campaigning, reelection propaganda stressed that "his work speaks for him". Pacheco was pictured as a lonely but dedicated leader who devoted all his energies to combatting subversion and fighting inflation. Government agencies took full-page advertisements in the press extolling their accomplishments during the previous four years and the Government abandoned its deflationary policies temporarily to increase wages and create public employment. The inflation rate rose from 20.9% in 1970 to 39.5 by the end of 1971. In the final months of the campaign, the Government subsidized the state-owned slaughter house to assure Montevideo an abundant supply of cheap, high-quality meat. Reelection forces also sponsored a series of highly effective anti-Communist "scare" advertisements, featuring scenes of Soviet tanks in Eastern European cities, the Berlin Wall, etc. It was suggested that only Pacheco could prevent the same from occurring in Uruguay: "Pacheco or chaos" was the theme.

In addition to dealing with the infidencia charge, Jorge Batlle had the problem of differentiating his own campaign from that of President Pacheco whom he had supported in the Congress and the Cabinet for the previous four years. Batlle suffered because Pacheco received credit for the successes of his Administration while he, Batlle, shared in the blame for its failures. He attempted to handle this problem by praising Pacheco as a leader, stating he opposed the reelection amendment "on principal" and concentrating his discussions on moderate proposals to deal with the country's problems in the future. He avoided criticism of the President because he hoped to pick up some of the reelection vote in the balloting for the

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Page 9 of A-22
MONTEVIDEO

Constitution in force. He promised the voters a "government of national unity" which would include members of the Blanco Party and strongly attacked the Frente Amplio as a creature of the Communist Party.

Senator Vasconcellos and his running mate, Senator Flores Mora campaigned heavily against the "Communist-dominated" Frente Amplio and against President Pacheco who, they claimed, had betrayed the liberal traditions of the Colorado Party and delivered the Government into the hands of big business interests. They walked picket on the left wing of the Colorado Party to prevent defections to the Frente Amplio. They offered traditional batllista solutions of increased state intervention in the economy as the answer to nearly all the country's ills.

Blancos: Ferreira Aldunate's strategy was to stake out the middle ground between the opposing poles of the Frente Amplio and the Pacheco Administration. He criticized both strongly: the Frente as a "political conglomerate" of losers under the influence of the Communist Party, and the Pacheco Government for financial scandals, disregard of the Constitution, and ineptness in dealing with the terrorist problem. Ferreira offered a reformist platform somewhat left of center and strove for the image of a populist leader. He proclaimed a positive nationalism which stressed the need for Uruguay to solve its own problems and get the country moving forward again. His most effective campaign themes were "to change the country in peace" and, toward the end of the campaign, "Wilson is Winning" which added a bandwagon effect to his campaign.

The Aguerrondo campaign was designed to present a conservative Blanco alternative to President Pacheco. It was pitched, primarily, at traditional Blanco voters in the interior who, it was feared, might be leaning toward President Pacheco. Aguerrondo's campaign had strong organizational support from all three Blanco Presidential candidates in the 1966 election. The campaign stressed Aguerrondo's personal integrity and his law and order credentials.

The Issues

By mid-year, the issues on which the campaign would be fought were also clear. The most important single issue was the restoration of peace to the country. Pacheco forces

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argued that only the "hard-line" law and order policies of the President could eventually end the growing disorders in the country. They supported continued use of the emergency security powers and an uncompromising refusal to deal with the terrorists. As they defined the word "terrorist", it often seemed to include all members of the Frente Amplio. The Frente argued that only it could bring peace to the country; that a just social revolution would remove the causes of violence and that the emergency security measures must be terminated and "political prisoners" released. On the Blanco side, Ferreira Aldunate argued for the lifting of the emergency security measures because of their arbitrary application against the general public and promised more effective implementation of existing laws. He maintained that the terrorist problem could be contained by restoring the faith of the people in the honesty and ability of their Government. General Aguerrondo on the other hand, advocated a "hard-line" on terrorists which sounded similar to the Pacheco Government's measures.

A second important issue was the "Communist threat" which all other parties and factions used against the Frente Amplio. It was highly effective, as Frente groups never succeeded in refuting the charge of their domination by the Moscow-line PCU.

A third issue was the management of the economy. Pacheco forces cited the Government's success in reducing the disastrous inflation rates of earlier years. They claimed that Pacheco had turned around the country and placed it on the road to economic recovery. Jorge Batlle agreed that much had been accomplished between 1968 and 1970 but added that mismanagement in 1971 had squandered the gains of the earlier years. Ferreira and Vasconcellos/Flores Mora maintained that the Pacheco Administration had delivered the economy into the hands of powerful banking and economic interests. They pointed to the number of high government officials who had been forced to resign for compromising or dishonest practices. They also stressed the shortages of consumer goods, including food stuffs, which plagued the economy during the winter months prior to the election. The Frente Amplio was uniformly critical of the Pacheco Administration's management of the economy and promised a simplistic series of solutions designed to placate virtually every voter group but the "oligarchy".

A final "issue" was the personalities of the candidates. Uruguayans have historically shown a penchant for personalistic political leadership. As the campaign progressed, Pacheco and Ferreira came across as the most clearly defined per-

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Page 11 of A-22
MONTEVIDEO

sonalities; Pacheco as a strong, uncompromising, dedicated and very macho leader; Ferreira as principled, capable, courageous and decisive, if somewhat impetuous. Both men, of course, also provoked strong negative reactions outside the ranks of their supporters: Pacheco as dictatorial, and Ferreira as recklessly ambitious. A private opinion poll showed that many voters regarded Jorge Batlle as the most intelligent and best prepared candidate, but questioned his personal honesty and courage. Generals Aguerrondo and Seregni did not project strong personal images.

Pre-Election Violence and the Frente Amplio:

Violence has become endemic in Uruguay in the past two years. Initially, it was limited to acts of the MLN/Tupamaros. In October 1970, the first bombs were thrown at the neighborhood political clubs of pro-Government forces and by the end of 1970 such attacks had become a regular occurrence. About that time counter-violence directed at sympathizers of the MLN and the Frente Amplio began to appear. By May 1971, counter-terrorists were regularly bombing Frente political clubs in roughly the same proportion as bombs against pro-Government clubs. The pro-Government press laid the responsibility for this violence at the door of the Frente. The Frente, in turn, blamed the violence against it on the Government, accusing the Pacheco Administration of employing "repression" and "fascist tactics". The issue was complicated when President Pacheco called in the Soviet Ambassador, "...in connection with terrorists attacks on politicians and political institutions".

Violence intensified in the secondary schools where the rightist JUP youth organization began to resist the domination of leftist, pro-Frente students by employing their same rough tactics. By the end of May, about half of the public secondary schools in Montevideo were periodically being closed for periods of oneday to several weeks as students fought out their battles in the halls and classrooms.

In July, the Frente Amplio supported Blanco efforts in the Congress to lift these Presidential emergency security decrees affecting political rights. The motion passed July 14. The following day, President Pacheco reimposed all security measures. The Blancos started impeachment proceedings. The Frente's leadership adopted a similar course and on July 20, the Communist-controlled CNT labor confederation led a general strike in Montevideo to support

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Page 12 of A-22
MONTEVIDEO

the Frente's position. The city was shut down by the first general strike in recent years called solely for political reasons. On July 24, a 16-year old vocational student was killed by gunfire in a confused incident in which police were attempting to control a student demonstration. The Frente supported the students' questionable charge that the boy had been shot by police and, backed by the CNT, turned the boy's funeral into a massive anti-Government demonstration. This incident was followed by several days of extreme tension during which rumors of additional strikes and demonstrations spread like wildfire. Public apprehension reached such a point that the CNT felt obliged to issue an official denial that it was planning further strikes, claiming that such "malicious rumors" were being spread by the Government.

In retrospect, it appears the Frente Amplio's early, strong support for student demonstrators and its association with CNT general strikes were serious tactical errors. They clearly identified the Frente with student and labor unrest and frightened the majority of the public. The Frente leadership seems to have realized this, and subsequently refrained from employing such intimidating tactics.

The Frente Amplio's identification with violence was furthered by its refusal to condemn the Tupamaro terrorists or reject their support. In a television interview, General Seregni described the terrorists as "socio-political offenders" and promised them and other "political prisoners" amnesty if elected. The Frente also accepted the support of the "26th of March Movement of Independents" in organizing Base Committees and gave the movement a voice in the coalition directorate. This also, in retrospect, appears to have been a mistake, for the "26th of March" movement made no effort to conceal the fact that it was a political front for the Tupamaros.

Campaign Highlights: August-October

The campaign began in earnest on August 18 when Ferreira Aldunate began his Montevideo campaign with a rally in a working class district of the city. It was well publicized, well organized, and well attended. It was the first venture in Montevideo by a candidate of either traditional party and marked the end of the Frente Amplio's monopoly on political activities in the nation's capital.

CONFIDENTIAL

Authority NND 969045

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POL 14 UR

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 13 of A-22
MONTEVIDEO

On August 25 (Independence Day), Frente supporters undertook a nationwide "voter canvass" and announced the details of the Frente's "First Thirty Measures". More than 10,000 party workers were involved in a door-to-door canvass of Montevideo. The bulk of these were younger people who, despite courteous approaches to the public, appear to have frightened more people than they convinced.

On September 6, 106 Tupamaros escaped from Punta Carretas prison in what first appeared to be a major blow to the "law and order" image of the President. Within two weeks, however, it was clear that the escape had actually strengthened the President politically. The accepted explanation of this phenomenon was that the escape was so massive a blow that it had stunned the public in much the same way as a natural disaster. The MLN apparently realized this too, and suspended further major violence until after the election.

In mid-September, Ferreira released his own "Program of Government" at a large Montevideo rally. In pamphlet form, this platform was more specific and moderate than that of the Frente Amplio, while at the same time calling for land reform, nationalization of the banks, increased investment in public works and public housing, and offering detailed proposals on a number of other issues. It compared favorably to the Frente's proposals which Ferreira derided as, "not a program but a series of slogans".

In early October, a National Convention of Colorado List 15 leaders formally proclaimed Jorge Batlle and Renán RODRIGUEZ as candidates for the Presidency and Vice Presidency. Batlle then launched a carefully orchestrated program planned for him by a Buenos Aires advertising agency. It was slick but never really came across as a political campaign. Among other faults, it adopted the daisy as the List 15 symbol which struck many voters as ridiculous. Batlle felt secure of his strength in the interior and concentrated most of his campaign effort in Montevideo where he staged a weekly television question-and-answer show in which viewers could phone questions to him. For the first time, he specifically answered questions about the infidencia charge. He handled initial questions well and was convincing. However, follow-up questions continued to indicate considerable misunderstanding of his motives and actions at the time of the 1968 devaluation and he was never able to completely put the issue to rest.

Authority NND 969045

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POL 14 UR

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Page 14 of A-22
MONTEVIDEO

The increased activity of the traditional parties was reflected in voter preferences as the September Gallup poll showed a slight drop in Frente support in Montevideo and gave the Colorados a slight lead. However, the undecided vote shown by Gallup continued to run at extremely high levels - approximately 36% or double the level at the same point in the 1966 campaign.

An initial series of visits to interior cities by Embassy officers at this time confirmed that the traditional parties remained very strong there and that the Frente Amplio had not had a significant impact. Economic and local issues dominated the interior campaigns in which Blancos appeared to have a clear lead over the Colorados. By mid-October, it seemed that a close national race between the two traditional parties was in the making.

Bordaberry Selected as Pacheco Alternate

On October 7, Minister of Agriculture Juan Maria BORDABERRY announced that President Pacheco had invited him to be the Vice Presidential candidate on the "reelection" slate. Bordaberry, 43, had headed the Agricultural Ministry for two years, and, in the mid-1960's, had served several years as a senator for the "Ruralist" faction of the Blanco Party. Bordaberry's nomination was seen as a tactic to draw old ruralista voters away from the Blancos. It touched off a wave of speculation as to whom Pacheco would choose as the alternate candidate for the constitutional system in force should the amendment fail. This speculation continued until October 22 when President Pacheco chose Bordaberry as his alternate presidential candidate and Labor Minister Jorge SAPELLI as the alternate for Vice President.

Pacheco's choice caught even his closest political advisors by surprise. Vice President Alberto ABDALA, who confidently had been expecting the nod, bitterly denounced Bordaberry's selection and claimed he had been "defrauded". Presidential staff members Hector GIORGI and Mario RENNA presented their resignations. In the week following the President's announcement, Budget and Planning Director Achilles LANZA, Transportation Minister Carlos QUERALTO and Education Minister Pedro CERSOSIMO also resigned. While their personal pique was undoubtedly a factor, the principal reason given by these men was their objection to an ex-Blanco heading the Colorado ticket. Many Colorado politicians felt Bordaberry would hurt the ticket in the interior where Government agricultural policies had resulted in a near

Authority NND 969045

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIALPage 15 of A-22
MONTEVIDEO

Bordaberry's participation in the campaign was limited, and when he did make a public appearance, he stressed that it was in his role as candidate for Vice President.

The Final Month

The final month of the campaign brought forth a burst of political activity and propaganda which overshadowed all other activities in the nation. All parties, factions and sub-factions had their own advertising and it was common for radio stations to broadcast several minutes of continuous political spots. Frente Amplio militants painted so many trees, lamp posts and other stationary objects with the Frente colors (red, blue and white) that it was rumored the local paint manufacturer had run out of pigment. Banners appeared on apartment balconies, posters covered walls, bumper stickers blossomed, streets were painted with list numbers, and sound trucks circulated day and night through residential areas blasting political messages. Traffic in Montevideo was hopelessly snarled on weekends by youths who stopped autos and busses to distribute copies of programs, plans and ballots. There was no way anyone in Uruguay possessed of either sight or hearing could be unaware of the upcoming election and its candidates.

The Pacheco/Bordaberry forces pulled out all stops in their advertising campaign and bombarded Montevideo with scare propaganda. As mentioned earlier, Bordaberry's public appearances were few, and when he did appear, his statements were limited to praising the accomplishments of the Pacheco Administration and denying that serious social or economic problems existed. Jorge Batlle continued to focus on Montevideo and his weekly television program. Senators Vasconcellos and Flores Mora continued to stress their credentials as old-line batllistas and attacked Bordaberry as a "johnny-come-lately" to the Colorado Party.

Ferreira Aldunate spent most of the final month of the campaign on a grueling swing through the interior with his "Victory Caravan". He re-visited every interior department, making six or more stops per day. Ferreira's reception was tumultuous in most communities. As his campaign gained momentum, it began to attract large numbers of youth workers. In the final weeks, young Ferreira supporters organized rallies and debates in University faculties and secondary schools. They provided the only direct competition to the Frente Amplio in these areas, and by the end of the campaign, it appeared that Ferreira's youth support in Montevideo approached that of the Frente.

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Authority NND 969045

CONFIDENTIALPage 16 of A-22
MONTEVIDEO

With a week to go, a member of the Ferreira campaign staff told an Embassy officer they were convinced they were within 20,000 votes of victory. Aguerrondo likewise spent the final month of the campaign travelling in the interior. He was well received, but did not generate the spontaneous enthusiasm characteristic of the Ferreira rallies.

General Seregni also made a swing through the interior in November. However, his reception varied from lukewarm to hostile. On November 7th, an eleven-year old child was fatally wounded by gunfire when the Frente caravan was leaving a small town under a barrage of stones. Later that evening, in the city of Rocha, Seregni received a slight scratch on the chest when he was attacked by a knife-wielding drunk. In a nationwide radio and TV address November 8th, Seregni alleged U. S. and Brazilian "advisors" were linked to the attacks on him and the Frente Amplio. From that point forward, the Frente press sharply stepped up its attacks on Embassy personnel and alleged direct U. S. intervention in the election. The PCU's daily, El Popular, regularly reprinted charges by Party First Secretary ARISMENDI that thirteen current and former Embassy officials were "CIA agents camouflaged as diplomats". The Frente apparently felt that the best way to deal with the charge of the traditional parties that it was Communist-dominated was to counter-charge that its opposition was directed and coordinated by the U. S. and Brazilian Governments.

The Final Week

The final week of the campaign opened with a nationwide radio-TV address by President Pacheco on November 22. In his only direct intervention in the campaign, the President emphasized that the voters must choose between traditional Uruguayan democracy and "foreign activities....directed from other lands". Pacheco claimed that he had "contained the forces of destruction". He said the struggle was between "the enemies of the country and its defenders". He urged the public to reject those who had "shot in the back" a foreign citizen (Dan Mitrione). It was an effective, emotional appeal. It was followed by a half hour interview with alternate candidate Bordaberry who also attempted to project an image which was strong on law and order, but who suffered from comparison with Pacheco.

On November 23, both Jorge Batlle and Senator Vasconcellos held their final rallies in downtown Montevideo. Both events were publicized well in advance, with Batlle's List 15 making an especially strong effort to assure a good turnout. Embassy officers estimated the size of the Batlle crowd at 12,000 persons - larger than his earlier Montevideo rallies, but smaller than anticipated. Vasconcellos' rally attracted about 9,000

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POL 14 UR

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Page 17 of A-22
MONTEVIDEO

persons, a good turnout considering the limited resources and appeal of his Third Front.

The Frente Amplio staged its final rally the evening of November 24. It was the largest political rally of the campaign, attracting about 70,000 spectators and stretching one mile from the Legislative Palace to Montevideo's main street, the 18th of July. Even more impressive than the turnout was the organizational effort which had gone into the rally. All Frente sub-units had been assigned specific areas to fill and did so. Traffic was tied up in the downtown area for several hours in advance of the rally as Frente militants converged on the site singing, chanting and waving banners. The crowd was young and in extremely good humor. After the rally, the most enthusiastic began dancing in downtown streets. This turnout convinced many Frente supporters they would carry Montevideo. However, the very size of the rally created a backlash of fear among supporters of the traditional parties and, most probably, among undecided voters. Without question, the success of the Frente rally helped to swell the attendance at Ferreira's rally the following night.

The Ferreira forces launched a one-day blitz advertising campaign November 25, urging the voters to attend his rally that evening. "Now it is the real Uruguayans' turn" was the slogan urging citizens to show their support for "the democratic system". By the time the caravan reached the downtown rally site, the crowd there had grown to an estimated 45,000 persons. As was his custom, Ferreira made his way slowly through the length of the cheering crowd, this time standing on top the caravan bus with arms spread above his head. It was a good show which exceeded the expectations of its organizers and ended the Ferreira campaign very much on the upswing.

The Pacheco and Aguerro groups ended their campaigns in Montevideo November 26. The Reelection rally attracted an estimated 40,000 participants. Bordaberry again appeared as a Vice Presidential candidate and the enthusiasm of the crowd was directed toward the absent Pacheco. Aguerro's final rally drew a crowd estimated at 16,000 persons.

Later that same evening, all major candidates or their representatives made closing addresses on a national radio-television network. The mood of all candidates was solemn, sober, almost philosophical, as they declared their work finished and urged the populace to fulfill its civic duty by voting. With a midnight rebroadcast of President Pacheco's November 22 speech to the nation, the campaign for all intents and purposes ended.

Election Day

Political experts forecast a record turnout for the 1971 election, owing to a law passed in 1969 which added teeth to

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Authority MND 9690-45

POL 14 UR

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Page 18 of A-22
MONTEVIDEO

an existing constitutional provision for compulsory voting. Any eligible citizen over 18 who failed to vote was subject to a stiff fine and, more important, would become ineligible to receive Social Security payments, work for the Government, receive Governmental services, etc. Approximately 1.5 million of Uruguay's 1.8 million registered voters were expected to show up at the polls. In fact, over 1.6 million persons or nearly 90% of the electorate voted - an increase of roughly 400,000 from the 1966 election.

Election Day, November 28, was hot and muggy. Polls were scheduled to open at 8:00 A.M. and close at 7:30 P. M. Polling places were manned by officials of the three parties assisted by Government employees. The parties and factions also had official observers at each polling place to insure that procedures established by the Electoral Court were followed.

Pre-election rumors that the Frente Amplio was urging its supporters to vote early in Montevideo because it intended to disrupt the elections later in the day led the traditional parties to similar action. Accordingly, voters began to line up at polling places as early as 5:00 A.M. By 8:00 A.M., most polls in Montevideo were swamped. In many cases, police were not on the scene early enough to organize the crowds and massive confusion resulted. Several Montevideo radio stations devoted their entire programming on Election Day to assisting election officials in straightening out problems as they arose. Radio El Espectador, for example, had twelve mobile teams cruising the city of Montevideo relaying procedural questions, reports of confusion, unruly crowds, etc. to election officials who would then take appropriate action. By 10:00 A.M., most major problems had been resolved, and voting proceeded in an orderly, but excruciatingly slow, manner. Reports of citizens standing six or more hours in the hot sun were common.

All observers remarked on the voters' patience and good humor. With the exception of President Pacheco and General Seregni, Presidential candidates took their places in line and waited their turns to vote. When it became apparent in late afternoon that many polling places would be unable to process all voters before the scheduled closing time, the Electoral Court extended the voting period to midnight. The polls closed with no major incidents and very few minor incidents reported. Foreign observers agreed they had witnessed a truly remarkable display of civic responsibility. The overwhelming majority of the Uruguayan people had again voted in free, honest and peaceful elections.

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Page 19 of A-22
MONTEVIDEO

The Vote Count

The vote count began immediately after the polls closed the morning of November 29 but it was mid-February before definitive results were known. The delay was occasioned by the closeness of the race between the Blancos and Colorados, and by a cumbersome vote count procedure.

By mid-morning November 29, partial returns from Montevideo and the interior indicated a close race between the Colorados and Blancos with the Frente running a poor third nationally and well behind the Colorados in Montevideo. It was clear from early returns, that the amendment to permit the reelection of President Pacheco would fail. Later returns confirmed these trends. When the Ministry of Interior finally released its official preliminary results on December 3, the Colorados led the Blancos by only 9,569 votes, and roughly 200,000 "observed" or absentee votes remained to be counted by the Electoral Court. The overall preliminary totals were as follows: Colorados-595,570 (40.8%); Blancos-585,974 (40.1%); Frente Amplio-271,510 (18.6%); URC-7,402 (0.5%); and others-523. The proposal to permit the reelection of President Pacheco received 439,627 votes or 30.1% of the total while Pacheco himself won 373,592 votes under the proposed system.

The final vote tally, released February 15, increased the Colorado margin to 12,802 votes out of a total of 1,664,119 valid votes cast. The final percentages were: Colorados-41.0%; Blancos-40.2%; Frente Amplio-18.3% and URC-0.5%. Within the Colorado Party, the pro-Pacheco coalition headed by Bordaberry led Jorge Batlle by 379,515 votes to 242,804, while Senator Vasconcellos ran a very poor third with 57,072 votes. In the Blanco Party, Ferreira led Aguerrondo by 439,649 votes to 228,569. General Seregni and the Frente Amplio received a total of 304,275 votes. Thus, Ferreira emerged as the most voted candidate, followed by Pacheco/Bordaberry and General Seregni. However, because of the ley de lemas, the Blanco Party trailed the Colorado Party by nearly 13,000 votes.

The key to the strong Blanco showing was the interior of the country where it carried 47.9% of the vote compared to 42.0% for the Colorados and only 9.6% for the Frente Amplio. The Blancos won control of fourteen interior departments - up from nine in the 1966 election. In Montevideo, the Colorados led with 39.5% of the vote to 30.1% for the Frente Amplio and 29.8% for the Blancos. For the new Legislature, the Colorados won thirteen Senate seats (plus the Vice President who presides as a voting member), the Blancos twelve, and the Frente Amplio five. In the Chamber of Deputies, the Colorados gained 41 seats, the Blancos 40, and the Frente Amplio 18. Thus, the new

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Montevideo 428

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Page 20 of A-22
MONTEVIDEO

Colorado Administration faces a Congress which could be controlled by a coalition of opposition parties.

Although the reelection amendment failed by a considerable margin, President Pacheco was confirmed as the strongest leader in the Colorado Party. Although Jorge Batlle ran somewhat better than many politicians had predicted, he was the second choice of approximately 50,000 voters who cast their ballots for Pacheco under the proposed constitutional amendment and switched to Batlle for the Constitution in force. The poor showing of Senator Vasconcellos and his allies marked the end of the old line batllista forces as a major power in the Colorado Party. Pachequismo had replaced batllismo as the dominant force in the Party. The strong showing of Ferreira in the Blanco Party shifted its control from the conservative heirs of deceased leader Luis Alberto de HERRERA to the liberal Ferreira.

The Frente Amplio's 18.3% represented an increase of 4% over the votes received by Frente components in the 1966 election. The biggest surprise in the Frente performance was that nearly all of this increase went to radical former Blanco Deputy Enrique ERRO who received 70,944 votes or 4.3% of the overall total - up from the 2,655 votes he received running as an independent in the 1966 election. The generally accepted explanation for Erro's strong performance was the tacit support given him by the radical "26th of March Movement", the MLN/Tupamaro political front with which it is believed many voters of the "New Left", mainly radical youth voting for the first time, identified. The Communist Party's electoral front, FIDEL, drew the largest vote, 100,211 (6.1% of total), within the Frente Amplio but this represented only a marginal and to PCU leaders, deeply disappointing increase over the 5.7% it won in 1966. The third largest group in the Frente was the Christian Democratic Party which gained 61,259 votes or 3.7% of the total, compared to 3.0% in 1966. The Socialist Party won 35,927 votes or 2.2% of the total, against 0.9% in 1966. Ex-Colorado Senators Michelini and Alba Roballo won only 31,478 votes or 1.9% of the total, down from 3.9% in 1966. Thus, the big winners within the Frente Amplio were Erro and the Socialists, its most radical elements, and the big losers were the ex-Colorados, while the Communists and Christian Democrats maintained their 1966 positions.

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Page 21 of A-22
MONTEVIDEO

Campaign Post-Mortum

When the campaign began, the opinion polls had indicated that the two strongest political forces were the opposing poles of President Pacheco (with roughly 25% voter approval) and the Frente Amplio (with about 20%). These two blocks contained the most polarized elements of society. They formed early and remained relatively constant throughout the campaign. The remaining 55% of the electorate was divided among the candidates of the center and an unusually large number of undecided voters. The question was whether this latter group would decide in favor of the center or the extremes as the campaign progressed. The results indicate that they opted for the center and, within the center, for Ferreira Aldunate.

The key to Ferreira's success appears to have been the combination of an attractive, forceful personality with a moderate, reformist program which recognized the country's problems and proposed to resolve them within the traditional Uruguayan political framework. Ferreira ran considerably better in the city of Montevideo than had been expected, and there is evidence that he picked up some votes from early Frente Amplio supporters in the closing weeks of the campaign when it became clear that he, and not the Frente, was the realistic alternative to a Pacheco-inspired Government. Ferreira also appears to have done well in interior areas which in the past had been strongholds of Jorge Batlle. Batlle's political advisors believe that many of their previous supporters, unhappy with Government policies, shifted to Ferreira.

The poor showing of the Frente Amplio appears largely because of its identification with student, worker and terrorist violence and with the Communist Party. In post-election critiques, Frente strategists admitted that they had failed to counter the scare campaign effectively used against them by the Frente's opponents. They also admitted to having devoted far too much time and energy to "convincing the convinced". Privately, many Frente supporters recognize the election outcome was adversely affected by the attraction of the Ferreira campaign to the protest vote. Several Frente factions, including the 26th of March Movement, conceded failure to attract significant new votes from the working class. While full data is not yet available, it appears that despite a massive propaganda effort by the CNT, the PCU, and Frente "Base Committees", the bulk of the working class vote went to Pacheco and, to a lesser extent, Ferreira, while the PCU just managed to hold

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Page 22 of A-22
MONTEVIDEO

its own. It also appears the Frente was most heavily voted by students, intellectuals, professionals and others from the educated middle class. Although Frente leaders are unquestionably disappointed by its performance, they believe it did attract enough new voters to remain a viable political force. Without intending irony, Seregni recently described it as "the third largest political force in the country". It seems a fairly sure bet that the Frente Amplio will be around to recruit the disillusioned and newly-radicalized should the political and economic situations worsen in the next five years.

The "reelection" tactic succeeded in electing President Pacheco's "alternate" candidate. However, it did so by such a narrow margin as to cast doubt on the extent of the President-elect's popular mandate. During the campaign, Bordaberry was not presented as a serious Presidential possibility and many who voted for him believed the reelection amendment would pass. Moreover, UNR legislators owe their election and their loyalty to Pacheco, not to Bordaberry.

The hard-fought campaign and the closeness of the outcome created strong resentments between and within the traditional parties. Strong polarization particularly between the forces of President Pacheco and the Frente Amplio continues. Most politicians in both traditional parties believe Bordaberry to be a man of good will and well-intentioned. However, many express misgivings that President Pacheco and several of his advisors may exercise excessive influence in the next Government. Bordaberry now faces the tasks of establishing himself as his own man, and winning the cooperation of at least some Blanco Party leaders in dealing with the myriad problems facing his Government. If he cannot do so, he will often face hostile majorities in the Congress and the stage will be set for a replay of the vicious political infighting of the past several years.

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23

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CONFIDENTIAL #16

PAGE 01 MONTEV 00428 291718Z

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ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 PM-06 SA-03 PRS-01 P-03 USIA-12 CIAE-00 INR-06

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INFO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
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CINCSO FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: NAVAL HEADQUARTERS COMMUNIQUE RE DETENTION OF SEVERAL SENIOR NAVAL OFFICERS

REF : DAO 090 OF FEB. 25 (CONFIDENTIAL)

1. THROUGHOUT WEEKEND, MONTEVIDEO PRESS CONTINUED SPECULATE ON REASONS FOR DETENTION LAST WEEK OF SEVERAL SENIOR NAVAL OFFICERS WHO REMAIN UNDER "HOUSE ARREST". INCLUDED IN GROUP WERE REAR ADMIRALS CARLOS FILIPPINI, WHO SEVERAL MONTHS AGO REQUESTED COURT OF HONOR OVER CHARGES THAT URUGUAYAN NAVY SOUGHT STATIONING OF U.S. NAVAL VESSEL IN URUGUAYAN WATERS PRIOR TO NOVEMBER 1971 ELECTIONS; FRANCISCO DE CASTRO, FORMER COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF NAVY; OMAR ROSSI, PREFECT OF PORT OF MONTEVIDEO AND VICTOR DODINO. PER REFTEL, LATTER THREE WERE MEMBERS OF FILIPPINI'S COURT OF HONOR.

2. STORY FIRST CAME TO LIGHT WHEN COMMUNIST PARTY DAILY "EL POPULAR" PUBLISHED INTERVIEW FEBRUARY 24 WITH UNSUCCESSFUL BLANCO PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE FERREIRA ALDUNATE, IN WHICH FERREIRA NOTED HE HAD JUST BEEN INFORMED OF DETENTION THESE OFFICERS AND NOTED THAT DODINO WAS MEMBER OF NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF FERREIRA'S "POR LA PATRIA" FACTION. STORY ENABLED "POPULAR" AND LATER PDC'S "AHORA" TO REVIVE CHARGES OF ALLEGED U.S. INTERVENTION IN URUGUAYAN NAVAL MATTERS AND CHARGES THAT USG

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Montevideo 428
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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 MONTEV 00325 171337Z

53

ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 PM-06 H-02 INR-06 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10

P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-14 USIA-12 SA-03 AID-20 PC-04

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1448
INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
CINCSO
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CINCSO FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: FINAL ELECTION RESULTS

REF

MONTEVIDEO 0311

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1. ELECTORAL COURT FEBRUARY 15 ISSUED FINAL OFFICIAL RESULTS OF NOVEMBER 28, 1971 ELECTION. COLORADO PARTY CANDIDATES BORDABERRY AND SAPELLI CERTIFIED PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT-ELECT. VALID VOTES TOTALED 1,664,119 OUT OF A POSSIBLE 1,800,000 VOTES (92.2 PERCENT). OF THESE, COLORADOS RECEIVED 691,624 (41.0 PERCENT); BLANCOS-668,822 (40.2 PERCENT); "FRENTE AMPLIO"-304,275 (18.3 PERCENT); URC-8,844 (0.5 PERCENT); AND OTHERS-554. COLORADO PARTY CARRIED MONTEVIDEO WITH 278,392 (39.5 PERCENT), WHILE BLANCOS TRAILED WITH 209,651 (29.8 PERCENT); "FRENTE AMPLIO" WITH 212,406 (30.1 PERCENT); AND URC-3,911 (0.6 PERCENT). IN INTERIOR OF COUNTRY, BLANCOS LED WITH 459,171 VOTES (47.9 PERCENT), FOLLOWED BY COLORADOS - 403,232 (42.0 PERCENT), "FRENTE AMPLIO" - 91,869 (19.6 PERCENT), AND URC - 4,933 (0.5 PERCENT). MARGIN OF COLORADO VICTORY OVER BLANCOS WAS 12,802 VOTES (0.8 PERCENT).

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Montevideo 325

Montevideo 307

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PAGE 02 MONTEV 00325 171337Z

2. WITHIN COLORADO PARTY, BORDABERRY RECEIVED 379,515 VOTES; JORGE BATLLE-242,804; VASCONCELLOS-57,072 AND OTHERS-2,233. IN BLANCO PARTY, FERREIRA ALDUNATE RECEIVED 439,649 VOTES, AGUERRONDO-228,569 AND OTHERS-604. LEADING "FRENTE AMPLIO" FACTION WAS PCU'S FIDEL WITH 100,211, FOLLOWED BY ENRIQUE ERRO'S "PATRIA GRANDE"-70,944; PDC-61,257; SOCIALISTS-35,927; AND MICHELINI-31,478.

3. COLORADOS WON 13 SENATE SEATS: 7 TO REELECTION MOVEMENT; 5 TO LIST 15; AND 1 TO SENATOR VASCONCELLOS. BLANCOS WON 12 SENATE SEATS: 8 TO FERREIRA ALDUNATE COALITION AND 4 TO AGUERRONDO GROUP. "FRENTE AMPLIO" WON 5 SENATE SEATS: 2 TO FIDEL, 2 TO PDC AND 1 TO ERRO.

4. IN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES, COLORADOS WON 41 SEATS: 28 TO RE-ELECTION MOVEMENT; 12 TO LIST 15; AND ONE TO VASCONCELLOS. BLANCOS WON 40: 30 TO FERREIRA COALITION AND 10 TO AGUERRONDO GROUP. "FRENTE AMPLIO" WON 18: 7 TO PDC; 5 TO "PATRIA GRANDE"; 4 TO FIDEL AND ONE EACH TO SOCIALISTS AND MICHELINI. REASON PDC REPRESENTATION IN CHAMBER EXCEEDS THAT OF FIDEL IS THAT ALL FIDEL DEPUTIES ELECTED FROM MONTEVIDEO WHERE MORE VOTES REQUIRED TO ELECT A DEPUTY THAN IN INTERIOR WHERE PDC PICKED UP 4 SEATS.

EXEMPT.
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PAGE 01 MONTEV 00311 151843Z

47
ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 CCO-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00
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FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1441
INFO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
CINCSO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE MONTEVIDEO 0311

CINCSO FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: ELECTORAL COURT PROCLAIMS ELECTION VICTORS

1. ELECTORAL COURT TODAY (FEBRUARY 15) OFFICIALLY PROCLAIMED COLORADO PARTY CANDIDATES JUAN MARIA BORDABERRY AND JOSE SAPELLI AS PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT-ELECT. OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT CAME AFTER ALL NIGHT SESSION BY COURT AND NAMING OF WINNERS IN CONGRESSIONAL AND MUNICIPAL CONTESTS. BORDABERRY'S MARGIN OVER BLANCO SENATOR WILSON FERREIRA ALDUNATE REPORTED AS 12,802 OUT OF RECORD OF OVER 1,600,000 VOTES CAST. COMPLETE SUMMARY OF OFFICIAL FIGURES WILL BE SENT AS SOON AS COPIES OF COURT'S DECLARATION OBTAINED.

2. EX-MONTEVIDEO MAYOR OSCAR RACHETTI FORMALLY RESUMED THAT OFFICE IN MID-DAY CEREMONIES TODAY, WHILE NEW CONGRESS WILL MEET LATER IN AFTERNOON TO BEGIN ITS 1972 SESSION. IN SENATE, COLORADOS WILL HAVE 14 SEATS (INCLUDING VICE PRESIDENT WHO PRESIDES OVER THAT BODY), BLANCOS 12 AND "FRENTE AMPLIO" COALITION 5. IN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES, COLORADOS 41, BLANCOS 40 AND "FRENTE AMPLIO" 18.

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PAGE 01 MONTEV 00307 112348Z

87

ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 PM-06 H-02 INR-06 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10

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CINCSO FOR POLAD

SUBJ: URUGUAYAN ELECTIONS - VOTE COUNT ENDS

REF: MVD 0281 NC

ELECTORAL COURT COMPLETED MONTEVIDEO VOTE COUNT
LATE EVENING FEBRUARY 10. WHILE NO OFFICIAL FINAL TOTALS
HAVE BEEN RELEASED, MONTEVIDEO PRESS FEBRUARY 11
UNANIMOUSLY FORECAST NATIONWIDE COLORADO PARTY VICTORY
BY MARGIN OF ABOUT 12,500 VOTES. IT IS EXPECTED THAT
ELECTORAL COURT WILL OFFICIALLY PROCLAIM JUAN MARIA
BORDABERRY AS PRESIDENT-ELECT EARLY NEXT WEEK. AT THAT
TIME, FINAL OFFICIAL VOTE TOTALS WILL BE RELEASED.
EMBASSY WILL REPORT WHEN OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT MADE.
EXEMPT.
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PAGE 01 MONTEV 00233 021955Z

91

ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 AID-20 AGR-20 E-11 CIAE-00 PM-06 H-02 INR-06

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CINCSO FOR POLAD

SUBJ: COLORADO PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE RESIGNS AGRICULTURAL
MINISTRY AS VOTE COUNT DRAWS TO CLOSE

REF: MVD 0196 POL 14 UR

1. PRESIDENT PACHECO'S OFFICE ANNOUNCED FEBRUARY 1 THAT HE
HAD ACCEPTED RESIGNATION OF MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE JUAN M.
BORDABERRY, WHO WILL ASSUME PRESIDENCY ON MARCH 1 IF
COLORADO PARTY MAINTAINS ITS LEAD IN CONTINUING TABULATION
OF VOTES FROM NOVEMBER 28 GENERAL ELECTION. PRESIDENT NAMED
AGRICULTURE SUB-SECRETARY HECTOR VIANA MARTORELL AS INTERIM
MINISTER TO REPLACE BORDABERRY. SHOULD BORDABERRY BE
DECLARED PRESIDENTIAL WINNER, VIANA HAS BEEN RUMORED FOR
SENIOR GOVERNMENTAL POSITION, POSSIBLY AS SECRETARY OF
PRESIDENT'S OFFICE.

2. ACCORDING TO AID SOURCES, MINISTER OF FINANCE CARLOS
FLEITAS PLANNING TO LEAVE HIS POST BY FEBRUARY 14 IN ORDER
TO TAKE HIS SEAT IN NEW CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES WHICH CONVENES
FOLLOWING DAY. PROMINENT AMONG THOSE NOW MENTIONED AS
POSSIBLE REPLACEMENT FOR FLEITAS IN BORDABERRY CABINET

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IS CURRENT PRESIDENT OF CENTRAL BANK, DR. JORGE ECHEVARRIA LEUNDA. BORDABERRY RUNNING MATE, MINISTER OF LABOR JORGE SAPELLI, LIKELY TO BE SUCCEEDED IN MINISTRY BY CURRENT SUB-SECRETARY JULIO AMORIN LARRANAGA.

3. MOST INTERIOR DEPARTMENTS HAVE COMPLETED TABULATION OF VOTES, BUT FINAL RESULT IN MONTEVIDEO AND ADJOINING CANELONES DEPARTMENT REMAINS A QUESTION MARK. AS NOTED REFTEL, STRONG SHOWING IN MOST INTERIOR AREAS BY BLANCO PARTY CANDIDATE FERREIRA ALDUNATE HAS CUT INTO BORDABERRY LEAD, BUT EXACT SIZE OF THIS MARGIN HAS NOT BEEN ANNOUNCED BY ELECTORAL COURT. BLANCO PARTY DAILY "EL PAIS" ESTIMATES THAT FERREIRA NOW TRAILS BY SOME THREE THOUSAND VOTES, WHILE "FRENTE AMPLIO" DAILY "AHORA" TODAY HEADLINES THAT FERREIRA HAS TAKEN LEAD, BASED ON UNOFFICIAL ESTIMATE BY BLANCO ELECTORAL OFFICIAL. AS WE POINTED OUT REFTEL, KEY TO FINAL RESULT WILL BE COUNT OF ABSENTEE VOTES CAST IN MONTEVIDEO WHERE COLORADO PARTY HAS SUBSTANTIAL LEAD. AT LEAST ANOTHER WEEK WILL BE NEEDED TO COMPLETE FINAL TABULATION. EXEMPT.

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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

INFO : American Embassy MONTEVIDEO

FROM : American Embassy MOSCOW

SUBJECT : Uruguayan Charge Protests Soviet Message to Cuba; Cuban-Soviet
Economic Relations; Soviet Magazine Replays Allegations of
REF : US Role in Uruguayan ElectionsRECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

JAN 10 8 21 AM 1972

RS/AN
ANALYSIS DIVISION January 6, 1972

Uruguayan Protest

Uruguayan Charge Ramiro Piriz told the reporting officer that he had lodged a protest with the Soviet Foreign Ministry over the Soviet leadership's January 1 message to Cuba on the occasion of the Cuban national holiday. Piriz' protest, made to the head of the Foreign Ministry's Latin American section, claimed that the message approved Castro's Latin American policy and by implication supported his statements in favor of the Tupamaros. The Soviet official tried to soothe the Uruguayan Charge by assuring him that the Soviet policy of having good relations with Uruguay had not changed.

Comment: Our view is that the Uruguayans overreacted to the Soviet message, which strikes us as a standard expression of the presently friendly state of Soviet-Cuban relations. While the message in fact does not explicitly endorse Cuban policy in Latin America, some of the public statements made by the Soviets in connection with Kosygin's visit to Havana and Cuban President Dorticos' just-concluded stay here could have given the Uruguayans this impression.

Soviet-Cuban Economic Relations

Piriz also reported that he has evidence that a Cuban economic delegation was in Moscow for negotiations at least two weeks prior to Dorticos' December 21 arrival here. He said that on December 7 he telephoned for an appointment to discuss economic matters with Soviet officials and was told that a meeting could not be arranged for the time being. The reason given was that "all our experts are busy with our Cuban visitors."

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Contents and Classification Approved by:

POL:TRBuchanan

Drafted by:

POL:PSHostal:wm 1/6/72

Clearances:

POL:EXT:MGarrison

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Soviet Magazine Replays Allegation of U.S. Embassy Role in Uruguayan Elections

In a January 1 New Times article on the Uruguayan elections by V. Tikhmenev, the Soviets replay a charge by the Uruguayan newspaper Popular that the American Embassy in Montevideo took an active part in the recent elections. This participation allegedly took the form of having USIS print large numbers of anti-Frente Amplio posters.

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PAGE 01 MONTEV 02985 211156Z

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ACTION ARA-14

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AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
CINCSO

C O N F I D E N T I A L MONTEVIDEO 2985

CINCSO FOR POLAD

DEPT PASS OPS AND DIA

SUBJECT: WEEKLY CHARGES SEREGNI BODYGUARDS ARE ESCAPED "TUPAMAROS"

1. RIGHTIST WEEKLY "TIEMPO" PUBLISHED DECEMBER 17 CHARGES THAT TWO BODYGUARDS ACCOMPANYING "FRENTE AMPLIO" PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE SEREGNI TO VOTE IN NOVEMBER 28 ELECTIONS WERE ESCAPED "TUPAMAROS", JOSE MARIA PEREZ LUTZ AND ALBERTO ANTONIO COCCO PEREZ. TO DOCUMENT CHARGE, "TIEMPO" REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHS OF SEREGNI VOTING PUBLISHED BY ARGENTINE MAGAZINES "GENTE", "SIETE DIAS ILLUSTRADOS" AND "MERCADO". "TIEMPO" COMPARED PHOTOS OF TWO MEN WHO APPEAR TO BE GUARDING SEREGNI IN ALL THREE PUBLICATIONS WITH PHOTOS OF PEREZ AND COCCO RELEASED BY MONTEVIDEO POLICE SHORTLY AFTER THEY ESCAPED FROM PUNTA CARRETAS PRISON SEPTEMBER 6. THE POLICE PHOTOS BEAR A STRONG RESEMBLANCE TO THE TWO MEN SHOWN IN ARGENTINE PUBLICATIONS. SUBSTANCE OF STORY REPEATED IN AFTERNOON COLORADO DAILY "ACCION" OF SAME DATE.

2. "FRENTE AMPLIO" PRESS THE FOLLOWING DAY STRONGLY REJECTED CHARGES AND IDENTIFIED BODYGUARDS AS AIRLINE PILOT ERCS CARVAJAL AND AGRONOMY STUDENT CARLOS BATTELLO WHO WERE VOLUNTEER WORKERS IN SEREGNI CAMPAIGN. THIS IDENTIFICATION HAS BEEN PRIVATELY CONFIRMED TO US BY LOCAL POLICE. SEREGNI

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PAGE 02 MONTEV 02985 211156Z

PROMPTLY FILED LIBEL CHARGES AGAINST "TIEMPO" AND "ACCION" IN LOCAL COURT. PCU'S AFTERNOON TABLOID "ECO" DECEMBER 18 CLAIMED THAT FALSE CHARGE AGAINST SEREGNI WAS PART OF "PLOT" DIRECTED BY EMBASSY TO DISCREDIT HIM. IT ADDED PLOT DIRECTED BY SERVICE ATTACHES COL. JAMES SMITH, COL. JOHN KOMP AND LT. COL. JAMES KEENAN. PCU'S "EL POPULAR" TOOK SAME LINE FOLLOWING DAY. HOWEVER, IT DID NOT SPECIFICALLY NAME SERVICE ATTACHES AS RESPONSIBLE PARTIES WITHIN THE EMBASSY.

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PAGE 01 MONTEV 02972 162156Z

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ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 PM-06 NSC-10 SS-14 RSC-01 SA-03 AID-20 PC-04
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 TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1173
 INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
 AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
 CINCSO

CONFIDENTIAL MONTEVIDEO 2972

CINCSO FOR POLAD

SUB: POST-ELECTION ECONOMIC MOOD: SOMEWHAT PESSIMISTIC

REF: A) MVD 2963 NC B) MVD 2924 NC

1. SUMMARY: IN CONTRAST TO SENSE OF RELIEF AND MILD EUPHORIA ON PART OF MOST URUGUAYANS OVER ELECTION RESULTS, THOSE CONCERNED WITH THIS NATION'S ECONOMY SEE SERIOUS PROBLEMS AHEAD. CONTINUING UNCERTAINTY OVER FINAL RESULT OF ELECTION MAKES MOST ECONOMIC OBSERVERS PESSIMISTIC THAT NEEDED DECISIVE ECONOMIC DECISIONS WILL BE MADE SOON. MOST WHO CLOSELY FOLLOW ECONOMY BELIEVE MEASURES DURING INTER-REGNUM WILL BE INTERIM AND PATCH-WORK WITH DECISIVE MEASURES POSTPONED FOR SEVERAL MONTHS.

2. DIFFICULT MAKE MEANINGFUL COMPARATIVE ESTIMATE OF RESPECTIVE ECONOMIC POLICIES THAT MIGHT BE FOLLOWED BY POTENTIAL PRESIDENTS-ELECT (BORDABERRY AND FERREIRA ALDUNATE). WE DO NOT ASSUME THAT ECONOMIC POLICIES OF THESE TWO MEN WOULD NECESSARILY BE IDENTICAL SIMPLY BECAUSE THEY ARE BOTH WEALTHY RANCHERS REPRESENTING URUGUAY'S TRADITIONAL PARTIES. BORDABERRY HARDLY CAMPAIGNED AT ALL AND, THEREFORE, PROMISED NOTHING ON WHICH TO BASE

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TO : Department of State

INFO: BRASILIA, BUENOS AIRES, MONTEVIDEO, RIO DE JANEIRO

DEC 20 8 38 PM 1971

ANALYSIS BRANCH DATE: December 15, 1971

FROM : Amembassy MOSCOW

SUBJECT : Soviets Take Restrained Line on Uruguayan Election Results

REF : Moscow 8857

Apparently disappointed by the leftist Frente Amplio's last place showing in the November 28 Uruguayan elections, the Soviet press has devoted little space to discussing the outcome. Pravda on November 30 summarized the results, giving the percentages obtained by each party and thus revealing to the Soviet reader that the Frente had come in last. Pravda did take comfort in the fact that the Frente's Presidential candidate had won more votes in Montevideo than any other candidate.

In a short item on December 10, Pravda quoted Uruguayan CP First Secretary Arismendi as saying that the elections had been a "noticeable success" for the Frente and had resulted in a shift in the relationship of political forces to the detriment of "reaction." The less authoritative Komsomolskaya Pravda, in a December 1 piece, had been more upbeat. Pointing out that the Frente has been in existence for only ten months, Komsomolskaya Pravda opined that the leftist coalition had become "a mighty political force."

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Contents and Classification Approved by:

Drafted by:

POL:EXT:RShostal/nh

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TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 581

PAGE 01 MONTEV 02943 131910Z

44

ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 RSR-01 PM-06 NSC-10 SS-14 RSC-01 CIAE-00

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1155
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AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L MONTEVIDEO 2943

ASUNCION FOR STEDMAN

SUBJECT: VIEWS OF MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE JUAN MARIA BORDABERRY ✓

1. VISITING COUNTRY DIRECTOR STEDMAN, ACCOMPANIED BY EMBASSY AID OFFICER STEPHENS, HAD HOUR CONVERSATION WITH MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE AND PRESUMED PRESIDENT-ELECT BORDABERRY IN PUNTA DEL ESTE DECEMBER 11. BORDABERRY WAS RELAXED, VERY OPEN AND FRIENDLY DURING INFORMAL CONVERSATION IN WHICH HE MADE FOLLOWING POINTS OF INTEREST.

2. BORDABERRY SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHO WAS GOING TO FINALLY WIN ELECTION BUT HOPED IT WOULD BE COLORADO PARTY. HE FELT FINAL ELECTION RESULTS WOULD NOT BE KNOWN BEFORE LATTER PART OF JANUARY. HE SAID THAT PRESIDENT PACHECO WAS VERY PLEASED WITH RESULTS OF ELECTION AND LOOKING FORWARD TO STEPPING DOWN FROM PRESIDENCY IN MARCH.

3. BORDABERRY SAID HE THOUGHT TWO KEY ELEMENTS IN THE LARGE COLORADO VOTE WERE PRESIDENT PACHECO'S SPEECH THE WEEK BEFORE ELECTIONS AND THE LARGE "FRENTE AMPLIO" RALLY NOVEMBER 24 WHICH WAS SO WELL ORGANIZED THAT IT FRIGHTENED MANY PEOPLE AND ENCOURAGED THEM TO VOTE FOR THE COLORADO PARTY IN MONTEVIDEO.

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INDICATE:

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ACTION: Amembassy MONTEVIDEO

Subject: Congratulations on Election Reporting

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY CRIMMINS

I am sure I speak for the entire Washington readership of your reports on the very important Uruguayan election campaign and preliminary results in sending you and your staff congratulations on an outstanding performance. The explanations of the complex Uruguayan electoral system and comprehensive reporting on the long and exhausting campaign were excellent. The wide contacts you and your staff maintain in Montevideo, as well as the numerous trips to the interior by several of your staff, inspired confidence in your forecasts of the election outcome.

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20467APPROVED BY:
ARA - Mr. Crimmins

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 MONTEV 02930 102009Z

53
ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-06 H-02 INR-06 L-03 NSAE-00

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FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1142

C O N F I D E N T I A L MONTEVIDEO 2930

SUBJECT: VIEWS OF SENATOR WILSON FERREIRA

1. VISITING COUNTRY DIRECTOR STEDMAN ACCOMPANIED BY DCM ON DEC 10 HAD HOUR'S CONVERSATION WITH SENATOR FERREIRA REGARDING CURRENT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS. FERREIRA IN RELAXED, JOVIAL AND FRIENDLY MOOD MADE FOLLOWING POINTS OF INTEREST:

A. HE BELIEVES THAT UPON COMPLETION OFFICIAL SECOND COUNT OF ALL BUT "OBSERVED" BALLOTS (SOME 210,000) SHOULD COLORADO PARTY LEAD OVER BLANCOS BY 6000 VOTES OR LESS HE WILL WIN PRESIDENCY AS HE BELIEVES BLANCOS CAN OVERCOME COLORADO LEAD OF THAT MAGNITUDE WHEN "OBSERVED" VOTES COUNTED. SHOULD COLORADO MARGIN BE IN 7-8000 RANGE BLANCO VICTORY STILL PROBABLE. A 9000 VOTE LEAD WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO OVERCOME, WHEREAS IF COLORADO LEAD IS 10,000 VOTES OR OVER FERREIRA DOES NOT BELIEVE HE CAN WIN.

B. FERREIRA BELIEVES URUGUAYAN PEOPLE MORE THAN ANYTHING WANT PEACE, ORDER AND OPPORTUNITY TO FOLLOW THEIR PURSUITS UNHINDERED BY POLITICAL WAVE-MAKING. FERREIRA AND HIS PARLIMENTARY GROUP WHICH HE ESTIMATES AT ABOUT 30 IN THE 99 MAN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES AND 8 IN THE 30-MAN SENATE WILL BE RESPONSIVE TO PEOPLE'S WISHES. HE MADE IT CLEAR NO ONE COULD GOVERN URUGUAY WITHOUT CONSENT OF HIS SECTOR OF BLANCO PARTY.

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12-10-71

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PAGE 02 MONTEV 02930 102009Z

C. FERREIRA SAID CATEGORICALLY THAT SHOULD HE BE ELECTED PRESIDENT HE WILL NAME COLORADO MINISTERS AND FORM A "NATIONAL GOVERNMENT". HE ALSO BELIEVES HE CAN WIN COOPERATION OF IMPORTANT SECTORS OF THE FRENTE AMPLIO.

D. FERREIRA SAID THAT SHOULD BORDABERRY BE ELECTED NONE OF FERREIRA SECTOR WOULD ACCEPT MINISTERIES IN COLORADO GOVERNMENT. FERREIRA SAID WHILE BORDABERRY HIMSELF IS A GOOD MAN, FERREIRA GROUP HAS NO USE FOR PEOPLE SURROUNDING BORDABERRY ESPECIALLY GARI AND GLAUCO SEGOVIA AND THEY WOULD HAVE TO BE GOTTEN RID OF BEFORE THERE COULD BE ANY DEALINGS WITH BORDABERRY.

E. FERREIRA DOES NOT BELIEVE FRENTE CAN CONTINUE AS VIABLE POLITICAL GROUP. PARTY WRECKING PROCLIVITIES OF SENATOR-ELECT ERRO WHOM FERREIRA DESCRIBES AS AN IRASCIBLE, DEVIUS AND FIERCE ENEMY OF MOSCOW-WING COMMUNISTS WILL HASTEN BREAK-UP OF FRENTE.

F. FERREIRA SAID HIS GROUP AND CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF THE COLORADOS AND FRENTE WOULD CONSTITUTE THEMSELVES AS A RESPONSIBLE OPPOSITION SHOULD BORDABERRY BE ELECTED.

G. FERREIRA SAID THAT COUNTRYSIDE IS THE REAL URUGUAY AND HIS PARTY WILL BE PRIMARILY INTERESTED IN MEASURES WHICH WILL HELP RURAL AREAS WHICH HAD SUFFERED SO MUCH NEGLECT.

H. FERREIRA SAID HE CONFIDENT HIS GROUP HAD ATTRACTED A GREATER NUMBER OF YOUTH THAN HAD THE FRENTE AMPLIO.

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PAGE 01 MONTEV 02922 101846Z

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ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 PM-06 NSC-10 SS-14 RSC-01 SA-03 CIAE-00

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1138
INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
CINCSO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE MONTEVIDEO 2922

SUBJECT: ELECTORAL COURT REJECTS BLANCO PETITION

REF: MVD 2882 - *POL 14UR*

1. ELECTORAL COURT, DECEMBER 9, VOTED TO REJECT A PETITION OF DIRECTORATE OF BLANCO PARTY, CALLING FOR VOTE-BY-VOTE RECOUNT OF ALL BALLOTS CAST IN MONTEVIDEO DURING NOVEMBER 28 ELECTIONS. SECOND COUNT WILL NOW CONTINUE TO TABULATE CERTIFICATES PREPARED DURING FIRST COUNT WHICH SHOW COMPOSITION OF VOTE IN EACH BALLOT BOX. ONLY WHERE THERE ARE REASONABLE GROUNDS TO EXPECT THAT ERROR WAS MADE ON FIRST COUNT WILL BALLOT BOX BE OPENED AND INDIVIDUAL VOTES RECOUNTED.

2. BLANCO PETITION WAS FIRST PRESENTED TO ELECTORAL BOARD IN MONTEVIDEO ON DECEMBER 8. BLANCO CASE RESTED ON A NUMBER OF MANIFEST ERRORS IN FIRST COUNT. ELECTORAL BOARD SUSPENDED SECOND COUNT IN MONTEVIDEO AND REFERRED MATTER

TO ELECTORAL COURT. COURT VOTED ALONG PARTY LINES, FIVE COLOPADOS VS. FOUR BLANCOS. DECISION, HOWEVER, EMPHASIZED NEED FOR VOTE-BY-VOTE COUNT IN EVENT THAT ERROR HAD

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ORVIOUSLY BEEN MADE ON FIRST COUNT. BLANCO PARTY HAS
EXPRESSED ITS WILLINGNESS TO ABIDE BY DECISION OF COURT.

3. COMMENT: AS SECOND COUNT PROCEEDS, ESTIMATED NUMBER
OF "OBSERVADO" VOTES HAS INCREASED AS IS NOT REPORTED TO

BE ALMOST 220,000. POPULAR PASTIME NOW IS SPECULATING
ABOUT WHICH PARTY "OBSERVADO" VOTES WILL FAVOR. EACH
TRADITIONAL PARTY MAKES PLAUSIBLE CASE THAT VOTE WILL
FAVOR IT.

EXEMPT.
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21

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 199

PAGE 01 MONTEV 02883 071152Z

19
ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 AID-20 NIC-01 EUR-14 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-06
H-02 INR-06 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01
SS-14 USIA-12 OPR-02 SY-03 PC-04 RSR-01 /118 W
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R 071059Z DEC 71
FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1110
INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
CINCSO

C O N F I D E N T I A L MONTEVIDEO 2883

CINCSO FOR POLAD

SUBJ: U.S. EMBASSY ACCUSED OF ATTACKS ON "FRENTE AMPLIO"

1. DECEMBER 5 EDITION OF COMMUNIST DAILY, "EL POPULAR", ACCUSED U.S. EMBASSY OF "LAUNCHING NEW WAVE OF TERROR AND VIOLENCE, MACHINEGUNNING SIX OTHER "FRENTE" CLUBS AT DAYBREAK YESTERDAY". ARTICLE CLAIMS JUP (RIGHTIST YOUTH GROUP) RESPONSIBLE FOR THESE ATTACKS AND THREE OTHERS ON DECEMBER 1, ACTING ON ORDERS OF EMBASSY.

2. "EL POPULAR" ALSO ACCUSES EMBASSY OF HAVING PAID FOR FULL PAGE, UNSIGNED ADVERTISEMENT WHICH APPEARED IN MOST PAPERS DECEMBER 4 WHICH DEPICTS URUGUAY AS HAVING SHATTERED SOVIET BOOT WHICH HAS JUST TRAMPLED CHILE. ATTACKS ON "FRENTE", BOTH AGAINST CLUBS AND IN PRESS, SAID TO BE RESULT OF EMBASSY'S FEAR OF 300,000 VOTES "FRENTE" WILL OBTAIN (I.E., AFTER FINAL COUNT).

3. COMMENT: LEFTIST PRESS HAS REPEATEDLY ATTEMPTED IN PAST ATTRIBUTE TO U.S. EMBASSY RESPONSIBILITY FOR ATTACKS AGAINST "FRENTE AMPLIO" AND SUPPORT OF ONE OR ANOTHER OF TRADITIONAL PARTIES AND OF "REPRESSIVE FORCES" (POLICE). THIS LATEST CHARGE AND OTHERS WHICH WILL SURELY FOLLOW ARE EVIDENTLY EFFORTS TO

CONFIDENTIAL

3

26

Montevideo 2883
12-7-71

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MONTEV 02883 071152Z

BLAME FAILURE IN ELECTIONS UPON US. AS THIS CHARGE, LIKE OTHERS,
COULD BE USED TO JUSTIFY ATTACKS AGAINST US PERSONS AND PROPERTY
WE HAVE AGAIN REITERATED TO STAFF NEED TO MAINTAIN SECURITY
PRECAUTIONS. GP-3.
ADAIR

CONFIDENTIAL

26

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Authority NND 969045



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 932

PAGE 01 MONTEV 02892 071949Z

45

ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 SA-03 SS-14 NSC-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00 INR-06

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R 071814Z DEC 71
FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1117
INFO USCINCSO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE MONTEVIDEO 2892

CINCSO FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: URUGUAYAN ELECTION RESULTS

REF: MVD 2882 - *POL 14 UR*

PARAGRAPH FOUR OF REFTEL REPEATED ERRONEOUS LOCAL PRESS FIGURES WHICH SHOWED VOTE OF "FRENTE AMPLIO" SECTOR HEADED BY ENRIQUE ERRO AT 74,106 VOTES OR 5.0 PERCENT OF TOTAL VOTES CAST. CORRECT FIGURE WHICH APPEARS IN PRESS TODAY (DECEMBER 7) IS 64,106 VOTES OR 4.4 PERCENT OF TOTAL VOTE. THIS CORRECTION DOES NOT EFFECT OVERALL "FRENTE" VOTE TOTAL OF 271,510 OR OVERALL "FRENTE" VOTE PERCENTAGE OF 18.6 PERCENT.

EXEMPT.
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12-7-71*

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Authority MMD 96045

23



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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CONFIDENTIAL 223

PAGE 01 MONTEV 00196 01 OF 02 281451Z

51

ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 SA-03 CIAE-00 INR-06 NSAE-00 P-03 RSC-01

USIA-12 PRS-01 AID-20 CU-04 E-11 H-02 NSC-10 SS-14

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R 281106Z JAN 72
FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1364
INFO CINCSO
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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 OF 2 MONTEVIDEO 0196

CINCSO FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: URUGUAYAN ELECTIONS - THE COUNT GOES ON...AND ON

REF : MONTEVIDEO 2882 Pol 14UR

1. SUMMARY: FINAL TABULATION OF ELECTION RESULTS CONTINUING AMID CHARGES OF FRAUD AND IRREGULARITIES. OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT ON WHO WON PRESIDENTIAL RACE NOT EXPECTED UNTIL NEAR MID-FEBRUARY, ALTHOUGH COLORADO PARTY HAS MAINTAINED LEAD. THERE IS CONSIDERABLE SPECULATION ON MEMBERS OF FUTURE CABINET, ALTHOUGH KEY POLITICAL LEADERS REMAIN MUM ON THIS AND ON POSSIBLE COLORADO/BLANCO POLITICAL ACCORDS. FORCES SUPPORTING THE MARXIST-DOMINATED "FRENTE AMPLIO" COALITION PLANNING MAJOR RALLY IN EARLY FEBRUARY, COMMEMORATING "FRENTE'S" FIRST ANNIVERSARY. DESPITE CONTINUING INTERNAL STRESSES, NO SERIOUS SPLIT IN THE "FRENTE'S" ORGANIZATIONAL UNITY APPEARS IMMINENT.

2. VOTE COUNT - ALTHOUGH NEARLY TWO MONTHS HAVE PASSED SINCE NOVEMBER 28 GENERAL ELECTIONS, NO PRESIDENTIAL WINNER HAS YET EMERGED AS VOTE COUNT PLODS SLOWLY TOWARD FEBRUARY 15 STATUTORY DEADLINE. COUNT OF ALL VOTES EXCEPT THOSE IN THE "CHALLENGED" OR "ARSENTEE" CATEGORY NOW APPEARS VIRTUALLY COMPLETE, EXCEPT FOR DEPARTMENTS OF MONTEVIDEO AND ADJOINING CANELONES (55 PERCENT OF TOTAL VOTE), WHERE SLOWNESS IN DECIDING VALIDITY

32
CONFIDENTIALMontevideo 196
1-28-72DECLASSIFIED
Authority MMD 940045



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MONTEV 00196 01 OF 02 281451Z

OF FEW SCATTERED VOTES HAS HELD UP ANNOUNCEMENT OF OFFICIAL TOTALS. HOWEVER, UTILIZING INTERIOR MINISTRY UNOFFICIAL FIGURES ANNOUNCED DECEMBER 3 FOR THESE TWO DEPARTMENTS, ON NATIONWIDE BASIS IT APPEARS 10,000 VOTE LEAD PREVIOUSLY HELD BY COLORADO CANDIDATE JUAN M. BORDABERRY OVER HIS BLANCO RIVAL SENATOR FERREIRA ALDUNATE HAS SHRUNK TO JUST OVER 6,000. REASON FOR THIS IS THAT VOTE COUNTS IN NUMBER OF INTERIOR DEPARTMENTS NOW COMPLETED AND SINCE THESE WERE AREAS WHERE BLANCOS VOTED WELL, THEY INCREASED THEIR MARGIN WHEN ABSENTEE BALLOTS WERE OPENED. HOWEVER, IN ABSENCE OF TOTALS IN MONTEVIDEO WHERE COLORADOS HAVE SUBSTANTIAL LEAD, THIS CANNOT BE TAKEN AS TREND INDICATING EVENTUAL BLANCO VICTORY. COLORADOS IN FACT BELIEVE BORDABERRY LEAD IN MONTEVIDEO HAS INCREASED BY SOME 5,000 VOTES ON BASIS OF UNANNOUNCED OFFICIAL RETURNS, CLAIM WHICH BLANCOS HOTLY DISPUTE AND WE CANNOT AT THIS POINT VERIFY. "OBSERVED" OR ABSENTEE BALLOTS IN MONTEVIDEO AMOUNT TO SOME 55,000 AND ELECTORAL BOARD HAS ONLY JUST BEGUN TO EXAMINE THESE. WE DO NOT EXPECT A FINAL OVERALL RESULT BEFORE END OF FIRST WEEK TO TEN DAYS IN FEBRUARY.

3. BLANCO UNHAPPINESS - INITIAL DISPLEASURE BY MEMBERS OF OPPOSITION BLANCO PARTY WITH MANNER IN WHICH VOTE COUNT HAS BEEN CONDUCTED (REFTEL) HAS DEEPENED AND INTENSIFIED IN PAST THREE WEEKS. WHERE FORMERLY BLANCOS WERE EXPRESSING UNHAPPINESS WITH MANNER IN WHICH PARTIAL VOTE TOTALS WERE BEING ANNOUNCED, THEY NOW OPENLY CHARGING FRAUD ON PART OF MONTEVIDEO ELECTORAL OFFICIALS, MAJORITY OF WHOM ARE COLORADOS. BLANCOS COMPLAIN THAT THERE HAVE BEEN NUMBER OF CASES OF MORE BALLOTS COUNTED THAN VOTERS REGISTERED AT VOTING PLACES, AND NOTE THAT THEIR APPEALS CONSISTENTLY REJECTED BY ELECTORAL COURT AUTHORITIES ON BASIS OF STRAIGHT PARTY VOTE. PARTY DIRECTORATE NOW PREPARING SUMMARY APPEAL OF ALL IRREGULARITIES IT CLAIMS HAVE OCCURRED TO PRESENT TO ELECTORAL COURT. MOST OF HEAT IN THIS ISSUE HAS COME FROM FERREIRA SUPPORTERS WHO CHARGED HE AND BLANCO PARTY BEING "ROBBED" OF VICTORY. FERREIRA YOUTH GROUPS HAVE HELD SEVERAL BRIEF, "LIGHTNING" DEMONSTRATIONS IN DOWNTOWN MONTEVIDEO IN RECENT DAYS, ONE OF WHICH WAS MET WITH POLICE TEAR GAS. PUBLICALLY, FERREIRA HIMSELF CONTINUES FAIRLY QUIET ON SUBJECT, DECLARING THAT HE OPTIMISTIC BLANCO VICTORY WILL IN THE END BE SUSTAINED, DESPITE NUMEROUS "IRREGULARITIES" IN VOTE TABULATION. PRIVATELY, WE UNDERSTAND HE IS FURIOUS. BLANCO DIRECTORATE HAS PUBLICLY TAKEN POSITION THAT

CONFIDENTIAL

Montevideo 2882
12-7-71

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969045



Department of State TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MONTEV 00196 01 OF 02 281451Z

PARTY WILL ENTERTAIN NO FORMAL DISCUSSIONS REGARDING POSSIBLE POLITICAL COOPERATION WITH COLORADOS UNTIL VOTE COUNT IS COMPLETE. NOTWITHSTANDING, WE UNDERSTAND SOME BLANCOS HAVE ALREADY APPROACHED COLORADO LEADERS ON THIS SUBJECT.

4. COLORADOS CALM - WITHOUT EXCEPTION, ALL COLORADOS WITH WHOM WE HAVE SPOKEN RECENTLY ARE CONVINCED THAT BLANCOS HAVE NO REAL CHANCE OF TAKING OVERALL LEAD AND DECLARE CATEGORICALLY THAT BORDABERRY WILL BE NEXT PRESIDENT OF URUGUAY. THEY HAVE RESPONDED TO BLANCO FRAUD CHARGES BY DISMISSING THOSE IRREGULARITIES WHICH HAVE BEEN DISCOVERED AS INSIGNIFICANT AND COUNTERCHARGING THAT BLANCOS ARE UNDERMINING "DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS" BY THEIR CLAIMS. MEANWHILE, SERIES OF MEETINGS BETWEEN VARIOUS COLORADO LEADERS AND PRESIDENT PACHECO AND BORDABERRY EARLY IN MONTH SPARKED NUMEROUS RUMORS ABOUT THE COMPOSITION OF POTENTIAL BORDABERRY CABINET. PROMINENT IN THESE IS SPECULATION THAT COLORADO LIST 15 LEADER JORGE BATLLE WILL ACCEPT CULTURE/EDUCATION MINISTRY. OTHER MEMBERS OF HIS FACTION (SUCH AS EX-COMMERCE MINISTER SANGUINETTI AND FINANCE SUB-SECRETARY FORTEZA) ALLEGEDLY WILL BE GIVEN CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION'S ECONOMIC/FINANCIAL POLICIES. HOWEVER, OTHER SOURCES, INCLUDING SOME IN BATLLE'S GROUP, HAVE TOLD US HE NOT INTERESTED IN ACCEPTING MINISTRY AND THAT IN FACT HIS FACTION MAY TAKE MORE INDEPENDENT, LESS COOPERATIVE ROLE WITH

BORDABERRY GOVERNMENT THAN IT MAINTAINED WITH PACHECO ADMINISTRATION. SUPPORTERS OF "THIRD COLORADO FRONT" LED BY SENATORS VASCONCELLOS AND FLORES MORA FREELY ADMIT THAT ELECTION WAS DISASTER FOR THEM AND SEE LITTLE IF ANY FUTURE POLITICAL ROLE FOR FACTIONS OF EITHER CANDIDATE. DESPITE BLANCO DIRECTORATE STATEMENT THAT NO POST-INAUGURATION ALLIANCES CAN BE DISCUSSED NOW, WE HAVE HAD SEVERAL INDICATIONS THAT SOME BLANCOS WHO SUPPORTED CANDIDACY OF GENERAL AGUERRONDO HAVE ALREADY APPROACHED BORDABERRY GROUP ON FUTURE POLITICAL COOPERATION. IF SO, BORDABERRY MIGHT ATTEMPT BUILD PRO-GOVERNMENT LEGISLATIVE MAJORITY COMPOSED OF HIS OWN GROUP, LIST 15 AND THOSE BLANCOS WHO REFUSE TO FOLLOW FERREIRA ALDUNATE'S LEAD. SUCH A COALITION MIGHT ACHIEVE THEORETICAL MAJORITY, BUT ITS MARGIN WOULD BE SO THIN AS TO MAKE IT UNSTABLE EXCEPT ON SPECIFIC ISSUES WHICH DISSIDENT BLANCOS FEEL THEY COULD SUPPORT WITHOUT POLITICAL DAMAGE TO THEMSELVES. LIKE FERREIRA, BORDABERRY

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Authority MMD 9690-15



Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 MONTEV 00196 01 OF 02 281451Z

CONTINUES TO BE MUM ON ANY FUTURE PLANS AND WE BELIEVE THERE IS LITTLE SUBSTANCE TO RUMORS OF HIS CABINET PREFERENCES. EMBASSY OFFICERS WHO RECENTLY MET WITH HIM AT MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE WERE IMPRESSED BY FACT HE GAVE NO OUTWARD SIGN OF INTEREST IN MATTERS BEYOND THOSE OF HIS PRESENT POSITION. ADAIR

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969045



Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 217

PAGE 01 MONTEV 00196 02 OF 02 281438Z

51
ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 SA-03 CIAE-00 INR-06 NSAE-00 P-03 RSC-01

USIA-12 PRS-01 AID-20 CU-04 E-11 H-02 NSC-10 SS-14

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1365
INFO CINCSO
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 MONTEVIDEO 0196

CINCSO FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: URUGUAYAN ELCTIONS - THE COUNT GOES ON...AND ON

REF : MONTEVIDEO 2882

5. "FRENTE AMPLIO" - LEADERS OF MARXIST-DOMINATED COALITION ARE CONCENTRATING THEIR EFFORTS ON MAINTAINING INTERNAL UNITY, AS WELL AS ON ATTEMPTS TO EXACERBATE BLANCO/COLORADO SITUATION WITH REGARD TO VOTE COUNT. FROM ALMOST BEGINNING OF TABULATION, ALL PRO-"FRENTE" MEDIA HAVE ATTACKED COLORADOS AND PACHECO ADMINISTRATION FOR SEEKING TO "DEFRAUD" BLANCOS AND HAVE TRIED TO INFLATE AND SHARPEN BLANCO CRITICISM WHENEVER IT EXPRESSED. FOLLOWING ITS MID-DECEMBER MEETING OF "BASE COMMITTEE" REPRESENTATIVES (A-215 OF DEC 29), "FRENTE" LEADERS HAVE CALLED FOR MASSIVE PUBLIC RALLY ON FEBRUARY 4 IN HONOR OF COALITION'S FIRST ANNIVERSARY AND TO KICK OFF ITS 1972 POLITICAL ACTIVITIES. INTERNALLY, CAS REPORTS INDICATE EXISTENCE OF SOME STRAINS WITHIN "FRENTE" LEADERSHIP, MOST CENTERING ON EFFORTS OF NON-COMMUNIST FACTIONS TO SET UP INTERNAL COALITION TO BALANCE INFLUENCE OF PCU AND ITS FIDEL POLITICAL ARM. MOST SPECULATION IN THIS REGARD CENTERS ON HOW NEWLY ELECTED SENATOR ENRIQUE ERRO AND HIS RESUSCITATED "UNION POPULAR" FACTION WILL BEHAVE. ERRO, UNPREDICTABLE, OPINIONATED AND DOGMATIC WHO WAS PRO-PELLED INTO THE "FRENTE'S" LEADERSHIP RANKS BY A SURPRISING

32
CONFIDENTIAL

Montevideo 2882

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969045



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MONTEV 00196 02 OF 02 281438Z

64,000 VOTES, IS A LONG-TIME OPPONENT OF THE RIGIDLY-DISCIPLINED PCU. POLITICIANS WHO HAVE KNOWN HIM WELL INDICATE ERRO IS DEVISIVE FORCE IN WHATEVER ORGANIZATION HE HAPPENS TO BELONG. FACT HIS GROUP RECEIVED SECOND HIGHEST VOTE IN "FRENTE" COULD PROVE TROUBLESOME FOR PCU AND "FRENTE" LEADERSHIP. NEVER- THELESS, "FRENTE" ORGANIZATION DOES NOT NOW EXHIBIT ANY STRUCTURAL CRACKS WHICH INDICATE ITS UNITY IS IN DOUBT.

6. ELECTIONS OF 72/73? - ONE OF NASTIEST RUMORS NOW MAKING RUNDS IS SPECULATION THAT COLORADO/BLANCO SQUABBLES WILL DEEPEN TO POINT THAT NEW CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS MIGHT BE HELD THIS YEAR OR NEXT. SUCH AN OCCURRENCE IS POSSIBLE UNDER COMPLICATED CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION ALLOWING PRESIDENT IN CERTAIN CASES TO DISSOLVE LEGISLATURE AS RESULT OF CONGRESSIONAL CENSURE OF ONE OR MORE MINISTERS. THIS RUMOR APPEARS TO BE INSPIRED BY HOTHEADS IN BOTH BORDABERRY AND FERREIRA RANKS, WHO CONVINCED THEIR RESPECTIVE LEADERS WOULD BENEFIT FROM SUCH A CONTEST. HOWEVER, MOST POLITICIANS, HAVING JUST COME THROUGH AN EXPENSIVE AND GRUELING PRESIDENTIAL CONTEST, WOULD DOUBTLESS SHRINK IN HORROR FROM REPEATING IT AT CONGRESSIONAL LEVEL IN NEAR FUTURE.

7. PROSPECTS - WITH FINAL ELECTORAL RESULTS STILL PENDING AND WITH URUGUAYAN SUMMER HOLIDAY SEASON IN FULL SWING, FUTURE POLITICAL PROSPECTS REMAIN LARGELY CONJECTURE AND GUESSWORK. MAJOR QUESTION MARK IS NOT SO MUCH ON FUTURE ACTIVITIES OF "FRENTE AMPLIO" OR EVEN OF TERRORISTS GROUPS (WHOSE EFFORTS MOST BELIEVE WILL INCREASE MARKEDLY), BUT RATHER ON WHAT LEVEL OF POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION CAN BE REACHED BETWEEN WHAT NOW LOOKS TO BE BORDABERRY ADMINISTRATION FACED WITH FERREIRA-LED OPPOSITION. INITIAL PUBLIC EUPHORIA OVER DECISIVE DEFEAT OF "FRENTE AMPLIO" AND LARGE-SCALE VOTER TURNOUT IN FAVOR OF TWO TRADITIONAL PARTIES HAS BEEN TARNISHED BY RECENT BITTERNESS OVER MANNER IN WHICH VOTE COUNT HAS PROCEEDED. WHETHER COLORADO AND BLANCO LEADERS CAN OR WILL PUT THIS ASIDE ONCE FINAL ELECTION RESULT KNOWN IS QUESTION TO WHICH NO ONE HERE NOW HAS DEFINITIVE ANSWER. GP-3.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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228

PAGE 01 MONTEV 02882 071215Z

21

ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 SA-03 SS-14 NSC-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00 INR-06

NSAF-00 P-03 RSC-01 USIA-12 PRS-01 AID-20 RSR-01 1086 W
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P R 071059Z DEC 71
FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1109
INFO CINCSO

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CINCSO FOR POLAD

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

DEPT PASS TO ALL ARA POSTS

SUBJECT: URUGUAYAN ELECTION RESULTS: OFFICIAL PRELIMINARY RESULTS

1. SUMMARY: MINISTRY OF INTERIOR OVER WEEKEND RELEASED FINAL OFFICIAL FIGURES RESULTING FROM PRELIMINARY VOTE COUNT. FIGURES DO NOT INCLUDE AN ESTIMATED 160-170,000 "OBSERVED" VOTES (APPROXIMATELY ONE-HALF OF THEM INTER-DEPARTMENTAL BALLOTS) WHICH WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE FINAL COUNT OF THE ELECTORAL COURT WHICH BEGINS TODAY (DECEMBER 6) AND IS EXPECTED TO LAST FOR SEVERAL WEEKS. OVERALL RESULTS ARE AS FOLLOWS: COLORADOS-595,572 (40.8 PERCENT); BLANCOS-585,974 (40.1 PERCENT); "FRENTE AMPLIO"-271,510 (18.6 PERCENT); "UNION RADICAL CRISTIANA"-7402 (0.5 PERCENT). TOTAL NUMBER OF VOTES COUNTED THUS FAR IS 1,460,456. WITHIN THE COLORADO PARTY, AGRICULTURE MINISTER JUAN M. BORDABERRY LEADS JORGE BATLLE BY 325,922 VOTES TO 217,353. IN THE BLANCO PARTY, SENATOR WILSON FERREIRA ALDUNATE LEADS RETIRED GENERAL AGUERRONDO BY 382,720 VOTES TO 202,877. THUS, FERREIRA ALDUNATE EMERGES FROM THE ELECTION AS THE MOST VOTED CANDIDATE OF ALL PARTIES, BUT, BECAUSE OF THE "LEY DE LEMA" WHICH ACCUMULATES VOTES BY PARTY RATHER THAN BY CANDIDATES, HE TRAILS BORDABERRY BY 9,596 VOTES AND BORDABERRY AS

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12-7-71

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NND 969045



Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 MONTEV 02882 071215Z

OF NOW WILL BE THE NEXT PRESIDENT OF URUGUAY. THE "FRENTE AMPLIO'S" CANDIDATE, RETIRED GENERAL LIBER SEREGNI, RAN A POOR THIRD WITH ONLY 271,510 VOTES. THE PROPOSAL TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION TO PERMIT THE REELECTION OF PRESIDENT PACHECO RECEIVED 439,627 VOTES (30.1 PERCENT), BUT PACHECO HIMSELF WON ONLY 372,592 VOTES OR 25.6 PERCENT UNDER THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT. END SUMMARY.

2. THE KEY TO THE STRONG BLANCO PARTY SHOWING WAS THE INTERIOR OF THE COUNTRY WHERE THEY CARRIED 48.4 PERCENT OF THE VOTES COMPARES TO 42.3 PERCENT FOR THE COLORADOS AND ONLY 8.9 PERCENT FOR THE "FRENTE AMPLIO". THE "FRENTE" IN MONTEVIDEO DID LESS WELL THAN EXPECTED WITH ONLY 30.6 PERCENT OF THE VOTE COMPARES TO 38.9 FOR THE COLORADOS AND 29.8 FOR THE BLANCOS.

3. BASED ON THESE PRELIMINARY FIGURES, IT APPEARS THAT THE NEXT CONGRESS WILL BE COMPOSED ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES. THE THIRTY-MAN SENATE WILL HAVE TWELVE COLORADOS, TWELVE BLANCOS AND FIVE "FRENTE AMPLIO" MEMBERS WITH ONE SEAT TO BE DECIDED BETWEEN THE BLANCOS AND COLORADOS ON THE BASIS OF THE FINAL RESULTS. IN THE NINETY-NINE MAN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES, IT APPEARS THAT THE COLORADOS AND BLANCOS WILL HAVE AT LEAST FORTY EACH AND THE "FRENTE AMPLIO" FIFTEEN. FOUR SEATS ARE PENDING THE FINAL COUNT. THE LARGEST SINGLE BLOC OF LEGISLATORS IN BOTH HOUSES WILL BELONG TO THE FERREIRA ALDUNATE SECTOR OF THE BLANCO PARTY.

4. WITHIN THE "FRENTE AMPLIO", THE COMMUNIST PARTY'S ELECTORAL FRONT, FIDEL, DREW 89,291 VOTES OR 6.1 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL VOTES COUNTED. THIS REPRESENTS A SLIGHT INCREASE OVER THE 5.7 PERCENT FIDEL GAINED IN THE 1966 ELECTIONS. THE SECOND LARGEST GROUP IN THE "FRENTE AMPLIO" WAS EX-BLANCO DEPUTY ENRIQUE ERRO'S "UNION POPULAR" WHICH WON 74,106 VOTES OR 5.2 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL. THIS IS AN INTERESTING ACHIEVEMENT CONSIDERING THAT ERRO RECEIVED ONLY 2,655 VOTES IN THE 1966 ELECTION AND SPENT VIRTUALLY NOTHING ON PUBLICITY DURING THE 1971 RACE. THE EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT MOST OF ERRO'S SUPPORT CAME FROM THE RADICAL LEFT INCLUDING SYMPATHIZERS OF THE MLN/"TURAMARO" ORGANIZATION AND ITS POLITICAL FRONT, THE "26TH OF MARCH" MOVEMENT OF INDEPENDENTS. THIRD LARGEST GROUP WITHIN THE "FRENTE" WAS THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY WHICH WON 53,949 VOTES OR 3.7 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL AS AGAINST 3.0

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23
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POL 14 UR
TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 MONTEV 02882 071215Z

IN THE 1966 ELECTIONS. THE SOCIALIST PARTY WON 32,306 VOTES OR 2.2 PERCENT OF TOTAL AS AGAINST 0.9 IN 1966. EX-COLORADO SENATOR MICHELINI CARRIED ONLY 27,585 VOTES OR 1.8 PERCENT OF TOTAL, DOWN FROM 3.9 IN 1966. BASED ON ABOVE FIGURES, THE PRESS SPECULATES THAT THE FIVE "FRENTE AMPLIO" SEATS IN THE SENATE WILL BREAK DOWN TWO EACH TO FIDEL AND PDC AND ONE TO ERRO. IT STILL NOT CLEAR WHETHER SECOND PDC SEAT WILL GO TO MICHELINI LIST OR TO PDC'S OWN CANDIDATE PLA RODRIGUEZ.

5. STIR CREATED BY BLANCO CHARGES LAST WEEK THAT MINISTRY OF INTERIOR HAD MANIPULATED RELEASE OF PRELIMINARY ELECTION RESULTS APPEARS TO BE PASSING. BLANCO PARTY DIRECTORATE ISSUED STATEMENT DECEMBER 4 IN WHICH IT REITERATED CRITICISM OF WAY FIGURES RELEASED BUT SPECIFICALLY DENIED IT HAD CHARGED MINISTER WITH CHANGING FIGURES OR WITH ELECTORAL FRAUD. STATEMENT CONCLUDED THAT IT HOPED THIS WOULD BRING END TO THIS "DISAGREEABLE INCIDENT".

EXEMPT.
ADAIR

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED ARA POSTS.

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POL Cuba- UR
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TELEGRAM
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CONFIDENTIAL 484

PAGE 01 MONTEV 02869 041640Z

51
ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 INR-06 NSAE-00 P-03 RSC-01
USIA-12 PRS-01 NIC-01 SS-14 NSC-10 EUR-14 RSR-01 1078 W
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P R 032137Z DEC 71
FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1099
INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
AMEMBASSY LIMA
AMEMBASSY QUITO
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO

C O N F I D E N T I A L MONTEVIDEO 2869

SUBJECT: GOU CALLS CASTRO REMARKS INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS

1. URUGUAYAN PRESS HAS CARRIED WIRE SERVICE REPORT (AFP) FROM CHILE THAT CUBAN PRIME MINISTER FIDEL CASTRO SAID, AFTER NOVEMBER 28 ELECTIONS "VIOLENCE IS THE ONLY PATH WHICH REMAINS IN URUGUAY TO ACQUIRE POWER". CASTRO REPORTEDLY MADE REMARK IN INFORMAL CONVERSATION WITH GROUP OF LATIN AMERICAN PRIESTS DURING HIS OFFICIAL VISIT TO CHILE.

2. GOU HAS REACTED BY ISSUING COMMUNIQUE REJECTING "WITH THE GREATEST ENERGY THE NEW INTERFERENCE OF THE CUBAN PRIME MINISTER IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF URUGUAY". COMMUNIQUE CALLS REMARKS "FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION". LINKING CASTRO'S REMARKS OBLIQUELY WITH DEFEATED "FRENTE AMPLIO", COMMUNIQUE CONTINUES "ANY ONE WHO TRIES TO RECOMMEND HATE AND VIOLENCE TO THEM OFFENDS THE URUGUAYAN PEOPLE; THEY HAVE DEMONSTRATED THIS TO THE WHOLE WORLD WITH THE EXAMPLE OF THEIR FREE AND DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS WHICH ARE THEMSELVES THE MOST CATEGORICAL REJECTION OF VIOLENCE AND HATE."

3. THE GOU ALSO PROTESTED CASTRO REMARKS TO GOVERNMENT OF CHILE THROUGH CHILEAN AMBASSADOR IN MONTEVIDEO YESTERDAY (DECEMBER 21).

CONFIDENTIAL

27

(4)

Montevideo 2869
12-3-71

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 144

PAGE 01 MONTEV 02867 032203Z

83
ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 USIE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00

PM-06 H-02 INR-06 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01

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INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
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CINCSO FOR POLAD

JOINT/STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJECT: ELECTION RESULTS: FOURTEEN - INTERIOR MINISTRY
RELEASES "FINAL" PRELIMINARY FIGURES

REF: MVD 2855 - *POL 14 UR*

1. AT 1700 HOURS TODAY (DECEMBER 31) MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
ISSUED COMMUNIQUE GIVING "FINAL" PRELIMINARY ELECTION RESULTS.
AS SUMMARIZED ON RADIO NEWS REPORTS, TOTALS ARE AS FOLLOWS:
COLORADOS-595,570; BLANCOS-585,974; "FRENTE AMPLIO"-271,510;
URC-7402; OTHERS-523. COLORADO LEAD OVER BLANCOS - 9,596.
INITIAL REPORTS DO NOT INCLUDE BREAKDOWNS BETWEEN INTERIOR
DEPARTMENTS AND MONTEVIDEO.

2. ABOVE FIGURES DO NOT INCLUDE "OBSERVED" VOTES WHICH TODAY'S
PRESS ESTIMATES WILL BE IN NEIGHBORHOOD OF 160-170,000.
IN INTERVIEW IN COLORADO DAILY "EL DIA" TODAY, URUGUAY'S
BEST KNOWN ELECTION EXPERT AND STATISTICIAN, DR. JULIO
FABREGAT, STATES THAT IN THE SEVENTEEN ELECTIONS SINCE
1925, THE "OBSERVED" VOTES HAVE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY ALTERED

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PAGE 02 MONTEV 02867 032203Z

THE OVERALL PERCENTAGE RESULTS OF THE INITIAL VOTE COUNT. HE BELIEVES, THAT IF THE COLORADO PARTY EMERGES FROM THE PRELIMINARY COUNT WITH A MAJORITY OF 10,000 VOTES, THEY WILL ALSO WIN THE ELECTION. SON-IN-LAW OF LEADING BLANCO PRESIDENTIAL CONTENDER, WILSON FERREIRA ALDUNATE, TOLD EMBOFF YESTERDAY THAT FERREIRA FORCES BELIEVE MAXIMUM ADVANTAGE OVER COLORADO PARTY THEY COULD PICK UP FROM "INTERDEPARTMENTAL" VOTES IS IN NEIGHBORHOOD OF 6,000 VOTES. HE RAGQPH

ZP

CO CHANCES OF EMERGING VICTORIOUS AFTER ALL VOTES COUNTED AT TWENTY OUT OF ONE HUNDRED. NONETHELESS, BOTH BLANCO AND COLORADO POLITICIANS WITH WHOM WE HAVE SPOKEN AGREE THAT BECAUSE OF CLOSE ELECTION, FINAL RESULTS MAY NOT BE KNOWN DEFINITELY UNTIL AFTER ELECTORAL COURT COMPLETES RECOUNT IN LATE JANUARY OR EARLY FEBRUARY OF NEXT YEAR. EXEMPT. ADAIR

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Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 MONTEV 02855 022031Z

47
ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-06 H-02 INR-06 L-03 NSAE-00
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P R 021920Z DEC 71
FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1091
INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
CINCSO

C O N F I D E N T I A L MONTEVIDEO 2855

CINCSO FOR POLAD

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJ: ELECTION RETURNS: THIRTEEN - WHY THE DELAY?

REF: MVD 2855 - POL 14 UR

1. NEARLY FOUR DAYS HAVE ELAPSED SINCE NOVEMBER 28 ELECTION AND GENERAL UNHAPPINESS WITH LONG DELAY IN COUNTING THE VOTE IS MANIFEST. THERE IS NO REPEAT NO EVIDENCE TO INDICATE THAT THIS DELAY DUE TO FRAUDULENT PRACTICES ON ELECTION DAY ITSELF. RATHER, WE BELIEVE IT BROUGHT ABOUT BY SERIES OF FACTORS WHICH COMBINED TO PRODUCE SITUATION WE NOW EXPERIENCING:

A - ELECTORAL COURT - ALTHOUGH ELECTORAL COURT IS SUPPOSED TO BE PERMANENT BODY, MANY POSITIONS ON IT HAD FALLEN VACANT THROUGH RESIGNATIONS SINCE 1966 CONTEST. COURT WAS ONLY FORMALLY REESTABLISHED LESS THAN ONE MONTH BEFORE ELECTION DAY. THUS, COURT OFFICIALS HAD LITTLE TIME TO ORGANIZE FOR WHAT OBVIOUSLY WOULD BE VERY HIGH VOTER TURNOUT.

CONFIDENTIAL
7

Montevideo 2855
12-2-71

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Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE #2 MONTEV 02855 022031Z

B - CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT - PRESENTATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT TO PERMIT REELECTION OF PRESIDENT UNDOUBTEDLY CONTRIBUTED TO THE SLOW COUNTING OF OFFICIAL RETURNS. INSTEAD OF SIMPLY TOTALING SINGLE LISTS OF CANDIDATES, COURT OFFICIALS HAD TO ADD UP VOTES FOR CANDIDATES UNDER PRESENT CONSTITUTION AS WELL AS "REFORMED" CONSTITUTION HAD AMENDMENT PASSED, PLUS "YES" VOTES FOR AMENDMENT ITSELF. FOR THOSE WHO WISHED SUPPORT PRESIDENT PACHECO AND HIS ALTERNATE BORDABERRY, FIVE SEPARATE BALLOTS WERE REQUIRED, ALL OF WHICH HAD TO BE SORTED OUT BY COURT OFFICIALS.

C - ELECTION OFFICIALS - ON ELECTION DAY, HUNDREDS OF VOTING BOOTHS WERE MANNED ESSENTIALLY BY AMATEURS WHOSE EXPERIENCE LIMITED TO WHATEVER WORK THEY HAD DONE DURING PREVIOUS ELECTIONS. PRESIDENT OF EACH POLLING PLACE WAS CONFRONTED BY HIGHLY DETAILED THIRTY-FIVE PAGE BOOKLET OF INSTRUCTIONS, KNOWLEDGE OF WHICH WAS IMPORTANT TO ORDERLY COMPUTATION OF VOTE. MANY POLLING PLACES OPENED LATE, OTHERS DID NOT HAVE COMPLETE SETS OF VOTING LISTS AND IN NEARLY ALL CASES, PRESIDENTS OF EACH VOTING MESA HAD NOT CONDUCTED "DRY RUN" WITH OTHER OFFICIALS TO IRON OUT IN ADVANCE ANY PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS.

D - VOTER TURNOUT - UPON THIS RATHER CREAKY AND ANTIQUATED SYSTEM FELL 400,000 MORE VOTES THAN OCCURRED IN 1966, AN INCREASE OF ONE-THIRD. WE BELIEVE THIS LARGE TURNOUT DUE PARTLY TO NEW OBLIGATORY VOTING LAW WHICH WAS IN EFFECT FOR FIRST TIME AND PARTLY TO SIGNIFICANCE OF ISSUES TO BE DECIDED. CRUSH OF VOTERS CAUSED COURT OFFICIALS TO PROLONG VOTING PERIOD UNTIL MIDNIGHT, THUS COUNTING DID NOT BEGIN UNTIL SIXTEEN HOURS AFTER POLLS OPENED. MANY OFFICIALS WERE PROBABLY EXHAUSTED AND SOMEWHAT INATTENTIVE.

E - MINISTRY OF INTERIOR - TRADITIONALLY, POLICEMEN AT EACH POLLING BOOTH TURN OVER INITIAL RESULTS TO THEIR PRECINCTS WHICH IN TURN FORWARD THEM TO MINISTRY OF INTERIOR FOR PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT. HOWEVER, BY MIDNIGHT SOME POLLS HAD ALREADY CLOSED OR OFFICIALS HAD DRIFTED OFF. INITIAL DATA AVAILABLE TO POLICE WAS OFTEN FRAGMENTARY. THUS, COUNT WAS CONFUSED AND DELAYED FROM THE START. WHEN CLOSENESS OF ELECTION BECAME APPARENT, PRESSURE INCREASED GREATLY ON INTERIOR MINISTRY OFFICIALS FOR RAPID

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Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 MONTEV 02855 022031Z

RESULTS AND GIVEN FRAGMENTARY AND CONFLICTING INFORMATION BEING FORWARDED TO THEM, ERRORS AND DELAYS WERE INEVITABLE.

2. IN FIRST TWO DAYS FOLLOWING THE ELECTIONS, MOOD OF BOTH BLANCOS AND COLORADOS WAS EUPHORIC. THEY FELT THEY HAD FACED THE MENACE OF "FRENTE AMPLIO" AND HAD OVERCOME IT. DOWNTOWN STREETS OF MONTEVIDEO WERE ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS FILLED WITH SUPPORTERS OF BOTH PARTIES, BOISTEROUS IN THEIR CLAIMS THAT URUGUAYAN DEMOCRACY HAD TRIUMPHED WITH THE "FRENTE'S" DEFEAT. IT IS UNFORTUNATE THAT IN PAST TWO DAYS, LONG DELAY IN VOTE COUNT HAS COOLED THESE EXPRESSIONS OF PUBLIC PRIDE AS IT HAS BECOME EVIDENT THAT ELECTORAL MACHINERY IS NOT PERFORMING AS WELL AS ELECTORATE. AT THE SAME TIME, IT IS IMPORTANT TO KEEP IN MIND THAT ALTHOUGH SPOKESMEN OF TRADITIONAL PARTIES AND THE "FRENTE AMPLIO" HAVE CHARGED EACH OTHER WITH A VARIETY OF HARRASSING TACTICS DURING ELECTION DAY, NONE CLAIM THAT SUCH ACTIVITIES ALTERED THE OVERALL STANDINGS BETWEEN THE THREE PRINCIPAL CONTENDING POLITICAL FORCES. CUSTOMARY SECOND COUNT OF ALL VOTES IS SCHEDULED TO BEGIN MORNING OF DECEMBER 3 BY ELECTORAL COURT. WE CANNOT PREDICT EXACTLY WHEN RESULTS OF THIS FINAL COUNT WILL BE AVAILABLE, BUT IT OBVIOUS THAT MAJORITY OF URUGUAYAN PUBLIC IS ANXIOUS AND EAGER TO KNOW WHO WILL BE NATION'S NEXT CHIEF EXECUTIVE. GP-3.
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PAGE 01 MONTEV 02850 031136Z

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ACTION ARA-14

21
ACTION ARA-14
INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 DODF-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 USIE-00
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NSC-10 AID-20 RSR-01

O R 021557Z DEC 71 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1088
INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
CINCSO

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CINCSO FOR POLAD
MESSAGE

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE
SUBJ: ELECTION RESULTS: TWELVE - COLORADOS MAINTAIN
SLIGHT LEAD

REF: MVD 2842 - POL 14UR

REF: MVD 2842 - POL 14 UR

1. AS OF 1100 HOURS TODAY (DECEMBER 21, LATEST ELECTION RESULTS ISSUED BY MINISTRY OF INTERIOR, WHICH IT SAYS REPRESENTS ALL VOTES CAST IN INTERIOR AND ALL BUT TWO BALLOT BOXES IN MONTEVIDEO, SHOW FOLLOWING RESULTS: COLORADOS-594,800; BLANCOS-583,957; "FRENTE AMPLIO"-271,339; URC-7434. COLORADO LEAD OVER BLANCOS IS 10,843 VOTES. PERCENTAGES VIRTUALLY UNCHANGED FROM PREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED RESULTS.

INTERIOR COMMUNIQUE SHOWS TOTAL VALID VOTES FOR MINISTRY'S OWN FIGURES FOR THEY TOTAL

2. MINISTRY OF INTERIOR COMMUNIQUE SHOWS TOTAL VALID VOTES AT 1,434,006. HOWEVER, WHEN MINISTRY'S OWN FIGURES FOR VOTES FOR INDIVIDUAL PARTIES ARE COMPUTED, THEY TOTAL 1,457,530 I.E., 23,524 MORE THAN SHOWN BY MINISTRY. THIS IS NUB OF PROBLEM WHICH HAS CAUSED ANGRY STORM OF

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PAGE 02 MONTEV 02850 031136Z

BLANCO PROTESTS. PAST SEVERAL MINISTRY OF INTERIOR COMMUNIQUE'S HAVE SHOWN SAME INTERNAL INCONSISTENCY. BLANCOS CHARGE THAT DISCREPANCY IS DUE TO ERRONEOUS CREDITING OF VOTES CAST FOR PRESIDENT PACHECO UNDER PROPOSED CONSTITUTION AS VOTES CAST FOR BORDABERRY UNDER PRESENT CONSTITUTION. FURTHER INCONSISTENCY IN MINISTRY FIGURES ARISES WHEN ONE TAKES MINISTRY'S LATEST FIGURE OF 1,635,617 VOTES CAST, AND SUBTRACTS OUR TOTAL OF THE MINISTRY'S FIGURE FOR VALID VOTES - 1,457,530; ANNULLED VOTES - 8037; OBSERVED VOTES - 87,598; AND BLANK VOTES - 2,476. THIS LEAVES 79,976 VOTES UNACCOUNTED FOR. WE BELIEVE, BUT CANNOT ESTABLISH, THAT THIS FIGURE PROBABLY REPRESENTS INTERDEPARTMENTAL OR ABSENTEE VOTES.

3. DESPITE EARLIER REPORT REFTEL THAT BLANCO PARTY DIRECTORATE WOULD ACCEPT MINISTER OF INTERIOR SENA'S INVITATION TO VISIT MINISTRY AND REVIEW ALL DATA, ONLY ONE REPRESENTATIVE OF DIRECTORATE SHOWED UP. SENA HELD PRESS CONFERENCE LAST NIGHT IN WHICH HE REJECTED BLANCO CHARGES THAT MINISTRY WAS MANIPULATING RELEASE OF FIGURES AND ENUMERATED DIFFICULTIES IN ARRIVING AT ACCURATE FINAL COUNT. HE CONCEDED THAT SOME ERRORS IN COMPUTATION HAD BEEN MADE AND SAID THEY WERE BEING CORRECTED AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE. HOWEVER, IN QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD, HE UNABLE TO ACCOUNT FOR APPARENT LARGE DISCREPANCIES IN THE FIGURES.

4. COMMENT: EMBASSY OF OPINION THAT PRESENT CONFUSED SITUATION DUE TO INADEQUATE ORGANIZATION, INEXPERIENCED PERSONNEL, AND FATIGUE FACTOR WHICH GRIPPING MINISTRY PERSONNEL ROUGHLY EIGHT-FOUR HOURS AFTER VOTE COUNT BEGAN. FATIGUE WAS PROBABLY RESPONSIBLE FOR SHORT TEMPER ON BLANCO SIDE. IN ANY EVENT, AS PART OF NORMAL PROCEDURE, ALL VOTES WILL BE RECOUNTED BY ELECTORAL COURT BEGINNING DECEMBER 3 AND FINAL OUTCOME MAY NOT BE KNOWN FOR SOME TIME. EXEMPT.
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NOTE BY OC/T: (H)AS RECEIVED. WILL BE SERVICED ON REQUEST.

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PAGE 01 MONTEV 02842 012021Z

47 ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 CCO-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00

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RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-14 AID-20 PC-04 RSR-01 1086 W
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O R 011951Z DEC 71
FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1082
INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
CINCSO

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CINCSO FOR POLAD

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJECT: ELECTION RESULTS: ELEVEN - COLORADO LEAD INCREASES
SLIGHTLY

REF : MONTEVIDEO 2838 - POL 14 UR

1. COUNT OF REMAINING THIRTY-EIGHT MONTEVIDEO BALLOT BOXES
HAS CONTINUED THROUGH DAY. WITH RESULTS OF ELEVEN STILL TO
BE ANNOUNCED, COLORADO PARTY LEAD OVER BLANCOS IS 10,651 AS
OF 1630 HOURS LOCAL. RESULTS OF NINE OF ELEVEN BOXES TO BE
ANNOUNCED THIS EVENING. FOR UNSPECIFIED REASONS, REMAINING
TWO BOXES WILL BE TURNED OVER TO ELECTORAL COURT FOR COM-
PILATION. ACCORDING TO MINISTRY OF INTERIOR COMMUNIQUE WHEN
RESULTS OF ABOVE NINE ARE ANNOUNCED NO FURTHER COMMUNIQUE
WILL BE ISSUED BY MINISTRY UNTIL MIDDAY DECEMBER 3.

2. BLANCO PARTY DIRECTORATE, WHICH EARLIER ATTACKED MINISTRY
OF INTERIOR COMMUNIQUE AS "ERRONEOUS", HAS NOW ACCEPTED INVI-
TATION BY MININTERIOR SENA TO VISIT MINISTRY AND REVIEW ALL
DATA AND RESULTS. THERE WERE REPORTS OF A STREET DEMONSTRATION

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PAGE 02 MONTEV 02842 012021Z

TION IN FRONT OF FERREIRA'S HEADQUARTERS AT MID AFTERNOON TODAY, WITH DEMONSTRATORS SHOUTING "FRAUD". HOWEVER, THESE GROUPS DISPERSED PEACEFULLY AFTER DIRECTORATE ACCEPTED MINISTRY'S INVITATION.

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Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 MONTEV 02836 011525Z

50

ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 SSD-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00

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O R 011449Z DEC 71
FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1079
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CINCSO FOR POLAD

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJ: ELECTION RESULTS: NINE - LATEST TOTALS

REF: MYD 2836 POL 14 UR

1. AT 1130 HOURS LOCAL TODAY (DECEMBER 11), COLORADO NATIONAL LEAD OVER BLANCO PARTY STANDS AT 9,389. THIRTY-EIGHT MONTEVIDEO BALLOT BOXES WHICH WERE NOT COUNTED IN INITIAL TOTALS ARE NOW BEING EXAMINED BY ELECTORAL COURT OFFICIALS. FINAL OFFICIAL MONTEVIDEO VOTE EXPECTED THIS AFTERNOON. AS OF THIS MOMENT, MONTEVIDEO TOTAL STANDS AT 642,135 WITH BREAKDOWN AS FOLLOWS: COLORADOS-249,705 (38.9 PERCENT); "FRENTE AMPLIO"-196,957 (30.7 PERCENT); BLANCOS-191,945 (29.9 PERCENT); URC-3,528 (0.5 PERCENT). OSCAR RACHETTI, CANDIDATE OF PRO-PACHECO UNR FACTION, ELECTED MAYOR OF MONTEVIDEO BY SUBSTANTIAL MARGIN OVER LIST 15 CANDIDATE PINTOS RISSO.

2. UNOFFICIAL TOTAL FOR ALL EIGHTEEN INTERIOR DEPARTMENTS IS 807,762. BREAKDOWN INTERIOR VOTE IS: BLANCOS-389,906 (48.3);

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28

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12-1-71

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PAGE 02 MONTEV 02836 011525Z

COLORADOS-341,535 (42.3); "FRENTE AMPLIO"-72,435 (8.9);
URC-3,886 (0.5).

3. TOTAL NATIONWIDE VOTE ANNOUNCED THIS MORNING IS 1,594,663 OR APPROXIMATELY 88 PERCENT OF TOTAL REGISTERED VOTE. OF THIS NUMBER, 1,449,887 BALLOTS HAVE BEEN COUNTED BY ELECTORAL AUTHORITIES, BROKEN DOWN AS FOLLOWS: COLORADOS-591,240 (40.7); BLANCOS-581,851 (40.1); "FRENTE AMPLIO"-269,382 (18.6); URC-7,414 (0.6). WITHIN COLORADO PARTY, BORDABERRY HAS APPROXIMATE VOTE OF 324,000 TO BATLLE'S 215,000. AMONG BLANCOS, FERREIRA TOTAL IS 380,000 TO AGUERRONDO'S 200,000. ACCORDING TO LATEST REPORT, THERE WERE 8001 ANNULLED VOTES OR 0.5 PERCENT OF TOTAL. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TOTAL VOTE CAST AND TOTAL COUNTED TO MOMENT IS 136,775. THIS REPRESENTS LATEST ESTIMATE OF "OBSERVED" VOTES, MOST OF WHICH ARE IN "ABSENTEE" CATEGORY. SEVERAL DAYS TO WEEK MAY BE NEEDED TO COUNT ABSENTEE VOTES, AND CONSIDERABLY LONGER FOR THOSE VOTES WHOSE LEGALITY WAS CHALLENGED BY ELECTION OFFICIALS.

4. COLORADO PARTY ELECTED "INTENDENTES" IN FIVE DEPARTMENTS (MONTEVIDEO, MALDONADO, CANELONES, ARTIGAS AND PAYSANDU). PRO-PACHECO UNR HOLDS THREE OF THESE, WHILE BATLLE'S LIST IS TWO (ARTIGAS AND PAYSANDU). OF FOURTEEN BLANCO DEPARTMENTS FERREIRA ALDUNATE FORCES ELECTED "INTENDENTES" IN SIX AND AGUERRONDO COALITION EIGHT.

5. OF OVERALL 18.6 PERCENT OF TOTAL RECEIVED BY "FRENTE AMPLIO", COMMUNIST FIDEL FACTION HAS NOW RECEIVED 5.8 PERCENT, SAME AS ITS 1966 FIGURE. PDC HAS 3.8 PERCENT OF TOTAL WHILE EX-COLORADO MICHELINI/ROBALLO GROUP SUNK TO 1.7 PERCENT (APPROXIMATELY 25,000 VOTES) REMAINING PERCENTAGES BELONG TO "UNION POPULAR" AND SOCIALIST FRONT.

6. DIVISION OF CONGRESSIONAL SEATS MUST AWAIT BREAKDOWN OF THOSE VOTES NOT YET COUNTED. HOWEVER, ROUGH ESTIMATE BASED ON CURRENT FIGURES WOULD GIVE COLORADOS AND BLANCOS TWELVE EACH IN SENATE, WITH SIX FOR "FRENTE AMPLIO". IN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES, BLANCOS-42, COLORADOS-40 AND "FRENTE AMPLIO"-17. PACHECO UNR FACTION DOMINATES COLORADO CONGRESSIONAL RACE, WHILE FERREIRA ALDUNATE WILL LIKELY HAVE DOUBLE THE NUMBER OF SEATS TO BE ALLOTTED TO AGUERRONDO.

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PAGE 03 MONTEV 02836 011525Z

WE WISH EMPHASIZE THAT THESE TOTALS ARE ONLY APPROXIMATIONS
AND WILL PROBABLY CHANGE SOMEWHAT AS OFFICIAL TOTALS BECOME
KNOWN. EXEMPT.

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PAGE 01 MONTEV 02838 020153Z

91
ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00
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O R 011827Z DEC 71
FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1081
INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
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CINCSO FOR POLAD

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJECT: ELECTION RESULTS: TEN - BLANCO DIRECTORATE ATTACKS
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

REF: MONTEVIDEO 2836 - POL 14 UR

1. SHORTLY AFTER NOON TODAY (DECEMBER 11), DIRECTORATE OF BLANCO PARTY ISSUED ANGRY DENUNCIATION OF MINISTRY OF INTERIOR, CHARGING OVERALL ELECTION RESULTS ANNOUNCED BY MINISTRY DO NOT AGREE WITH MINISTRY'S OWN DETAILED COMPILATION OF ELECTORAL RESULTS. BLANCOS CHARGES CAME AFTER DIRECTORATE MEETING ATTENDED BY BOTH OF PARTY'S PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES. DIRECTORATE NOTED THAT IT HAD RECEIVED TABLE CONTAINING MINISTRY'S DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF VOTES COUNTED THUS FAR, BUT DISCOVERED THESE DIFFERENT FROM VOTE SUMMARY ISSUED BY MINISTRY AT 0130 HOURS TODAY. DIRECTORATE DECLARED THAT MINISTRY "DOES NOT MERIT OUR CONFIDENCE" AND CALLED UPON ARMED FORCES TO TAKE OVER PUBLICIZING RETURNS.

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PAGE 02 MONTEV 02838 020153Z

2. DIRECTORATE DID NOT SPECIFY NUMBERS INVOLVED OR EXACTLY WHICH PARTY HAD BENEFITED, ALTHOUGH SENATOR FERREIRA IN PRESS INTERVIEW FOLLOWING BLANCO MEETING OBVIOUSLY BELIEVES MININTERIOR FIGURES FAVOR BORDABERRY FORCES. NEITHER FERREIRA NOR DIRECTORATE CLAIMING THAT ANY IRREGULARITIES HAVE OCCURRED IN THE VOTE COUNT ITSELF. RATHER, THEY CHARGE ONLY THAT THE INTERIOR MINISTRY'S COMMUNIQUE ARE ERRONEOUS.

3. IN RESPONSE, MININTERIOR SENA HAS PUBLICALLY INVITED BLANCO DIRECTORATE AND CANDIDATES TO MINISTRY TO EXAMINE ALL DATA AVAILABLE AND MANNER IN WHICH VOTES BEING TABULATED. MINISTER HAS ALSO EMPHASIZED THAT RESPONSIBILITY FOR FINAL TABULATION RESTS WITH ELECTORAL COURT.

4. COMMENT: AS CAN BE EXPECTED WITH NO CLEAR RESULT TWO AND ONE-HALF DAYS AFTER POLLS CLOSED, TEMPER ARE BEGINNING TO FRAY AND NERVES ARE RAGGED, ESPECIALLY AMONG FERREIRA FORCES WHO CAMPAIGNED SO HARD AND BELIEVE THEY ARE SO CLOSE TO VICTORY.

EXEMPT

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PAGE 01 MONTEV 02830 302118Z

90

ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 INRE-00 SSD-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
INR-06 NSAE-00 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 USIE-00 PM-06
NSC-10 SS-14 AID-20 PC-04 RSR-01 /081 W 082259

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CINCSO FOR POLAD

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJECT: ELECTION RESULTS: EIGHT - RACE REMAINS CLOSE

REF : MONTEVIDEO 2819 - POL 14 UR

1. AS OF 1800 HOURS TODAY (NOVEMBER 30), ELECTION OUTCOME REMAINS UNCERTAIN AS OFFICIAL VOTE TABULATIONS CONTINUE VERY SLOWLY. MINISTRY OF INTERIOR THIS AFTERNOON HAS ISSUED SEVERAL COMMUNIQUEES GIVING FINAL RESULTS IN DEPARTMENTS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED IN PART, AND CORRECTING FINAL TOTALS GIVEN PREVIOUSLY. NET RESULT LEAVES SITUATION BASICALLY UNCHANGED FROM REFTEL, WITH COLORADOS LEADING BLANCOS BY MARGIN OF 10,969 VOTES AT PRESENT TIME. DELAYS DUE TO DIFFICULTIES IN LOCATING BALLOT BOXES FROM SOME THIRTY-EIGHT MONTEVIDEO POLLING PLACES, AND DELAYS IN OBTAINING FINAL RESULTS FOR DEPARTMENTS OF RIVERA AND TACUAREMBO. IT WILL PROBABLY BE TOMORROW BEFORE THESE RESULTS FINAL.

2. WE STILL UNABLE TO OBTAIN FIRM ESTIMATE OF NUMBER OF "OBSERVED" BALLOTS. HOWEVER, IT NOW APPEARS THAT TOTAL NUMBER OF

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PAGE 02 MONTEV 02830 302118Z

THESE VOTES WILL BE IN AREA OF 80,000. ONE PROBLEM IS THAT THIS IS CLOSEST URUGUAYAN ELECTION SINCE 1920'S, AND THESE VOTES HAVE NEVER PLAYED A DECISIVE ROLE IN OUTCOME OF ELECTION SINCE THEN. AS RESULT, POLITICAL EXPERTS SIMPLY HAVE NOT PAID CLOSE ATTENTION TO THEM IN RECENT YEARS.

3. PUBLIC ORDER SITUATION SINCE ELECTION HAS REMAINED EXTREMELY CALM. BOTH BLANCOS AND COLORADO SUPPORTERS STAGED VICTORY CELEBRATIONS IN DOWNTOWN MONTEVIDEO LAST NIGHT. POLICE REPORT NO INCIDENTS BETWEEN POLITICAL PARTISANS OF ANY PARTY. THEY EXPECT SITUATION TO REMAIN QUIET FOR NEXT SEVERAL DAYS UNTIL FINAL OUTCOME IS FULLY CLEAR.

EXEMPT.
ADAIR

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PAGE 01 MONTEV 02819 301703Z

45

ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 PM-06 NSC-10
 SS-14 RSC-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 INR-06 NSAE-00 P-03
 PRS-01 AID-20 PC-04 RSR-01 /081 W

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O R 301607Z NOV 71
 FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1067
 INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
 AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
 CINCSO

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CINCSO FOR POLAD

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJ: ELECTION RESULTS: SEVEN - COLORADO LEAD CONTINUES
 TO NARROW

REF: MVD 2814 - *POL 14 UR*

1. AS OF NOON TODAY (NOVEMBER 30), PARTIAL OFFICIAL FIGURES SHOW COLORADO PARTY LEAD OVER BLANCOS IN RACE FOR PRESIDENCY HAS NARROWED TO 10,134 VOTES OUT OF TOTAL COUNTED THUS FAR OF 1,410,000. BLANCO SHOWING IN INTERIOR CONTINUES TO BE VERY STRONG AND THEY NOW EXPECTED TO CARRY FOURTEEN OF NINETEEN DEPARTMENTS. COLORADOS LEADING ONLY IN MONTEVIDEO, CANELONES, ARTIGAS, RIVERA AND MALDONADO. COLORADO LEAD IN CANELONES UNOFFICIALLY REPORTED AT 2,000 VOTES. OFFICIAL TOTALS AT PRESENT TIME ARE AS FOLLOWS:
 COLORADOS-575,690 (40.6 PERCENT); BLANCOS-565,556 (40.0 PERCENT); "FRENTE AMPLIO"-262,390 (18.5 PERCENT); URC - 6,928 (0.5 PERCENT). AMENDMENT TO PERMIT REELECTION OF PRESIDENT HAS RECEIVED 427,627 VOTES (30.1 PERCENT OF TOTAL).

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PAGE 02 MONTEV 02819 301703Z

2. IN COLORADO PARTY, BORDABERRY LEADING WITH 313,364 VOTES, FOLLOWED BY RATLLE (209,300 VOTES), AND VASCONCELLOS (41,874). IN BLANCO PARTY, FERREIRA LEADING WITH 366,665 VOTES TO AGUERRONDO'S 195,767. MINOR CANDIDATES ACCOUNT FOR DIFFERENCES IN TOTALS.

3. NO OFFICIAL FIGURES HAVE BEEN GIVEN ON NUMBER OF "OBSERVED BALLOTS" AND THERE SOME CONFLICT BETWEEN UNOFFICIAL ESTIMATES WHICH RUN FROM 79,000 TO 150,000. THIS DISCREPANCY MAY BE ACCOUNTED FOR BY FACT THAT THERE TWO DISTINCT KINDS OF "OBSERVED BALLOTS". FIRST CATEGORY INCLUDES LOCAL EQUIVALENT OF OUR ABSENTEE BALLOTS. SECOND CATEGORY COMPOSED PRINCIPALLY OF PERSONS WHOSE VOTE CHALLENGED AT VOTING BOOTH, USUALLY FOR INADEQUATE IDENTIFICATION OR TO CLERICAL ERROR IN PREPARING VOTER LISTS. WE PRESENTLY ATTEMPTING TO OBTAIN MORE SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON THIS POINT.

4. OFFICIAL INFORMATION NOT YET AVAILABLE ON BREAKDOWN OF VOTE TOTALS WITHIN THE VARIOUS "SUB-LEMAS". ONLY UNOFFICIAL ESTIMATES THUS FAR PUBLISHED IN PRO-FRENTE "AHORA" THIS MORNING, AND SHOW "FRENTE AMPLIO" BREAKDOWN AS FOLLOWS: PDC-50,914; MICHELINI/ROBALLO-23,698; FIDEL-75,502; SOCIALISTS-25,268; UNION POPULAR-57,879. THIS WILL PROBABLY GIVE "FRENTE AMPLIO" FIVE SENATORS - ONE PDC; TWO FIDEL; ONE UNION POPULAR AND ONE FOR EITHER SOCIALISTS OR MICHELINI. IT APPEARS SENATOR ALBA ROBALLO AND DEPUTIES PREVITAL AND ARIEL COLLAZO HAVE BEEN DEFEATED.

5. "FRENTE AMPLIO" PAPERS TODAY TAKING DEFEAT IN STRIDE. THEY QUOTE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE SEREGNI TO EFFECT THAT, "YOU DON'T MAKE A REVOLUTION IN EIGHT MONTHS". PAPERS URGE "FRENTE" SUPPORTERS TO CONTINUED MILITANCY, PARTICULARLY WITHIN "BASE COMMITTEES".

6. WE EXPECT ADDITIONAL OFFICIAL RETURNS TO BE RELEASED LATER THIS AFTERNOON.
EXEMPT.
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PAGE 01 MONTEV 02814 292344Z

91

ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 USIE-00

INRE-00 PM-06 H-02 INR-06 L-03 NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01

PRS-01 SS-14 RSR-01 CCO-00 /062 W

O R 292315Z NOV 71
FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1062 IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
USCINCSO

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CINCSO FOR POLAD

JOINT STATE DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJECT: ELECTION RESULTS: SIX - COLORADO-BLANCO RACE
TIGHTENS

REF: MONTEVIDEO 2812 - POL 14 UR

1. AS OF 2000 HOURS LOCAL TODAY (NOVEMBER 29), COLORADO PARTY
LEAD OVER BLANCOS IN RACE FOR PRESIDENCY HAS NARROWED TO 25,000
VOTES OR UNDER. THROUGHOUT AFTERNOON HOURS, STRONG BLANCO
SHOWING IN INTERIOR AREAS CUT INTO COLORADO LEAD IN MONTEVIDEO
(REFTEL) AND AS OF 1930 HOURS, OFFICIAL TOTALS OF NATIONAL RACE
WERE AS FOLLOWS: COLORADOS - 401,900 (39.78 PERCENT); BLANCOS -
376,700 (37.28 PERCENT); "FRENTE AMPLIO" - 225,000 (22 PERCENT).

2. SEVEN INTERIOR DEPARTMENTS STILL LACK OFFICIAL RESULTS INCLUDING
POPULOUS DEPARTMENTS OF CANELONES, COLONIA, SALTO, AND
PAYSANDU. FIVE OF SEVEN ARE FORECAST TO PRODUCE BLANCO MAJORITIES
OF VARYING DEGREES.

3. LATEST OFFICIAL COUNT OF ABSENTEE OR "OBSERVED" BALLOTS AS OF

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PAGE 02 MONTEV 02814 292344Z

LATE AFTERNOON WAS 160,000. IF AS EXPECTED COLORADO LEAD IN NATION CONTINUES TO DIMISH, IT OBVIOUS THAT SPLIT IN THESE ARSENTEE BALLOTS WILL BE CRUCIAL FACTOR. IT MAY TAKE SEVERAL DAYS BEFORE "OBSERVED" VOTES ARE COUNTED.

4. WITHIN COLORADO PARTY, MIN AGRICULTURE BORDABERRY CONTINUES TO MAINTAIN CLEAR LEAD OVER JORGE BATLLE. ESTIMATES OF VOTES CAST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT TO PERMIT RE-ELECTION OF PRESIDENT NOW AT BETWEEN 25-30 PERCENT. WE EXPECT "FRENTE AMPLIO" TOTAL OF 22 PERCENT TO DIMISH AS REMAINING INTERIOR RESULTS BECOME KNOWN. TABULATION OF MONTEVIDEO VOTE HAS NOT CHANGED FROM FIGURES SUBMITTED REFTEL.
EXEMPT
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31



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PAGE 01 MONTEV 02812 291523Z

40
ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 INRE-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 CIAE-00
DODE-00 INR-06 NSAE-00 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 PM-06

NSC-10 SS-14 AID-20 RSR-01 1077 W
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O R 291455Z NOV 71
FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1061
INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
CINCSO

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JOINT STATE DEFENSE MESSAGE -- CINCSO FOR POLAD
SUBJECT: ELECTION RESULTS: FIVE - OFFICIAL RESULTS FOR
MONTEVIDEO

REF: MVD 2811 - POL 14 UR

1. AT 1130 HOURS LOCAL TODAY (NOVEMBER 29), MINISTRY OF
INTERIOR RELEASED OFFICIAL VOTE TABULATION FOR 2786 OF MONTEVIDEO'S
2744 VOTING BOOTHS. NEARLY COMPLETED RETURNS IN MONTEVIDEO
TOTALLED 641,053 WITH BREAKDOWN AS FOLLOWS: COLORADOS - 249,074
(40 PERCENT); BLANCOS - 191,494 (30 PERCENT); FRENTE AMPLIO -
196,957 (30 PERCENT)

2. ABOVE FIGURES DUPLICATE GALLUP PROJECTIONS FOR MONTEVIDEO SENT
REFTEL. GALLUP BREAKDOWN OF CANDIDATES WITHIN RESPECTIVE PARTIES
CONFIRMED BY OFFICIAL COUNT.

3. MONTEVIDEO VOTE FOR RE-ELECTION AMENDMENT WAS 225,772 OR
35 PERCENT OF TOTAL.

4. WE CONTINUE TO EXPECT SEVERAL MORE HOURS DELAY UNTIL OFFICIAL
TOTALS ARE KNOWN FOR INTERIOR DEPARTMENTS. SUCH OFFICIAL RETURNS
AS ARE AVAILABLE NOW INDICATE THAT "FRENTE AMPLIO" CONTINUING TO
RUN DISTANT THIRD IN INTERIOR AREAS TO BLANCOS AND COLORADOS. WE
SHALL WITHHOLD FURTHER REPORTS UNTIL WE HAVE OFFICIAL INTERIOR
VOTE LATER THIS AFTERNOON.
EXEMPT

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PAGE 01 MONTEV 02811 291352Z

50
ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 INR-06 NSAE-00
P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 H-02 NSCE-00 NSC-10 SS-14 RSR-01
NIC-01 INRE-00 /054 W
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O R 291331Z NOV 71
FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1060
INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
CINCSO

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CINCSO FOR POLAD

JOINT STATE DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJ: ELECTION RESULTS: FOUR - GALLUP PROJECTION NO. 4

REF: MVD 2808 - POL 14 UR

1. GALLUP ORGANIZATION ISSUED ITS FOURTH PROJECTION OF MONTEVIDEO VOTE AT 0930 HOURS LOCAL TODAY (NOVEMBER 29). TOTALS WERE:
COLORADOS - 261,660 (40 PERCENT); BLANCOS - 195,902 (29.9 PERCENT);
FRENTE AMPLIO - 199,000 (30 PERCENT).

2. IN THIS PROJECTION B O R D A B E R R Y SHOWS APPROXIMATELY
15,000 VOTES, 65,000 GREATER THAN B A T L L E. IN BLANCO PARTY,
F E R R E I R A LEADS A G U E R R O N D O 158,000 TO 37,000. WITHIN
FRENTE AMPLIO, COMMUNIST FIDEL FACTION 65,000; MICHELINI/
ROBALLO 65,000; PDC 39,000, AND SOCIALIST AND OTHERS 30,000.

3. GALLUP PROJECTION NO. 5 JUST ISSUED 1015 HOURS LOCAL REVEALED
NO RPT NO CHANGES IN ABOVE PERCENTAGE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PARTIES.
THIS IS FINAL GALLUP PROJECTION FOR MONTEVIDEO.

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11-29-71

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PAGE 01 MONTEV 02809 291200Z

21

ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 USIE-00

CCO-00 SA-03 NSC-10 SS-14 RSC-01 INR-06 P-03 PRS-01

L-03 INRE-00 RSR-01 /057 W

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O R 291134Z NOV 71
 FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1059 IMMEDIATE
 INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
 AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
 CINCSO

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CINCSO FOR POLAD

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJECT: ELECTION RESULTS: THREE - PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS

REF: MVD 2807 - POL 14 UR

1. AS OF 0830 HOURS LOCAL, OVERALL OUTCOME OF ELECTIONS STILL NOT CLEAR DUE TO SLOWNESS OF BOTH OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL RETURNS. HOWEVER, BASED ON SCATTERED PARTIAL RETURNS, TWO CONCLUSIONS ARE EMERGING. FIRST, COMMUNIST-DOMINATED "FRENTE AMPLIO" APPEARS TO HAVE NO REPEAT NO CHANCE OF WINNING PRESIDENCY AND LOCAL COMMENTATORS DISCOUNTING POSSIBILITY OF ITS WINNING MONTEVIDEO CITY RACE. SECOND, IT IS ALSO CLEAR THAT PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO PERMIT THE REELECTION OF PRESIDENT PACHECO WILL FALL CONSIDERABLY SHORT OF THE MAJORITY VOTER APPROVAL REQUIRED BY CONSTITUTION.

2. ON THE NATIONAL SCENE, THE RACE BETWEEN THE COLORADO AND BLANCO PARTIES APPEARS TO BE VERY CLOSE, WITH THE COLORADOS MAINTAINING A SLIGHT EDGE. LOCAL POLITICAL COMMENTATORS AND ANALYSTS ARE PREDICTING A COLORADO VICTORY, BUT HEDGING IT HEAVILY. PARTIAL RETURNS CONTINUE TO SHOW THE COLORADOS WITH A SUBSTANTIAL LEAD IN MONTEVIDEO AND THE BLANCOS WILL BE SUBSTANTIAL LEAD IN THE INTERIOR. HOWEVER, SEVERAL CRITICAL DEPARTMENTS SUCH AS COLONIA AND CANELONES HAVE YET TO GIVE EVEN PRELIMINARY REPORTS, AND THEIR RESULTS WILL HAVE SUBSTANTIAL IMPACT

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PAGE 02 MONTEV 02809 291200Z

ON THE FINAL TOTALS. WITHIN TRADITIONAL PARTIES, MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE BORDABERRI APPEARS TO HAVE SOLID LEAD IN COLORADO PARTY AND SENATOR FERREIRA ALDUNATE HAS OVERWHELMING LEAD IN BLANCO PARTY. "FRENTE AMPLIO" APPEARS LIKELY TO EMERGE FROM ELECTION WITH ROUGHLY TWENTY PERCENT OF VOTE.

3. COMMENT: WITH COMMENTATORS OBSERVING THAT COUNT PROCEEDING WITH "IMPRESSIVE SLOWNESS", MININTERIOR NOW STATING THAT FINAL OFFICIAL RESULTS WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE UNTIL 1800 OR 1900 LOCAL TODAY. THESE RESULTS WILL NOT INCLUDE COUNT OF ABSENTEE BALLOTS.
EXEMPT.
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CONFIDENTIAL 147

PAGE 01 MONTEV 02807 290956Z

12
ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00
DODE-00 INR-06 NSAE-00 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-14 NSC-10
SA-03 RSR-01 /054 W

O R 290930Z NOV 71
FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1057 IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 2071
CINCSO

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CINCSO FOR POLAD

SUBJ: ELECTION RESULTS: TWO - OFFICIAL RETURNS AND
GALLUP PROJECTIONS

REF: MVD 2806 - POL 14 UR

1. SIX HOURS AFTER POLLS HAVE CLOSED, OFFICIAL RESULTS AS RELEASED BY MINISTRY OF INTERIOR CONTINUE TO TRICKLE IN. AT 2600 HOURS LOCAL, BASED ON OFFICIAL RETURNS FROM FIVE HUNDRED VOTING PLACES IN MONTEVIDEO AND TWENTY-EIGHT IN INTERIOR. MINISTRY DECLARED TOTAL OF 147,958 VOTES CAST. BREAKDOWN THIS TOTAL WAS: COLORADOS-59,961; BLANCOS-81,571; "FRENTE AMPLIO"-36,426. BORDABERRY HAS ABOUT 8,000 VOTE LEAD OVER BATLLE IN COLORADO PARTY. MINISTRY ALSO DECLARED THAT 46,913 VOTES HAD BEEN CONFIRMED FOR REELECTION AMENDMENT.
2. GALLUP ORGANIZATION HAS JUST RELEASED ITS FIRST PROJECTION REPEAT PROJECTION OF VOTES IN MONTEVIDEO BASED ON UNOFFICIAL RETURNS IN PRE-SELECTED DISTRICTS. PROJECTED TOTAL OF 664,831 DIVIDES AS FOLLOWS: COLORADOS-272,440 OF 40.0 PERCENT; "FRENTE AMPLIO" - 198,090 OR 29.7 PERCENT; BLANCOS - 194,301 OR 29.1 PERCENT. WITHIN COLORADO PARTY FOR MONTEVIDEO BREAKDOWN (IN ROUND NUMBERS) OF PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES IS: BORDABERRY-151,000, BATLLE-91,000; VASCONCELLOS-44,000. WITHIN BLANCO PARTY, FERREIRA AIDSGATE PROJECTED AT 151,000 AND AGUERRONDO AT 36,000.
3. UNOFFICIAL RETURNS CONTINUE TO SHOW HEAVY BLANCO VOTE

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4

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11-29-71



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PAGE 02 MONTEV 02807 290956Z

IN INTERIOR AREAS, BUT AT PRESENT TIME WE CANNOT ESTIMATE
HOW THIS WILL BALANCE OFF AGAINST COLORADO LEAD IN MONTEVIDEO.
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PAGE 01 MONTEV 02806 290720Z

21
ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 SA-03 INRE-00 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00
USIE-00 CCO-00 SS-14 NSC-10 INR-06 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01
L-03 RSR-01 /057 W ----- 068176

O R 290658Z NOV 71
FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1056
INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
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CINCSO FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: ELECTION RETURNS: ONE - UNOFFICIAL TRENDS FROM
SCATTERED RETURNS

REF: MONTEVIDEO 2805 - POL 14 UR

1. ALTHOUGH AT 0330 HOURS LOCAL, ALL VOTING PLACES HAVE
BEEN CLOSED FOR THREE AND ONE-HALF HOURS AND SOME VOTE
COUNTS HAVE CONTINUED FOR OVER FOUR HOURS, THERE IS AS
YET NO OFFICIAL NATION-WIDE SUMMARY OF RETURNS. CONTRARY
TO EARLIER ESTIMATE, GALLUP HAS NOT REPEAT NOT MADE ITS
INITIAL PROJECTION.

2. HOWEVER, BASED ON LARGE NUMBER OF UNOFFICIAL RETURNS
IN MONTEVIDEO AND INTERIOR, WE JUDGE SITUATION AT THIS POINT
AS FOLLOWS:

A - MONTEVIDEO - COLORADOS ARE MAINTAINING AND PERHAPS
INCREASING LEAD OVER "FRENTE AMPLIO" AND BLANCOS.
BLANCO VOTE AT PRESENT APPEARS AT OR ABOVE THAT OF "FRENTE",
AT CLOSE TO THIRTY PER CENT EACH.

B - INTERIOR - BLANCOS APPEAR TO BE VOTING WELL AHEAD
OF COLORADOS. "FRENTE" TOTALS IN INTERIOR THUS FAR REMAIN

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PAGE 02 MONTEV 02806 290720Z

IN OVERALL TEN PER CENT RANGE.

3. CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT TO PERMIT REELECTION OF PRESIDENT PACHECO RECEIVING ABOUT THIRTY-FIVE PERCENT APPROVAL FROM VOTERS.

4. AMONG COLORADOS, BORDABERRY MAINTAINING VERY DEFINITE LEAD OVER BATLLE, WITH VASCONCELLOS A POOR THIRD. IN BLANCO PARTY, FERREIRA IS ROLLING UP TWO TO THREE TIMES VOTES OF AGUERRONDO, ESPECIALLY IN MONTEVIDEO.

5. IN RESPONSE TO COMPLAINTS ABOUT SLOWNESS OF OFFICIAL RETURNS PARTICULARLY FROM INTERIOR AREAS, MINISTRY OF INTERIOR HAS JUST ISSUED COMMUNIQUE BLAMING DELAY ON "OBSTACLES" BY "CERTAIN POLITICAL GROUPS", WHICH WW BELIEVE ALLUDES TO "FRENTE AMPLIO".

6. WE WISH EMPHASIZE ABOVE BASED ON PARTIAL, SCATTERED AND UNOFFICIAL RETURNS.
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11-29-71

PAGE 01 MONTEV 01805 290325Z

83

ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 USIE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
PM-06 H-02 INR-06 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 P-00 RSC-01
PRS-01 SS-14 INRE-00 RSR-01 1062 W
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O R 290309Z NOV 71
FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1055
INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 2069
USCINCSO

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CINCSO FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: ELECTIONS - POLLS CLOSE AND COUNTING BEGINS

REF: MONTEVIDEO 2804 - POL 14 UR

1. POLLS THROUGHOUT NATION CLOSED AT MIDNIGHT TONIGHT
WITH WHAT APPEARS TO BE MUCH LARGER VOTER TURNOUT THAN
EXPECTED. VOTE COUNT BEGAN AT SOME POLLING PLACES AT
2300 HOURS BUT NO SIGNIFICANT RESULTS AVAILABLE AS YET.

2. POLICE CONTINUE TO INDICATE THAT VOTING TOOK PLACE
THROUGHOUT NATION WITH NO SERIOUS DISTURBANCES. THERE
WERE A NUMBER OF REPORTS OF EFFORTS BY "FRENTE AMPLIO"
GROUPS TO DELAY VOTING, DESTROY VOTING LISTS IN POLLING
PLACES AND OTHER TYPES OF HARRASSMENT. HOWEVER, THESE
INCIDENTS CONSIDERED MINOR BY AUTHORITIES.

3. IN TELEVISION INTERVIEW, DIRECTOR OF GALLUP ORGANIZATION
INDICATED FIRST OF SEVERAL GALLUP VOTE PROJECTIONS IN
MONTEVIDEO WILL COMMENCE SHORTLY, WITH INITIAL RESULTS
EXPECTED TO BE AVAILABLE BEFORE 0200 HOURS.

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PAGE 01 MOSCOW 08857 291343Z

40

ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 EUR-14 PM-06 NSC-10 SS-14 RSC-01 CIAE-00

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R 291302Z NOV 71
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6278
INFO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
AMEMBASSY MONTIVIDEO
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO

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SUBJ: PRAVDA COMMENT ON EVE OF URUGUAYAN ELECTIONS

URUGUAY'S ELECTION DAY WAS SUBJECT OF NOV 28 PRAVDA ARTICLE
IN WHICH LEFTIST "BROAD FRONT" FORCES DESCRIBED AS PITTED
AGAINST WELL-FINANCED AND EXPERIENCED "BOURGEOIS" PARTIES.
WHILE OPENLY DISPLAYING ITS PREFERENCE FOR "BROAD FRONT,"
PRAVDA CAREFULLY AVOIDS ANY PREDICTIONS ON ELECTION OUTCOME,
AND CONCLUDES WITH BLAND REMARK THAT ELECTION RESULT WILL
REFLECT CHOICE BETWEEN "TWO OPPOSING DIRECTIONS IN URUGUAY'S
POLITICAL LIFE."

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PAGE 01 MONTEV 02804 282331Z

83

ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 USIE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00

PM-06 H-02 INR-06 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01

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O R 282306Z NOV 71
FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1054
INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
USCINCSO

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CINCSO FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: ELECTIONS - ELECTORAL COURT EXTENDS VOTING HOURS

1* BECAUSE OF MASSIVE TURNOUT BY URUGUAYAN VOTERS FROM
MOMENT POLLS OPENED AT 0800 HOURS LOCAL TODAY (NOVEMBER 28),
ELECTORAL COURT DECIDED IN LATE AFTERNOON TO EXTEND VOTING
PERIOD FROM 2130 HOURS TO MIDNIGHT TONIGHT THROUGHOUT NATION.
COURT HAS ALSO DECREED THAT VOTE COUNT CANNOT BEGIN BEFORE
2300 HOURS.

2* AS OF 2000 HOURS, POLICE REPORT NO REPEAT NO DISTURBANCES
BEYOND REPORTS OF SCATTERED INCIDENTS OF MINOR HARRASSMENT
ALLEGEDLY BY "FRENTE AMPLIO" GROUPS. MAIN DIFFICULTY WHICH
POLLING PLACES HAVE EXPERIENCED HAS BEEN IN OVERWHELMING
NUMBERS OF URUGUAYANS CLAMORING TO CAST THEIR VOTES THROUGH-
OUT THIS HOT, SULTRY SPRING DAY. EMBOFFS TOURING CITY FOUND
MOST POLLING PLACES JAMMED BEYOND
CAPACITY AT MIDDAY, BUT
PUBLIC CONTINUES TO SHOW REMARKABLE PATIENCE DESPITE
LONG DELAYS.

3* COURT DECISION TO HOLD POLLS OPEN UNTIL MIDNIGHT

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PAGE 02 MONTEV 02804 282331Z

MEANS THAT OVERALL RESULT WILL PROBABLY NOT EMERGE UNTIL MORNING HOURS OF NOVEMBER 29. ALL OBSERVERS HERE COMMENTING ON IMPRESSIVE SIZE OF PUBLIC TURNOUT AND FACT THAT, THUS FAR, VOTING HAS PROCEEDED WITH GREAT CLAM.
EXEMPT.
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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 MONTEV 02796 262024Z

46
ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 INRE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-06 H-02 INR-06 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-14 USIA-12 SA-03

PC-04 RSR-01 /081 W 056835

P R 261918Z NOV 71
FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1046
INFO CINCSO

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CINCSO FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: "FRENTE" AND FERREIRA HOLD FINAL RALLIES

1. THE "FRENTE AMPLIO" HELD ITS FINAL MONTEVIDEO RALLY EVENING NOVEMBER 24. RALLY STAGED IN FRONT OF LEGISLATIVE PALACE AND STRETCHED ONE MILE DOWN AVENIDA AGRACIADA TO THE INTERSECTION OF 18 DE JULIO. "FRENTE" MADE ALL-OUT EFFORT TO FILL THIS AREA AND SUCCEEDED IN ATTRACTING A CROWD OF 60-70,000 PERSONS. ACCORDING TO EMBOFFS PRESENT, CROWD PACKED MOST SOLIDLY AT EITHER END OF RALLY AND THINNED OUT CONSIDERABLY AT MID-POINT. EMBOFFS ESTIMATED APPROXIMATELY 70 PERCENT OF CROWD UNDER AGE 30. 10-15 PERCENT WERE PROBABLY UNDER VOTER AGE OF 18. VARIOUS "FRENTE" ORGANIZATIONAL UNITS HAD BEEN ASSIGNED SPECIFIC BLOCKS TO COVER AND STAYED IN PLACE THROUGHOUT THE RALLY. SPEAKER SYSTEM WAS POOR AND IN MANY AREAS CROWD AMUSED ITSELF BY DANCING, CHANTING, ETC. CROWD IN EXTREMELY GOOD HUMOR AND GAVE SPEAKERS ENTHUSIASTIC APPLAUSE, PARTICULARLY GENERAL SEREGNI. CARNIVAL-LIKE ATMOSPHERE PREVAILED AND PARTICIPANTS BEGAN DANCING IN STREET AFTER RALLY TERMINATED. IT WAS AN IMPRESSIVE PERFORMANCE AND CAUSED SOME CONCERN AMONG SUPPORTERS OF TRADITIONAL PARTIES WHO WITNESSED IT.

2. FERREIRA ADLUNATE CLOSING RALLY HELD MONTEVIDEO FOLLOWING EVENING, NOVEMBER 25. RALLY HAD BEEN ADVERTISED FOR SEVERAL

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Montevideo 2796
11-26-71

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Authority NND 965025

Page 14 UR



Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 MONTEV 02796 262024Z

DAYS IN ADVANCE, AND ON THE DAY ITSELF, FERREIRA FORCES BLANKETED RADIO AND TV WITH ADS URGING CITIZENS TO ATTEND RALLY AND SHOW SUPPORT FOR "DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM". MESSAGE ENDED "NOW IT IS THE TURN OF REAL URUGUAYANS". FERREIRA ALSO PUT TOGETHER MULTI-STATION NETWORK WHICH BROADCAST EMOTIONAL AND PROBABLY GREATLY EXAGGERATED REPORTS ON PROGRESS OF "VICTORY CARAVAN" INTO CITY BEGINNING AT 6:00 P.M. EFFECT WAS TO GIVE IMPRESSION THAT ROUTE LINED SOLIDLY WITH CHEERING THRONGS. BY TIME (9:30P.M.) CARAVAN ARRIVED AT RALLY SITE, CROWD HAD SWELLED TO NUMBER ESTIMATED BY EMBOFFS AT 40-45,000 PERSONS. CROWD MUCH MORE TIGHTLY PACKED THAN AT "FRENTE" RALLY AND EXTENDED SEVERAL BLOCKS BEYOND END OF SPEAKER SYSTEM. CROWD APPEARED TO BE FAIRLY REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE OF MONTEVIDEO POPULATION. CARAVAN RECEPTION CAN ONLY BE DESCRIBED AS TUMULTUOUS AND IT TOOK OVER HALF HOUR FOR CANDIDATES' BUS TO MAKE WAY THROUGH CROWD. BASED ON PHOTOS IN TODAY'S NEWSPAPERS (NOVEMBER 26), SHOWING CROWD LINING STREET IN AREA THEY COULD NOT SEE, EMBOFFS BELIEVE TOTAL SIZE OF FERREIRA RALLY APPROACHED THAT OF "FRENTE AMPLIO". ORGANIZERS EXPRESSED DELIGHT AT SIZE OF CROWD WHICH CLEARLY EXCEEDED THEIR EXPECTATIONS.

3. COMMENT: FERREIRA RALLY UNDOUBTEDLY HELPED BY STRONG "FRENTE" SHOWING PREVIOUS EVENING. MANY PEOPLE WHO OTHERWISE WOULD HAVE STAYED HOME PROBABLY MOTIVATED TO SHOW SUPPORT FOR TRADITIONAL PARTY AFTER IMPRESSIVE "FRENTE" RALLY. FERREIRA PROPAGANDA SLANTED TO TAKE MAXIMUM ADVANTAGE OF THIS FEELING. THERE NO QUESTION BOTH RALLIES ENDED THEIR CAMPAIGNS ON THE UPSWING.

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PAGE 01 MONTEV 02803 271531Z

47

ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 CCO-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00

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FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1053

INFO USCINCSO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE MONTEVIDEO 2803

CINCSO PASS POLAD

SUBJ: ELECTIONS - FINAL RALLIES

1. BLANCO PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE GENERAL AGUERRONDO AND GROUPS SUPPORTING REELECTION OF PRESIDENT PACHECO HELD THEIR FINAL RALLIES IN MONTEVIDEO LAST NIGHT, NOVEMBER 26. AGUERRONDO RALLY TOOK PLACE NEAR DOWNTOWN "PLAZA DE INDEPENDENCIA" AND DREW CROWD ESTIMATED BY EMBOFFS AT 15-16,000 PERSONS. CROWD INCLUDED SIZEABLE NUMBER OF SUPPORTERS OF OTHER BLANCO CANDIDATE, FERREIRA ALDUNATE, WHO EVIDENTLY ATTENDED TO SWELL THE RANKS OF THE PARTY'S FINAL PUBLIC DEMONSTRATION. AGUERRONDO BUS CARAVAN WAS RECEIVED WITH GREAT ENTHUSIASM.

2. DUE TO TRAFFIC TIE-UP CAUSED BY AGUERRONDO CARAVAN IN DOWNTOWN MONTEVIDEO, EMBOFFS ARRIVED AT ELECTION RALLY ONLY SHORTLY BEFORE IT ENDED AT 2300 LOCAL. BECAUSE CROWD ALREADY DISPERSING, WE WERE UNABLE TO ESTIMATE ITS SIZE AT PEAK. PRESS TODAY IS OF LITTLE HELP: PRO-GOVERNMENT "LA MANANA" CLAIMS RALLY WAS LARGEST STAGED IN MONTEVIDEO THIS YEAR, BUT GIVES NO NUMBERS. PCU'S "EL POPULAR" CLAIMS RALLY WAS FLOP WHICH ATTRACTED "LESS THAN 30,000" PEOPLE. EMBOFFS WOULD GUESS IT WAS AREA OF 40,000. CROWD WAS NOTABLE IN THAT IT WAS PREDOMINATELY WORKING CLASS AND ENTHUSIASTICALLY PRO-PACHECO. IT APPEARED FROM BANNERED BUSES, ETC., THAT EX-MONTEVIDEO MAYOR GLAUCO SEGOVIA'S LIST #5 GROUP

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11-27-71

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 MONTEV 02803 271531Z

PROVIDED BULK OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THIS RALLY.

3. THROUGHOUT THE EVENING HOURS, MAJOR CANDIDATES AND THEIR REPRESENTATIVES ALSO MADE CLOSING NATIONAL RADIO-TELEVISION ADDRESSES. NO NEW POINTS WERE RAISED BY THE SPEAKERS. ALL STRESSED THAT THE NOVEMBER 28TH CONTEST WILL BE MORE THAN JUST ANOTHER ELECTION. THAT THE OUTCOME COULD DETERMINE THE COURSE OF EVENTS IN URUGUAY FOR THE NEXT DECADE OR MORE. THE GENERAL MOOD OF ALL SPEECHES WAS SOLEMN, SOMBER, ALMOST PHILOSOPHICAL, AS CANDIDATES DECLARED THEIR WORK FINISHED AND URGED URUGUAYAN CITIZENS FULFILL THEIR CIVIC DUTY BY VOTING.. WITH A MIDNIGHT REBROADCAST OF PRESIDENT PACHECO'S NOVEMBER 22 SPEECH TO THE NATION, THE CAMPAIGN FOR ALL INTENTS AND PURPOSES ENDED.
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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 204

PAGE 01 MONTEV 02785 241952Z

46 82
ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 EUR-14 CPR-02 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-06 W-02
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USIA-12 RSR-01 /090 W 842894

R 241841Z NOV 71
FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1038
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
CINCSO

CONFIDENTIAL MONTEVIDEO 2785

CINCSO FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: GOU SEEKS CONTROL INTRODUCTION SOVIET PROPAGANDA
MATERIALS

1. FONMIN MORA CALLED ME IN TODAY (NOV 24) TO REPORT GROWING GOU CONCERN OVER EXCESSIVE QUANTITIES OF MATERIALS ESPECIALLY PRINTED PAPER IMPORTED INTO URUGUAY BY SOVIET EMBASSY UNDER DIPLOMATIC ENTRY PRIVILEGES. GOU STRONGLY SUSPECTS THESE DIPLOMATIC BAGS AND OTHER IMPORTS CONTAIN PROPAGANDA MATERIALS WHICH ARE BEING USED IN CURRENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN. URUGUAYAN FONOFF IS DELAYING APPROVAL OF RECENT REQUESTS FOR DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCES HOPING THUS ADMINISTRATIVELY TO CONTROL SITUATION, AT LEAST FOR THE REMAINDER OF ELECTORAL PERIOD. GOU HAS DECIDED TO STUDY THE POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATING A CULTURAL AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION WHICH WOULD ENABLE GOU TO REGULATE THE QUANTITY (AND PRESUMABLY THE TYPE) OF PROPAGANDA MATERIALS IMPORTED. THE FOREIGN OFFICE HAS SENT A NOTE TO THE RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR IN MONTEVIDEO REQUESTING HIS VIEWS ON FEASIBILITY SUCH AGREEMENT.

2. FONMIN EXPRESSED PRESUMPTION THAT USG HAS INFORMATION RE EFFECTIVE TERMS SUCH AN AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD BE HELPFUL IN GOU STUDY. TEXTS OF SIMILAR AGREEMENTS USG MAY HAVE WITH BLOC COUNTRIES WOULD BE USEFUL. ANY OTHER ADVICE WHICH DEPT MAY

CONFIDENTIAL

3

Montevideo 2785
11-24-71

Authority

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 793

Montevideo 2802
11-26-71

PAGE 01 MONTEV 02802 01 OF 02 262215Z

82

ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 USIE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 INRE-00 PC-04

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O R 262103Z NOV 71
FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1051
INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
CINCSO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MONTEVIDEO 2802

CINCSO FOR POLAD

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJECT: ELECTIONS: THE CAMPAIGN ENDS

REF : MONTEVIDEO 2740 POL 14UR

1. SUMMARY OF OVERALL ELECTORAL PICTURE - THE LONG, TUMULTUOUS, EXHAUSTING AND BITTERLY-CONTESTED URUGUAYAN CAMPAIGN IS DRAWING TO A CLOSE, WITH A SERIES OF HALF-HOUR RADIO-TELEVISION ADDRESSES TO NATION BY ALL MAJOR CANDIDATES THIS EVENING (NOVEMBER 26). IN PJA TEN DAYS, CAMPAIGN PUBLICITY REACHED CRESCENDO AND IN OUR EYES, PASSED POINT OF DIMINISHING RETURN BY CONSIDERABLE MARGIN. OUR FINAL OVERALL ESTIMATE OF THE RELATIVE STRENGTHS OF THE THREE CONTENDING FACTIONS REMAINS UNCHANGED: COLORADOS APPEAR TO HAVE RETAINED THEIR LEAD IN THE NATION BUT BY A NARROW MARGIN OVER BLANCO CANDIDATES WHO HAVE DEMONSTRATED INCREASING STRENGTH IN PAST TWO WEEKS. IN MONTEVIDEO, WE CONTINUE TO FEEL THAT COLORADO PARTY WILL LEAD COMMUNIST-DOMINATED "FRENTE AMPLIO" COALITION BUT BY EVEN NARROWER MARGIN. IN BOTH THESE RACES, CHALLENGERS TO THE COLORADOS ARE STRONG ENOUGH THAT A WIN BY EITHER COULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE CONSIDERED MAJOR UPSET. ALTHOUGH PRO-PACHECO FORCES SEEKING AMENDMENT TO PERMIT HIS ELECTION HAVE

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Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 MONTEV 02802 01 OF 02 262215Z

POSSIBLY GAINED STRENGTH IN PAST TEN DAYS, THEIR EFFORT CONTINUES TO APPEAR SHORT OF THE NECESSARY MAJORITY.

2. THE PRESIDENTIAL RACE - ALTHOUGH THE CAMPAIGN OF PRO-PACHECO FORCES HAS CONTINUED TO CONCENTRATE ON PRESIDENT HIMSELF AND HIS REELECTION, THE CANDIDACY OF PRESIDENTIAL ALTERNATE BORDABERRY HAS EMERGED MUCH MORE CLEARLY IN THE PAST WEEK. FOLLOWING A MEDIOCRE TELEVISION PERFORMANCE NOVEMBER 22, BORDABERRY ADDRESSED NATION ON THE FOLLOWING DAY IN AN EFFECTIVE AND WELL-ORGANIZED MANNER. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT UNHAPPINESS AMONG COLORADOS OVER THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO NAME BORDABERRY AS HIS ALTERNATE IS NOT SO WIDESPREAD AS TO EFFECT BORDABERRY'S POSITION AS PARTY'S FRONTRUNNER. HOWEVER, CHALLENGE TO HIM BY LIST QLE#PRESIDENTIAL HOPEFUL JORGE BATLLE IS STRONG. BATLLE HAS USED SERIES OF TELEVISION PROGRAMS WITH INCREASING EFFECT AND IN INTERIOR AREAS, HIS POLITICAL MACHINE APPEARS TO BE RUNNING EVEN WITH BORDABERRY AND IN SOME CASES AHEAD. POSSIBILITY OF BATLLE OVERTAKING BORDABERRY IN CLINING HOURS EXISTS BUT IT MUST BE CALLED A LONG-SHOT. AMONG BLANCOS, SENATOR WILSON FERREIRA REMAINS THE STRONGEST CANDIDATE. HOWEVER, BOTH HE AND RETIRED GENERAL AGUERRONDO APPEAR TO HAVE PEAKED THEIR CAMPAIGNS AT PRECISELY THE RIGHT MOMENT. BLANCOS ARE PULLING OUT ALL STOPS IN EFFORT TO CAPITALIZE IN MONTEVIDEO ON THEIR LARGE INTERIOR SHOWING. ALTHOUGH THE BLANCOS WILL PROBABLY FALL SHORT, THEIR TURNOUT WILL BE IMPRESSIVE AND THE MARGIN OF THEIR DEFEAT SMALL. WE CONTINUE TO SEE RETIRED GENERAL LIBER SEREGNI OF THE "FRENTE AMPLIO" AS RUNNING THIRD IN THE NATIONAL RACE.

3. THE MONTEVIDEO RACE - THE CONTEST IN MONTEVIDEO IS CLOSER NOW THAN AT ANY OTHER TIME IN THE CAMPAIGN. WE FEEL THE MARGIN BETWEEN THE COLORADO PARTY AND THE "FRENTE AMPLIO" IS WELL WITHIN THE RANGE OF PREDICTABLE ERROR. COLORADO ESTIMATES OF THEIR VICTORY HERE ARE IN THE AREA OF 30-70,000 VOTES BUT WITH SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF VOTERS STILL REFUSING TO INDICATE A CANDIDATE PREFERENCE, A "FRENTE" VICTORY REMAINS A DISTINCT POSSIBILITY. WITHIN THE COLORADO PARTY, FORMER MAYOR OSCAR RACHETTI REPRESENTING PRO-PACHECO FORCES AND MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS PINTOS RISSO REPRESENTING BATLLE'S LIST IS ARE THE FRONT-RUNNERS. BASED ON RACHETTI'S IDENTIFICATION WITH PRESIDENT PACHECO AND THE STRENGTH OF THE PRO-PACHECO POLITICAL MACHINE IN THE CAPITAL, WE GIVE RACHETTI THE NOD IN THIS CONTEST. NONE

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MONTEV 02802 01 OF 02 262215Z

OF THE BLANCO CANDIDATES FOR INTENDENTE HAVE ATTRACTED MUCH VOTER INTEREST ON THEIR OWN. VOTES FOR THEM WILL BE BASED MAINLY ON VOTER PREFERENCES IN THE CITY FOR BLANCO PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES.

4. THE INTERIOR CAMPAIGN - SEVERAL INTERESTING FACTORS HAVE EMERGED FROM OUR RECHECK OF SEVEN KEY INTERIOR AREAS DURING THE PAST WEEK. FIRST, THERE HAS BEEN NO REPEAT NO SLIPPAGE IN "FRENTE AMPLIO" SUPPORT IN INTERIOR AREAS. ON CONTRARY, THEIR STRENGTH THERE IS NOW MORE IN EVIDENCE THAN DURING OUR PREVIOUS VISITS. FOR SOMETIME, WE HAVE BEEN EXPECTING A STRONG SHOWING FOR THE "FRENTE" IN THE INTERIOR INDUSTRIAL CITY OF PAYSANDU. EVIDENCE OF THIS IS NOW CLEAR AS "FRENTE" FORCES HAVE MADE A STRONG EFFORT AMONG LABOR UNIONS TO MAXIMIZE ITS VOTE. THE "FRENTE" MAY DRAW IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF 9-10,000 VOTES IN THIS DEPARTMENT OR ABOUT 17 PERCENT. OVERALL, WE PLACE "FRENTE" STRENGTH IN THE EIGHTEEN INTERIOR DEPARTMENTS IN 10-12 PERCENT RANGE OR 80-100,000 VOTES. SECOND, WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT BLANCO PARTY HAS AN OVERALL LEAD IN THESE AREAS. WE EXPECT BLANCOS TO IMPROVE THEIR POSITION IN DEPARTMENTS ALREADY CONTROLLED BY THEM AND INCREASE THEIR VOTE IN COLORADO AREAS. THIRD, IN THE COLORADO STRONGHOLDS ALONG THE "LITORAL" AREA ADJOINING THE URUGUAY RIVER, BATLLE'S LIST 15 MACHINE IS SHOWING UP VERY WELL AGAINST PRO-PACHECO FORCES. IT IS IN THESE AREAS THAT SHIFTS FROM BORDABERRY TO BATLLE ARE MOST PRONOUNCED.

5. CAMPAIGN ISSUES - ISSUES RECEIVING THE MOST ATTENTION BY CANDIDATES AND THE PUBLIC THROUGHOUT THIS LONG CAMPAIGN HAVE CONTINUED TO BE THE PACIFICATION OF THE COUNTRY, LAW AND ORDER AND ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RECOVERY. IN RECENT WEEKS, THE ISSUE OF "FOREIGN INTERVENTION" HAS BEEN GREATLY STRESSED BY ALL PARTIES. TRY AS IT MAY, THE "FRENTE AMPLIO" HAS SUFFERED MOST FROM CHARGES THAT IT IS BEING AIDED DIRECTLY BY "OUTSIDE FORCES", I.E. THE SOVIET UNION. ITS EFFORTS SUCCESSIVELY TO IGNORE, REFUTE AND RIDICULE THESE CHARGES HAVE NOT BEEN SUCCESSFUL. THEREFORE, "FRENTE" SPOKESMEN NOW ARE LAYING GREAT EMPHASIS ON THEIR OWN CHARGES THAT THE USG AND "IMPERIALIST" FOREIGN COMPANIES ARE INTERVENING DIRECTLY AND OPENLY ON THE SIDE OF THE TRADITIONAL PARTIES.

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Montevideo 2786

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 802

PAGE 01 MONTEV 02802 02 OF 02 262232Z

82

ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 USIE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 INRE-00 PC-04
CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-06 H-02 INR-06 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10
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INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
CINCSO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 MONTEVIDEO 2802

CINCSO FOR POLAD

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJECT: ELECTIONS: THE CAMPAIGN ENDS

REF : MONTEVIDEO 2740

6. VIEWS OF OTHER OBSERVERS - WE HAVE FOUND A REMARKABLE
SIMILARITY OF VIEWS AMONG GROUPS NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE
CAMPAIGN, SUCH AS CERTAIN MEMBERS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS AND
THE FOREIGN BUSINESS COMMUNITY. BOTH THE BRAZILIAN AND ARGENTINE
EMBASSIES HAVE RULED OUT THE LIKELIHOOD OF A "FRENTE" VICTORY
FOR THE PRESIDENCY, ALTHOUGH BOTH FEEL THE MONTEVIDEO RACE
COULD GO EITHER WAY. THIS IS IN CONTRAST TO EARLIER VIEWS,
PARTICULARLY FROM ARGENTINE MILITARY SOURCES, WHICH FORECAST AN
OVERALL "FRENTE" VICTORY. ATTITUDES AMONG THE AMERICAN BUSINESS
COMMUNITY REMAIN VERY MUCH SIMILAR TO OUR OWN. THERE WAS A
GENERAL CONSENSUS BY MEMBERS OF THE "COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAS"
GROUP AT THEIR MEETING WITH THE AMBASSADOR SEVERAL DAYS AGO THAT
THE NATIONAL CONTEST WAS BETWEEN BLANCOS AND COLORADOS. MOST
FELT THE LATTER WOULD WIN. THE ATTITUDE OF SENIOR URUGUAYAN

CONFIDENTIAL

10

Montevideo 2781

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Authority NND 969045



Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 MONTEV 02802 02 OF 02 262232Z

MILITARY AND POLICE OFFICERS COULD BEST BE DESCRIBED AS "CALM AND CONFIDENT", SO FAR AS THE ELECTION ITSELF IS CONCERNED. BOTH HAVE COORDINATED ON CONTINGENCY PLANS TO DEAL WITH ANY DISTURBANCES ON ELECTION DAY AND SHORTLY THEREAFTER. THEY BELIEVE THESE WILL BE ADEQUATE TO ASSURE A PEACEFUL RESULT. IN A RECENT CONVERSATION WITH OUR MITGH COMMANDER, MIN STER OF DEFENSE GARCIA CAPURRO SAID THAT COLORADO LEADERS IN THE GOVERNMENT EXPECT TO WIN THE NATIONAL ELECTION BY 100,000 VOTES. GARCIA CAPURRO EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE CONCERN, HOWEVER, ABOUT THE SITUATION IN MONTEVIDEO AND FELT THAT THE COLORADO LEAD OVER THE "FRENTE" WAS ONLY IN THE 30,000 RANGE. HE DECLARED THAT A "FRENTE" VICTORY IN MONTEVIDEO WOULD LEAD TO INCREASED PUBLIC ORDER PROBLEMS AND THAT IN SUCH AN EVENT, THE GOU WOULD BE FORCED TO TAKE "DRASTIC MEASURES" AFTER THE FIRST OF THE YEAR. HE CHARACTERIZED BORDABERRY AS VERY INTELLIGENT AND KNOWLEDGEABLE AND SAID HE WOULD NOT HESITATE TO UNDERTAKE SUCH MEASURES (WHICH HE DID NOT DEFINE).

7. POST ELECTION VIOLENCE - ALTHOUGH THE GOU'S PUBLIC ORDER FORCES ARE GEARED FOR POSSIBLE OUTBREAKS OF VIOLENCE DURING ELECTION DAY, THEY THINK IT MORE LIKELY THAT THE BALLOTING ITSELF WILL PROCEED PEACEFULLY. HOWEVER, AS RETURNS COME IN AND IF THE "FRENTE" FAILS TO WIN NATIONALLY OR IN MONTEVIDEO, MOST OBSERVERS INSIDE GOVERNMENT AND OUT EXPECT DEMONSTRATIONS AND DISTURBANCES AMONG DISAPPOINTED "FRENTE" YOUTH. A PDC SOURCE RECENTLY TOLD US THAT HIS PARTY'S LEADERS AND THOSE OF THE COMMUNIST FIDEL FACTION COULD MAINTAIN SUFFICIENT DISCIPLINE TO PREVENT ANY MAJOR PROBLEMS FROM ITS RESPECTIVE YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS. HOWEVER, HE TOO EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT REACTIONS FROM LESS WELL-ORGANIZED AND MORE VIOLENCE-PRONE MEMBERS OF "SOCIALIST" GROUPS AND THE PRO-"TUPAMARO" "26TH OF MARCH MOVEMENT". MOST OBSERVERS ALSO EXPECT A RENEWAL OF ACTIVITIES BY MLN TERRORISTS FOLLOWING ELECTION DAY BUT OPINION DIVIDES ON WHETHER THIS WILL OCCUR IMMEDIATELY OR ONLY AFTER A PLANNING PERIOD DURING WHICH MLN WILL SET ITS NEW STRATEGY.

8. PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD THE ELECTIONS - DURING THE RECENT YEARS OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL TURMOIL, WE HAVE OFTEN CHARACTERIZED THE MOOD OF THE URUGUAYAN PEOPLE AS UPSET, SOMEWHAT FEARFUL, UNCERTAIN AND CONFUSED. WHATEVER THE PUBLIC'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THEIR ADMITTEDLY SERIOUS PROBLEMS, THIS CAMPAIGN HAS DEMONSTRATED THAT THERE IS NO LOSS OF ENTHUSIASM FOR AND PAR-

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TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 802

PAGE 01 MONTEV 02802 02 OF 02 262232Z

82

ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 USIE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 INRE-00 PC-04
CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-06 H-02 INR-06 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1052
INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
CINCSO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 MONTEVIDEO 2802

CINCSO FOR POLAD

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJECT: ELECTIONS: THE CAMPAIGN ENDS

REF 1 MONTEVIDEO 2740

6. VIEWS OF OTHER OBSERVERS - WE HAVE FOUND A REMARKABLE
SIMILARITY OF VIEWS AMONG GROUPS NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE
CAMPAIGN, SUCH AS CERTAIN MEMBERS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS AND
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GENERAL CONSENSUS BY MEMBERS OF THE "COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAS"
GROUP AT THEIR MEETING WITH THE AMBASSADOR SEVERAL DAYS AGO THAT
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CONFIDENTIAL

10

Montevideo 2786
11-24-71

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Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 MONTEV 02802 02 OF 02 262232Z

MILITARY AND POLICE OFFICERS COULD BEST BE DESCRIBED AS "CALM AND CONFIDENT", SO FAR AS THE ELECTION ITSELF IS CONCERNED. BOTH HAVE COORDINATED ON CONTINGENCY PLANS TO DEAL WITH ANY DISTURBANCES ON ELECTION DAY AND SHORTLY THEREAFTER. THEY BELIEVE THESE WILL BE ADEQUATE TO ASSURE A PEACEFUL RESULT. IN A RECENT CONVERSATION WITH OUR MICH COMMANDER, MINISTER OF DEFENSE GARCIA CAPURRO SAID THAT COLORADO LEADERS IN THE GOVERNMENT EXPECT TO WIN THE NATIONAL ELECTION BY 100,000 VOTES. GARCIA CAPURRO EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE CONCERN, HOWEVER, ABOUT THE SITUATION IN MONTEVIDEO AND FELT THAT THE COLORADO LEAD OVER THE "FRENTE" WAS ONLY IN THE 30,000 RANGE. HE DECLARED THAT A "FRENTE" VICTORY IN MONTEVIDEO WOULD LEAD TO INCREASED PUBLIC ORDER PROBLEMS AND THAT IN SUCH AN EVENT, THE GOU WOULD BE FORCED TO TAKE "DRASTIC MEASURES" AFTER THE FIRST OF THE YEAR. HE CHARACTERIZED BORDABERRY AS VERY INTELLIGENT AND KNOWLEDGEABLE AND SAID HE WOULD NOT HESITATE TO UNDERTAKE SUCH MEASURES (WHICH HE DID NOT DEFINE).

7. POST ELECTION VIOLENCE - ALTHOUGH THE GOU'S PUBLIC ORDER FORCES ARE GEARED FOR POSSIBLE OUTBREAKS OF VIOLENCE DURING ELECTION DAY, THEY THINK IT MORE LIKELY THAT THE BALLOTING ITSELF WILL PROCEED PEACEFULLY. HOWEVER, AS RETURNS COME IN AND IF THE "FRENTE" FAILS TO WIN NATIONALLY OR IN MONTEVIDEO, MOST OBSERVERS INSIDE GOVERNMENT AND OUT EXPECT DEMONSTRATIONS AND DISTURBANCES AMONG DISAPPOINTED "FRENTE" YOUTH. A POC SOURCE RECENTLY TOLD US THAT HIS PARTY'S LEADERS AND THOSE OF THE COMMUNIST FIDEL FACTION COULD MAINTAIN SUFFICIENT DISCIPLINE TO PREVENT ANY MAJOR PROBLEMS FROM ITS RESPECTIVE YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS. HOWEVER, HE TOO EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT REACTIONS FROM LESS WELL-ORGANIZED AND MORE VIOLENCE-PRONE MEMBERS OF "SOCIALIST" GROUPS AND THE PRO-"TUPAMARO" "26TH OF MARCH MOVEMENT". MOST OBSERVERS ALSO EXPECT A RENEWAL OF ACTIVITIES BY MLN TERRORISTS FOLLOWING ELECTION DAY BUT OPINION DIVIDES ON WHETHER THIS WILL OCCUR IMMEDIATELY OR ONLY AFTER A PLANNING PERIOD DURING WHICH MLN WILL SET ITS NEW STRATEGY.

8. PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD THE ELECTIONS - DURING THE RECENT YEARS OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL TURMOIL, WE HAVE OFTEN CHARACTERIZED THE MOOD OF THE URUGUAYAN PEOPLE AS UPSET, SOMEWHAT FEARFUL, UNCERTAIN AND CONFUSED. WHATEVER THE PUBLIC'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THEIR ADMITTEDLY SERIOUS PROBLEMS, THIS CAMPAIGN HAS DEMONSTRATED THAT THERE IS NO LOSS OF ENTHUSIASM FOR AND PAR-

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TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 802

PAGE 01 MONTEV 02802 02 OF 02 262232Z

82

ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 USIE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 CCD-00 INRE-00 PC-04
CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-06 H-02 INR-06 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10
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FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1052
INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
CINCSO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 MONTEVIDEO 2802

CINCSO FOR POLAD

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJECT: ELECTIONS: THE CAMPAIGN ENDS

REF 1 MONTEVIDEO 2740

6. VIEWS OF OTHER OBSERVERS - WE HAVE FOUND A REMARKABLE
SIMILARITY OF VIEWS AMONG GROUPS NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE
CAMPAIGN, SUCH AS CERTAIN MEMBERS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS AND
THE FOREIGN BUSINESS COMMUNITY. BOTH THE BRAZILIAN AND ARGENTINE
EMBASSIES HAVE RULED OUT THE LIKELIHOOD OF A "FRETE" VICTORY
FOR THE PRESIDENCY, ALTHOUGH BOTH FEEL THE MONTEVIDEO RACE
COULD GO EITHER WAY. THIS IS IN CONTRAST TO EARLIER VIEWS,
PARTICULARLY FROM ARGENTINE MILITARY SOURCES, WHICH FORECAST AN
OVERALL "FRETE" VICTORY. ATTITUDES AMONG THE AMERICAN BUSINESS
COMMUNITY REMAIN VERY MUCH SIMILAR TO OUR OWN. THERE WAS A
GENERAL CONSENSUS BY MEMBERS OF THE "COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAS"
GROUP AT THEIR MEETING WITH THE AMBASSADOR SEVERAL DAYS AGO THAT
THE NATIONAL CONTEST WAS BETWEEN BLANCOS AND COLORADOS. MOST
FELT THE LATTER WOULD WIN. THE ATTITUDE OF SENIOR URUGUAYAN

CONFIDENTIAL
10

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 MONTEV 02802 02 OF 02 262232Z

MILITARY AND POLICE OFFICERS COULD BEST BE DESCRIBED AS "CALM AND CONFIDENT", SO FAR AS THE ELECTION ITSELF IS CONCERNED. BOTH HAVE COORDINATED ON CONTINGENCY PLANS TO DEAL WITH ANY DISTURBANCES ON ELECTION DAY AND SHORTLY THEREAFTER. THEY BELIEVE THESE WILL BE ADEQUATE TO ASSURE A PEACEFUL RESULT. IN A RECENT CONVERSATION WITH OUR MITCH COMMANDER, MINISTER OF DEFENSE GARCIA CAPURRO SAID THAT COLORADO LEADERS IN THE GOVERNMENT EXPECT TO WIN THE NATIONAL ELECTION BY 100,000 VOTES. GARCIA CAPURRO EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE CONCERN, HOWEVER, ABOUT THE SITUATION IN MONTEVIDEO AND FELT THAT THE COLORADO LEAD OVER THE "FRENTE" WAS ONLY IN THE 30,000 RANGE. HE DECLARED THAT A "FRENTE" VICTORY IN MONTEVIDEO WOULD LEAD TO INCREASED PUBLIC ORDER PROBLEMS AND THAT IN SUCH AN EVENT, THE GOV WOULD BE FORCED TO TAKE "DRASTIC MEASURES" AFTER THE FIRST OF THE YEAR. HE CHARACTERIZED BORDABERRY AS VERY INTELLIGENT AND KNOWLEDGEABLE AND SAID HE WOULD NOT HESITATE TO UNDERTAKE SUCH MEASURES (WHICH HE DID NOT DEFINE).

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TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 240

PAGE 01 MONTEV 02786 242025Z

46

ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 INR-06 NSAE-00 P-03 RSC-01

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R 241841Z NOV 71
FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1039
INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
CINCSO

C O N F I D E N T I A L MONTEVIDEO 2786

CINCSO FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT PACHECO GIVES PRE-ELECTION ADDRESS

1. IN HIS MOST DIRECT INTERVENTION IN CAMPAIGN TO DATE, PRESIDENT PACHECO MADE NATIONWIDE RADIO-TV ADDRESS EVENING NOVEMBER 22. THROUGHOUT ADDRESS, PRESIDENT EMPHASIZED THAT VOTER CHOICE IS BETWEEN TRADITIONAL URUGUAYAN DEMOCRACY AND "FOREIGN ACTIVITIES CONCEIVED IN OTHER LANDS, PLANNED IN OTHER LATITUDES, AND DIRECTED FROM OTHER COUNTRIES". HE BEGAN BY DESCRIBING TERRORISM AS "FOREIGN-DIRECTED" AND SPOKE OF THE CONSTANT INFILTRATION OVER YEARS OF EDUCATION, THEATER, AND LITERATURE, WHICH HAD CORRUPTED MINDS OF MANY YOUNG PEOPLE. HE CITED DIFFICULTIES OF DEMOCRATIC STATE IN MEETING THESE THREATS AND SAID HE PROUD OF HAVING MAINTAINED INTACT THE COUNTRY'S DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS. PRESIDENT DECLARED HE HAD "CONTAINED THE FORCES OF DESTRUCTION" BUT HAD NOT DESTROYED THEM, ADDING THAT FIGHT MUST CONTINUE. STRUGGLE IS BETWEEN THE ENEMIES AND THE DEFENDERS OF THE COUNTRY. URUGUAYANS ARE NOT PREPARED TO REPEAT THE TRAGIC EXPERIENCES OF OTHER NATIONS NOR "BE THE LABORATORY RATS FOR REVOLUTIONARY EXPERIENCES TO BE APPLIED IN OTHER COUNTRIES". PACHECO SAID THAT WHILE SUBVERSIVES HAD ARMED THEMSELVES WITH RIFLES, MACHINEGUNS AND BOMBS, HE HAD ARMED "MY PEOPLE" WITH THE VOTE TO DEFEND DEMOCRACY. THIS VOTE SHOULD BE USED TO CONDEMN SUBVERSION, TO REJECT THOSE WHO HAD "SHOT IN THE BACK"

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 MONTEV 02786 242025Z

A FOREIGN CITIZEN (A CLEAR REFERENCE TO DAN MITRIONE). HE ALSO MENTIONED THE FOUR KIDNAP VICTIMS NOW HELD BY MLN, WHOM HE SAID ARE BEING TREATED WITHOUT "CHARITY", AND UNABLE TO VOTE IN COMING ELECTION. HE URGED PUBLIC TO VOTE IN THEIR PLACE AND DEFEAT THOSE WHO EMPLOY VIOLENCE. HE CALLED UPON ALL CITIZENS TO REJECT EXTREMISM (I.E. THE "FRENTE AMPLIO") AND VOTE "TO SAVE THE REPUBLIC".

2. PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS FOLLOWED IMMEDIATELY BY HALF-HOUR INTERVIEW OF ALTERNATE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE BORDABERRY, WHICH WAS ALSO BROADCAST NATIONWIDE. GREATER PART OF PROGRAM DEVOTED TO BORDABERRY'S OPINIONS ON TERRORISM AND "LAW AND ORDER". BORDABERRY TOOK SHARP EXCEPTION TO VIEW THAT THERE ARE ECONOMIC AND SOCIOLOGICAL COURSES FOR TERRORIST MOVEMENT. HE STATED CATEGORICALLY THAT TERRORISTS OPERATE SOLELY FROM POLITICAL MOTIVES AND TO SUPPORT HIS CASE, CLAIMED THAT URUGUAY HAS ONE OF HIGHEST PER CAPITA INCOME AND MOST EQUITABLE INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN ALL OF LATIN AMERICA. ASKED TO COMMENT ON BLANCO CANDIDATE FERREIRA ALDUNATE'S ASSERTION THAT MORE EFFICIENCY AND NOT MORE LAWS ARE NEEDED TO SOLVE TERRORIST PROBLEM, BORDABERRY REPLIED THAT RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONTINUING TERRORIST SUCCESSES, INCLUDING MASS ESCAPE FROM PRISON, LIES WITH GENERAL ASSEMBLY WHICH DELAYED ACTION ON PACHECO'S 1970 REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL POLICE POWERS. ASKED FOR HIS VIEWS ON COUNTER-TERRORISM, BORDABERRY GAVE LENGTHY EXPLANATION NOTING THAT COUNTER-TERRORISM EMERGED ONLY AFTER YEARS OF LEFTIST TERRORISM. HE DID NOT CONDEMN COUNTER-TERRORISM OUTRIGHT.

3. COMMENT: WHILE PACHECO'S SPEECH APPEARED TO BE ATTUNED TO PUBLIC CONCERN OVER VIOLENCE AND THEREFORE PROBABLY HAD SOME IMPACT, BORDABERRY'S PRESENTATION LACKED COHERENCE. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, BORDABERRY ALLOWED NEWSMEN BOX HIM INTO CORNERS AND ON OTHERS, HIS REPLIES WERE HESITANT OR VAGUE. IF THESE TWO PROGRAMS WERE INTENDED FIRST, TO RAISE THE "LAW AND ORDER" ISSUE AND SECOND, TO TRANSFER IT FROM PACHECO TO BORDABERRY, THE ATTEMPT WAS NOT TOTALLY SUCCESSFUL. PACHECO PROJECTED HIMSELF MUCH MORE AS A NATIONAL LEADER THAN DID BORDABERRY, WHO SUFFERED IN COMPARISON.

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23



Department of State TELEGRAM

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Montevideo 2787
11-24-71

PAGE 01 MONTEV 02787 242119Z

46
ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 INR-06 NSAE-00 P-03 RSC-01
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R 242006Z NOV 71
FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1040
INFO CINCSO

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CINCSO FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: FINAL ELECTION RALLIES IN MONTEVIDEO

1. THREE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES HELD THEIR FINAL RALLIES IN MONTEVIDEO EVENING NOVEMBER 23. THE RALLIES, HELD SIMULTANEOUSLY IN DOWNTOWN AREA, WERE ORGANIZED BY JORGE BATLLE'S COLORADO LIST 15, SENATOR VASCONCELLOS' THIRD COLORADO FRONT, AND DANIEL PEREZ DEL CASTILLO'S RADICAL CHRISTIAN UNION. EACH OF THESE EVENTS HAD BEEN WIDELY PUBLICIZED AND THIS PLUS A WARM SUMMER NIGHT, ATTRACTED A SIZEABLE TURNOUT OF PARTY FAITHFUL AND THE GENERAL PUBLIC.

2. LARGEST AND MOST ELABORATELY STAGED OF THE RALLIES WAS JORGE BATLLE'S WHICH TOOK PLACE ON AVENIDA AGRACIADA AND STRETCHED SEVERAL BLOCKS TOWARD THE LEGISLATIVE PALACE. EMBOFFS ESTIMATED CROWD BETWEEN 10-12,000 PERSONS. IT APPEARED TO BE LARGELY MIDDLE-CLASS, WITH SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS OF YOUTH PRESENT, ALL OF WHOM PAID CLOSE ATTENTION TO SERIES OF SPEAKERS WHICH INCLUDED DEPUTIES NELSON COSTANZO, CARLOS QUERALTO AND JULIO SANGUINETTI PLUS VICE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE RENAN RODRIGUEZ AND JORGE BATLLE. RALLY BEGAN ABOUT 9:30 P.M. AND RAN PAST 12:30. BATLLE'S ADDRESS WAS BROADCAST LIVE ON NATIONAL RADIO NETWORK. RALLY ORGANIZERS WERE PROBABLY DISAPPOINTED BY SIZE OF CROWD. ONE LIST 15 SOURCE TOLD EMBOFF THEY HOPING TO ATTRACT MINIMUM OF 20,000 PERSONS.

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PAGE 02 MONTEV 02787 242119Z

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3. THIRD COLORADO FRONT RALLY HELD IN PLABX IN FRONT OF CITY HALL AND STRETCHED IN DIRECTION OF AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE. EMBOFFS ESTIMATE CROWD SIZE AT 7-9,000 PERSONS. CROWD APPEARED TO BE LARGELY WORKING CLASS WITH GOOD PORTION OF UNDER 30.

IT ALSO APPEARED FROM BANNERS, ETC. THAT SUPPORTERS OF VICE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE FLORES MORA OUTNUMBERED THOSE OF PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE VASCONCELLOS. HOWEVER, ALL SPEAKERS WELL AND ENTHUSIASTICALLY RECEIVED. GIVEN RATHER LIMITED RESOURCES AND APPEAL OF THIRD COLORADO FRONT, IT WAS A VERY GOOD TURNOUT.

4. RADICAL CHRISTIAN UNION RALLY HELD AT PLAZA LIBERTAD, MIDWAY BETWEEN OTHER TWO RALLIES. EMBOFFS ESTIMATED CROWD AT 1500-2000 PERSONS. THEY LARGELY MIDDLE-CLASS WITH A PREPOND-ERANCE OF WOMEN AND YOUNG GIRLS. RALLY WELL ORGANIZED TO ACCOM-MODATE CROWD OF CONSIDERABLY GREATER SIZE AND URC LEADERS PROB-ABLY DISAPPOINTED AT TURNOUT.

5. COMMENT: CROWDS AT ENL RALLIES IN EXCELLENT HUMOR AND EN-THUSIASTIC. LARGE NUMBER OF STROLLERS CIRCULATED FROM ONE RALLY TO ANOTHER. EMBOFFS HAD IMPRESSION THAT CROWDS AS WELL AS SPEAKERS FATIGUED BY CAMPAIGN AND LOOKING FORWARD TO ITS TERMINATION THIS COMING SUNDAY. "FRENTE AMPLIO" HAS SCHEDULED ITS FINAL MONTEVIDEO RALLY AT LEGISLATIVE PALACE FOR THIS EVENING, NOVEMBER 24. FERREIRA ALDUNATE RALLY PLANNED FOR NOVEMBER 25, WITH PRO-PACHECO AND AGUERRONDO CAM-PAIGNS WINDING UP IN MONTEVIDEO ON NOVEMBER 26.

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PAGE 01 MONTEV 02773 232057Z

84
ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 PM-06 NSC-10 SS-14 RSC-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00
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R 231956Z NOV 71
 FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1031
 INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
 AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
 CINCSO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE MONTEVIDEO 2773

CINCSO FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: ELECTIONS: FINAL PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY PROJECTIONS

REF : MONTEVIDEO 2703 - POL 14 UR

1. DIRECTOR OF GALLUP ORGANIZATION HAS JUST GIVEN US FOLLOW-
 ING PRIVATE REPEAT PRIVATE PROJECTION OF VOTER PREFERENCES,
 BASED ON NOVEMBER 3-11 SURVEY (MONTEVIDEO 2760):

A - MONTEVIDEO - COLORADO 39.3; "FRENTE AMPLIO" 33.2; BLANCO
 26.1 URC 1.5.

B - INTERIOR - COLORADO 41.3; BLANCO 40.0; "FRENTE AMPLIO"
 17.1; URC 1.6.

C - TOTAL PROJECTION - COLORADO 40.5; BLANCO 34; "FRENTE
 AMPLIO" 24; URC 1.5.

2. SIMILAR PROJECTION OF THREE MAJOR PARTIES ONLY BY INSTITUTE
 OF APPLIED SOCIAL SCIENCE (PRIVATE POLL SPONSORED BY COLORADO
 LIST 15 FACTION) BASED ON SYNTHESIS OF OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER
 POLLS SHOWS FOLLOWING:

A - MONTEVIDEO - COLORADO 40; "FRENTE AMPLIO" 34.3; BLANCO

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PAGE 02 MONTEV 02773 232057Z

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B - INTERIOR - COLORADO 43.5; BLANCO 45.5; "FRENTE AMPLIO" 12.

C - TOTAL PROJECTION - COLORADO 42.8; BLANCO 36.2; "FRENTE AMPLIO" 21.

3. COMMENT: GREATEST DISPARITIES BETWEEN TWO SURVEYS ARE IN ESTIMATES OF INTERIOR BLANCO AND "FRENTE" VOTE. WE ARE CONTINUING TO RECHECK OUR OWN SOURCES IN SEVERAL INTERIOR CITIES AND THESE RESULTS WILL BE INCLUDED IN OUR FINAL CAMPAIGN WRAP-UP ON NOVEMBER 26.

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Montevideo 2760
11-22-71

PAGE 01 MONTEV 02760 222027Z

53

ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 NSC-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00 INR-06 NSAE-00
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 FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1021
 INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
 AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
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CINCSO FOR POLAD

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJ: ELECTIONS - RESULT OF NOVEMBER GALLUP POLL

REF: MVD 2703 - POL 14 UR

1. GALLUP ORGANIZATION HAS JUST RELEASED FIGURES FROM ITS FINAL SURVEY OF PUBLIC OPINION PRIOR TO NOVEMBER 28 GENERAL ELECTION. RESULTS ARE BASED ON APPROXIMATELY 1500 INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED IN MONTEVIDEO AS WELL AS IN TWENTY-SIX INTERIOR CITIES NOVEMBER 3-15. GALLUP REPORT ON PARTY PREFERENCE IS:

A - MONTEVIDEO: COLORADO 28; "FRENTE AMPLIO" 24; BLANCO 19; URC 1; UNDECIDED 13; REFUSED TO RESPOND 10; NOT REGISTERED TO VOTE 5.

B - INTERIOR CITIES: COLORADO 31; "FRENTE AMPLIO" 13; BLANCO 30; URC 1; UNDECIDED 15; REFUSED TO RESPOND 8; NOT REGISTERED TO VOTE 2.

2. FOLLOWING ARE RESULTS OF SAME SURVEY ON QUESTION OF VOTER ATTITUDES TOWARD AMENDMENT OF CONSTITUTION TO PERMIT

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PAGE 02 MONTEV 02760 222027Z

REELECTION OF PRESIDENT:

A - MONTEVIDEO: WILL SUPPORT 22; WILL OPPOSE 58; NO
OPINION 20.

B - INTERIOR CITIES: WILL SUPPORT 23; WILL OPPOSE 57;
NO OPINION 20.

3. COMMENT: CONTRARY TO OUR EARLIER EXPECTATIONS, GALLUP
HAS NOT PRODUCED ANY FINAL SURVEY OF VOTER ATTITUDES TOWARD
INDIVIDUAL BLANCO AND COLORADO CANDIDATES. NOVEMBER FIGURES
PROVIDED CHARGES OF "FRAUD" AND "MANIPULATION" FROM BOTH
BLANCOS AND "FRENTE AMPLIO". GALLUP ITSELF INCLUDES FOLLOWING
STATEMENT WITH ITS TABLE SHOWING PARTY PREFERENCES: "ONCE
AGAIN IT SHOULD BE STRESSED THAT THE PERCENTAGES INDICATED
DO NOT CONSTITUTE A PREDICTION OF THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTION,
BUT RATHER SIMPLY REFLECT THE PREDISPOSITION TO VOTE, IN THE
FIRST FIFTEEN DAYS OF NOVEMBER, WITHIN THE LIMITS OF CON-
FIDENCE INDICATED ON THE TABLE OF POSSIBLE ERROR: PLUS OR
MINUS 4 PERCENT.
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44

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STATEMENT OF

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TELEGRAM

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CONFIDENTIAL 842

PAGE 01 MONTEV 02740 01 OF 02 182213Z

82

ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-06 H-02 INR-06 L-03 NSAE-00

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FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1005
INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 OF 2 MONTEVIDEO 2740

CINCSO FOR POLAD

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJECT: ELECTIONS - TEN DAYS TO GO

REF : MONTEVIDEO 2640

POL 14 UR

XR POL 15-1 UR

1. SUMMARY OF OVERALL ELECTORAL PICTURE - WITH ONLY TEN DAYS REMAINING BEFORE GENERAL ELECTIONS, IT CONTINUES TO BE OUR IMPRESSION THAT COLORADO PARTY IS MAINTAINING ITS NATIONAL LEAD. WITHIN COLORADOS, MINAGRICULTURE JUAN MARIA BOARDABERRY IS STRONGEST CANDIDATE, DESPITE FUROR CAUSED BY HIS NOMINATION AS PRESIDENT PACHECO'S ALTERNATE. HOWEVER, OPPOSITION BLANCO PARTY, PRINCIPALLY SENATOR WILSON FERREIRA ALDUNATE, APPEARS HAVE OVERALL LEAD IN DEPARTMENTS OUTSIDE MONTEVIDEO AND WE BELIEVE BLANCOS ARE WITHIN STRIKING DISTANCE OF COLORADOS AND PRESIDENCY. "FRENTE AMPLIO" CAMPAIGN AND ENTHUSIASM IT HAS GENERATED IN MONTEVIDEO CONTINUES TO BE IMPRESSIVE. WE WOULD STILL RATE COLORADO PARTY AS HAVING THIN MARGIN IN CAPITAL CITY, BUT THIS MARGIN IS SO CLOSE AS TO MAKE "FRENTE" VICTORY HERE A DISTINCT POSSIBILITY. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT FORCES BACKING THE REELECTION OF PRESIDENT PACHECO HAVE SUFFICIENT SUPPORT TO SECURE NECESSARY MAJORITY APPROVAL

Montevideo 2740
11-18-71

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 MONTEV 02740 01 OF 02 182213Z

OF THEIR EFFORT TO AMEND CONSTITUTION. ALL ANTI-REELECTION GROUPS HAVE CARRIED OUT THEIR THREAT NOT TO SUBMIT LISTS OF CANDIDATES FOR "REFORMED" SYSTEM WHICH WOULD BE IN FORCE SHOULD CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT PASS (MONTEVIDEO 2706). DEADLINE FOR FILING LISTS OF CANDIDATES EXPIRED NOVEMBER 13, WITH ONLY PRO-PACHECO FORCES OFFERING CANDIDATES FOR "REFORMED" CONSTITUTION AS WELL AS PRESENT CONSTITUTION WHICH PROHIBITS PRESIDENTIAL REELECTION. WE HAVE ONLY PARTIAL RESULTS OF NOVEMBER GALLUP POLL (PARA 4 BELOW), BUT GALLUP DIRECTOR HAS TOLD US THAT FIGURES SHOW NO APPRECIABLE CHANGE OVER OCTOBER SURVEY.

2. ABSENTEE VOTERS - IN EVENT OF "PHOTO FINISH" IN MONTEVIDEO OR NATIONALLY, ABSENTEE BALLOTS MAY BECOME VERY IMPORTANT. IN 1966 SOME 80,000 VOTERS IN URUGUAY VOTED IN AREAS OTHER THAN THEIR RESIDENCE SHOWN IN ELECTORAL COURT RECORDS. FOR EXAMPLE, VOTER INSCRIBED ON ELECTORAL ROLLS IN INTERIOR CITY OF RIVERA BUT WHO LIVES AND VOTES IN MONTEVIDEO MUST HAVE HIS VOTE RETURNED TO RIVERA FOR COUNTING. THIS PROCESS USUALLY TAKES SEVERAL DAYS. WE WOULD GUESS THAT APPROXIMATELY ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND OF THE MILLION AND HALF VOTES EXPECTED TO BE CAST WILL FALL IN THIS CATEGORY.

3. COLORADO PARTY - ONE OF MOST DIFFICULT ASPECTS OF ASSESSING POSITION OF COLORADO PARTY IN CAMPAIGN HAS BEEN TO JUDGE EFFECT OF NAMING OF MINAGRICULTURE BORDABERRY AS PRESIDENT PACHECO'S ALTERNATE CANDIDATE. THIS IN LARGE MEASURE CAUSED BY FACT THAT BORDABERRY CANDIDACY AS SUCH IS ALMOST INVISIBLE. PRO-PACHECO UNR GROUPS CONTINUE CONCENTRATE ALL REPEAT ALL THEIR PUBLICITY ON PACHECO HIMSELF. WHEN QUESTIONED ABOUT HIS OWN CANDIDACY ON TELEVISION INTERVIEW NOVEMBER 17, BORDABERRY REPLIED THAT HE PREFERS CONSIDER HIMSELF AS VICE PRESIDENTIAL HOPEFUL ON REELECTION SLATE WHICH PACHECO HEADS. ALTHOUGH UNHAPPINESS AND DISCONTENT AMONG COLORADOS CONTINUES OVER NAMING OF BORDABERRY, HE STILL MUST BE CONSIDERED PARTY'S FRONT RUNNER BECAUSE OF HIS CLOSE IDENTIFICATION WITH PRESIDENT PACHECO. LIST IS PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE JORGE BATLLE IS MAKING STRONG AND WELL-ORGANIZED CAMPAIGN AND HAS CONCENTRATED ON TELEVISION AS MEANS TO REACH THE BROADEST MASS OF VOTERS. HOWEVER, ALTHOUGH HE WAS PROBABLY PRINCIPAL BENEFICIARY FROM BORDABERRY'S NAMING, WE HAVE YET TO SEE THAT HIS CAMPAIGN HAS MOVED FORWARD TO POINT OF OVERCOMING PRO-PACHECO ORDER. THIS IN LARGE MEASURE IS DUE TO HIS RELATIVELY POOR

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23

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PAGE 03 MONTEV 02740 01 OF 02 182213Z

SHOWING IN MONTEVIDEO. SENATOR AMILCAR VASCONCELLOS, CANDIDATE OF "THIRD COLORADO FRONT", HAS NOW BEEN JOINED BY MINOR PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES JUAN PINTOS AND GENERAL RIBAS. ALL THREE WILL MAINTAIN THEIR CANDIDACIES UNDER COMMON SUB-FACTION "POR LA UNION DEL PARTIDO". THIS WILL MEAN THAT ALL VOTES IN THIS SUB-FACTION WILL ACCUMULATE TO WHICHEVER OF THREE (UNDOUBTEDLY VASCONCELLOS) GAINS MOST VOTES.

4. BLANCOS - BOTH BLANCO PARTY PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES, RETIRED GENERAL AGUERRONDO AND SENATOR FERREIRA ALDUNATE, ARE NEARING END OF MONTH-LONG CAMPAIGN THROUGH INTERIOR DEPARTMENTS DESIGNED TO MAXIMIZE PARTY'S SUPPORT THERE. LATEST GALLUP SURVEY TAKEN A WEEK AGO INDICATES THAT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BLANCOS AND COLORADOS IN INTERIOR HAS VIRTUALLY DISAPPEARED. GALLUP PLACES COLORADO STRENGTH AT 31.8 PERCENT AND BLANCO AT 31.4 PERCENT. WHEN ALL CANDIDATES RETURN TO MONTEVIDEO FOR SERIES OF RALLIES DURING FINAL WEEK, CAMPAIGN TO ALL INTENTS AND PURPOSES WILL HAVE ENDED IN INTERIOR. EMBASSY OFFICERS ARE NOW CHECKING RESULTS IN SEVEN KEY INTERIOR CITIES. HOWEVER, IT REMAINS OUR OPINION THAT BLANCOS IN FACT NOW HAVE A SLIGHT MAJORITY THERE. AS WE INDICATED EARLIER, THIS MARGIN WILL BE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT FOR BLANCOS IN MAKING UP WHAT THEY CONCEDE WILL BE THEIR LOSS IN MONTEVIDEO. BLANCOS NOW APPEAR TO BE CLOSER NATIONALLY TO COLORADOS THAN AT ANY PREVIOUS TIME IN CAMPAIGN. SEVERAL PERSONS WHO ARE TRAVELLING WITH FERREIRA'S CARAVAN HAVE TOLD US HIS RECEPTION HAS BEEN AS GREAT AS THAT RECORDED IN VICTORIOUS BLANCO CAMPAIGN OF 1958.

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TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 887

PAGE 01 MONTEV 02740 02 OF 02 182154Z

82

ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-06 H-02 INR-06 L-03 NSAE-00

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INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 MONTEVIDEO 2740

CINCSO FOR POLAD

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJECT: ELECTIONS - TEN DAYS TO GO

REF : MONTEVIDEO 2640

5. "FRENTE AMPLIO" - "FRENTE" PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE SEREGNI'S CARAVAN THROUGH INTERIOR CITIES HAS BEEN MET BY SOME VIOLENCE AND PUBLIC HOSTILITY, BUT IT RETURNS TO MONTEVIDEO NEXT WEEK WHERE ITS RECEPTION WILL BE CONSIDERABLY WARMER. "FRENTE" PUBLICITY AND CAMPAIGN RALLIES CONTINUE IN MONTEVIDEO ON MASSIVE SCALE AND IT OBVIOUS THAT "FRENTE" GROUPS ARE PLACING MAXIMUM EMPHASIS ON EFFORT TO WIN CONTROL OF CAPITAL. EARLIER EXPRESSIONS OF OPTIMISM BY SOME OBSERVERS THAT "FRENTE" STRENGTH IS MONTEVIDEO APPEARED TO BE DECLINING HAVE LARGELY EVAPORATED. HOWEVER, WE DO NOT SEE THAT THE "FRENTE" HAS ADDED MEASURABLY TO ITS VOTING STRENGTH HERE IN THE PAST MONTH. "FRENTE" FORCES ARE CLEARLY PLANNING ALL OUT EFFORT IN NEXT FEW DAYS AND AS MENTIONED ABOVE, IF THEIR VICTORY IN CAPITAL NOT PROBABLE, IT REMAINS POSSIBLE. ONE SURPRISING FACTOR WHICH HAS EMERGED FROM RECENT POLLS IS STRONG SHOWING WITHIN "FRENTE" OF THOSE FAVORING THE "SOCIALIST AND OTHER" CATEGORY. "FRENTE" CHRIST-

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 MONTEV 02740 02 OF 02 182154Z

IAN DEMOCRATIC SOURCE RECENTLY TOLD US HE BELIEVED THOSE IN THIS CATEGORY INCLUDE SYMPATHIZERS OF MLN/"TUPAMARO" TERRORIST GROUP, AS WELL AS "NEW LEFT" VOTERS WHO REJECT MOSCOW-LINE PCU AS FOREIGN DOMINATED AND PDC AS TOO TAME.

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PAGE 01 MONTEV 02720 161533Z

44
ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 (RSR-01) CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-06 H-02 INR-06 L-03
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CINCSO FOR POLAD

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

DEPT PASS OPS

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PRESS ATTACKS ON EMBASSY PERSONNEL CONTINUE
REF 1 MONTEVIDEO 2684- ORG CIA

1. COMMUNIST PARTY'S "EL POPULAR" OVER WEEKEND REPEATED CHARGES THAT CERTAIN U.S. EMBASSY PERSONNEL IN URUGUAY ARE CIA AGENTS. BOTH AFTERNOON EDITION NOVEMBER 12 AND MORNING EDITION NOVEMBER 13 REPRINTED FULL TEXT OF SPEECH GIVEN TO METALLURGICAL WORKERS BY PARTY CHAIRMAN RODNEY ARISMENDI, IN WHICH HE RENEWED HIS CHARGE THAT GOU, ASSISTED BY U.S. AND BRAZILIAN ESPIONAGE AGENTS, IS RESPONSIBLE FOR VIOLENCE AGAINST "FRENTE AMPLIO" CANDIDATES AND INSTALLATIONS. ARISMENDI AGAIN NAMED EMBASSY OFFICERS, CUNNINGHAM, GOULD AND BARBIERI AS "CIA AGENTS".

2. "POPULAR" EDITORIAL PAGE NOVEMBER 13 FEATURES ARTICLE EN-

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PAGE 01 MONTEV 02706 122233Z

88

ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-06 H-02 INR-06 L-03 NSAE-00
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CINCNUCVPTINALD (H)

SUBJECT: ANTI-REELECTION CANDIDATES REJECT ELECTORAL COURT
RECOMMENDATION RE DOUBLE BALLOTING

REF: MVD 2539 POL 14 UR

1. AS REPORTED REFTEL, PRESENTATION BY PRO-PACHECO FORCES OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT TO PERMIT PRESIDENT'S REELECTION WILL RESULT IN HAVING IN EFFECT TWO SEPARATE ELECTIONS ON NOVEMBER 28, ONE UNDER PRESENT SYSTEM WHICH PROHIBITS NEW TERM FOR PRESIDENT AND SECOND UNDER WHICH PRESIDENT PACHECO'S REELECTIONS LEGALLY PERMISSIBLE. AS WE HAVE ALREADY POINTED OUT, URUGUAYAN ELECTORATE HAS BEEN CONFRONTED WITH THIS TYPE OF SITUATION IN EARLIER ELECTIONS AND HAS RESPONDED WITH MINIMUM OF CONFUSION. HOWEVER, ELECTORAL COURT OBVIOUSLY CONCERNED THAT COMPLEXITY OF DOUBLE VOTING MIGHT CAUSE UNUSUALLY HIGH NUMBER OF SPOILED BALLOTS. IN ORDER CLARIFY SITUATION, COURT LAST WEEK SUGGESTED TO ALL REPEAT ALL PARTIES THAT THEY PRESENT TWO COMPLETELY SEPARATE LISTS OF CANDIDATES, NOTWITHSTANDING FACT THAT APPROVAL OR DISAPPROVAL OF REELECTION AMENDMENT WOULD EFFECT ONLY PRO-PACHECO VOTING LIST. COURT DECLARED THAT ALL LISTS OF CANDIDATES SUBMITTED UNDER "REFORM" SYSTEM WOULD BE MARKED "PROYECTADO" (LITERALLY, "PROJECTED" OR

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PAGE 02 MONTEV 02706 122233Z

PROPOSED). THUS, SHOULD AMENDMENT PASS, COURT WOULD COUNT ONLY THOSE BALLOTS STAMPED "PROYECTADO". IN EVENT AMENDMENT FAILS, ALL LISTS OF CANDIDATES SO MARKED WOULD NOT BE COUNTED AND INSTEAD LISTS SUBMITTED UNDER PRESENT SYSTEM WOULD DECIDE CONTEST. COURT OBVIOUSLY FELT THAT CANDIDATE PREFERENCE WOULD BE EASIER FOR VOTER TO DECIDE AND COUNTING OF BALLOTS MUCH MORE RAPID.

2. REACTION BY ANTI-REELECTION COLORADO CANDIDATES (BATLLE AND VASCONCELLOS), OPPOSITION BLANCO PARTY AND COMMUNIST-DOMINATED "FRENTE AMPLIO" UNANIMOUSLY NEGATIVE TO COURT RECOMMENDATION. ALL THESE GROUPS HAVE NOW DECLARED THAT THEY WILL NOT REPEAT NOT SUBMIT LISTS OF CANDIDATES UNDER THE "REFORM" SYSTEM TO BE MARKED "PROYECTADO". INSTEAD, ALL GROUPS OTHER THAN THE PRO-PACHECO UNR COALITION HAVE ANNOUNCED INTENTION TO SUBMIT ONLY ONE SLATE OF CANDIDATES UNDER PRESENT SYSTEM WHICH PROHIBITS REELECTIONS. OPPOSITION TO IDEA OF REELECTION AMENDMENT RANGES FROM CHARGES THAT IT "UNCONSTITUTIONAL" TO COMPLAINTS THAT CONSTITUTION SHOULD NOT BE AMENDED SIMPLY TO FAVOR ONE CANDIDATE, I.E., PACHECO.

3. COMMENT: IF ANTI-REELECTION CANDIDATES REMAIN FIRM IN THEIR DECISION, THIS WILL PROBABLY REDUCE TENDENCY BY SOME OF THEIR VOTERS TO VOTE FOR THEIR OWN CANDIDATES UNDER PRESENT SYSTEM AS WELL AS PACHECO UNDER "REFORM" SYSTEM. BECAUSE THEY CLAIM THAT REELECTION AMENDMENT HAS NO REPEAT NO CHANCE OF SUCCESS, ANTI-REELECTION GROUPS CHARGE THAT AMENDMENT IS DESIGNED TO "DECEIVE" AND "CONFUSE" URUGUAYAN VOTERS. PRO-PACHECO FORCES COUNTER-CHARGE THAT THIS DECISION IS ACT OF "COWARDICE" ON PART OF OTHER CANDIDATES SINCE THEY SEEKING "DENY" VOTER RIGHT TO INDICATE PREFERENCE FOR REELECTION OF PRESIDENT. THIS DECISION COULD OF COURSE HAVE UNPLEASANT RESULT: IF AGAINST ALL PRESENT ODDS, REELECTION AMENDMENT SHOULD PASS, ONLY THOSE VOTES MARKED "PROYECTADO" WOULD BE COUNTED. IN OTHER WORDS, SINCE OTHER CANDIDATES WOULD NOT HAVE SUBMITTED BALLOT UNDER "REFORM" SYSTEM, ONLY REPEAT ONLY PACHECO VOTES WOULD BE COUNTED, AND ONLY PACHECO CANDIDATES FOR ALL ELECTIVE OFFICES WOULD BE ELECTED. WE AGREE THAT CHANCES FOR PASSAGE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT APPEAR SLIGHT, THUS THIS DECISION BY ANTI-ELECTION CANDIDATES WILL PROBABLY REPRESENT SIMPLY ANOTHER COMPLICATION IN THE ALREADY COMPLEX URUGUAYAN ELECTORAL PICTURE. HOWEVER, IF THIS DECISION WRONG, CONSEQUENCES (WHICH WOULD IN EFFECT BE A COMPLETE SHUT-OUT OF ALL CANDIDATES FOR ALL OFFICES EXCEPT THOSE RUNNING ON PACHECO LIST) IS SCARCELY IMAGINABLE.

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PAGE 01 MONTEV 02703 122107Z

85
ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 PM-06 NSC-10 SS-14 RSC-01 AID-20 PC-24 CIAE-00
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CINCSO FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: LATEST PUBLIC OPINION SURVEYS ON URUGUAYAN ELECTION

REF : MONTEVIDEO 2640 *POL 14 UR*
XR POL 15-1 UR

1. LATEST GALLUP POLL, TAKEN OCTOBER 10-23 IN MONTEVIDEO AND ALL INTERIOR DEPARTMENTS, REVEALED FOLLOWING PERCENTAGE RESULTS:

A - MONTEVIDEO: COLORADO 26; FRENTA AMPLIO 23; BLANCO 19; URC 1; UNDECIDED 18; REFUSED INFORMATION 9; NOT REGISTERED TO VOTE 4.

B - INTERIOR: COLORADO 32; FRENTA AMPLIO 13; BLANCO 29; URC 1; UNDECIDED 14; REFUSED INFORMATION 10; NOT REGISTERED TO VOTE 1.

2. BASED ON THESE FIGURES, GALLUP DIRECTOR HAS GIVEN US PRIVATE REPEAT PRIVATE PROJECTION OF RESULTS WHICH INCLUDE UNDECIDED AND THOSE REFUSING INFORMATION:

A - MONTEVIDEO: COLORADO 38.4; FRENTA AMPLIO 33.7; BLANCO 27; URC 0.9.

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PAGE 02 MONTEV 02703 122107Z

B - INTERIOR: COLORADO 41.7; BLANCO 40.2; FRENTE AMPLIO 16.4;
URC 1.7.

C - TOTAL PROJECTION ALL LOCATIONS: COLORADO 40.3; BLANCO 34.5;
FRENTE AMPLIO 23.8; URC 1.4.

3. FOLLOWING ARE PARTIAL RESULTS FROM POLL TAKEN NOVEMBER
7-10 IN MONTEVIDEO ONLY BY INSTITUTE OF APPLIED SOCIAL SCIENCE
(ICSA):

A - SURVEY: COLORADO 21; BLANCO 19; FRENTE AMPLIO 15; UNDECIDED
15; BLANK VOTES 1; REFUSED INFORMATION 19.

B - ICSA PROJECTION INCLUDING UNDECIDED: COLORADO 28; BLANCO
22; FRENTE AMPLIO 20; BLANK VOTES 1; REFUSED INFORMATION 29.

4. GALLUP HAS JUST BEGUN ITS FINAL ELECTION SURVEY WITH RE-
SULTS EXPECTED BY NOVEMBER 20. NEITHER OF ABOVE SURVEYS HAVE
PRODUCED RESULTS ON EFFECT OF NAMING MINAGRICULTURE BORDABERRY
AS PRESIDENT PACHECO ALTERNATE. HOWEVER, BOTH GALLUP AND ICSA
NOW CONDUCTING SPECIAL POLL OF BORDABERRY AS CANDIDATE WITH
RESULTS EXPECTED EARLY NEXT WEEK.

5. COMMENT: ICSA IS PRIVATE GROUP BEING FINANCED BY COLORADO
LIST IS PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE JORGE BATLLE. IT IS DIRECTED
BY ULISIS GRACERAS, URUGUAYAN TEACHER AND DOCTORAL CANDIDATE
IN SOCIOLOGY AT MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY WHO HAS RETURNED
HERE TEMPORARILY AT BATLLE'S REQUEST. GRACERAS IS FORMER
GALLUP EMPLOYEE WITH EXTENSIVE WORK IN MARKET RESEARCH AND
SURVEYING. HE BELIEVES UNUSUALLY HIGH NUMBER OF THOSE NOW
REFUSING ANSWER QUESTIONNAIRE PRIMARILY DUE TO VOTER IRRITA-
TION OVER WHAT SOME CLAIM HAS BEEN "BADGERING" IN RECENT MONTHS
BY VARIOUS OPINION SAMPLERS. HE ALSO BELIEVES THAT AS TENSION
INCREASING TOWARD CLOSE OF CAMPAIGN, SOME VOTERS ARE RELUCT-
ANT OR FEARFUL TO INDICATE THEIR CHOICE. ICSA PLANS TWO ADDI-
TIONAL SURVEYS BEFORE ELECTIONS.

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 MONTEV 02692 112222Z

85

ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-06 H-02 INR-06 L-03 NSAE-00

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CINCSO FOR POLAD

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

DEPT PASS OPS

SUBJ: FOUR WOUNDED IN CLASH BETWEEN RIGHTIST AND
COMMUNIST YOUTHS

REF: MVD 2684-ORG CIA
XR POL 14 UR XR AID (US) 2-TUR

IN LATEST INCIDENTS OF PRE-ELECTION VIOLENCE, FOUR
PERSONS WERE WOUNDED EVENING NOVEMBER 10 IN CLASH BETWEEN
MEMBERS OF RIGHTIST JUP YOUTH GROUP AND COMMUNIST YOUTH
ORGANIZATION (UJC). INCIDENT OCCURRED IN POCITOS AREA
WHEN GROUP OF SEVERAL HUNDRED JUP MEMBERS MARCHING DOWN-
TOWN AFTER JUP RALLY PASSED LOCAL UJC HEADQUARTERS.
AT THIS POINT, ACCOUNTS DIFFER AS TO EXACTLY WHAT HAPPENED.
POLICE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED THIS MORNING STATES JUP MEMBERS
BEGAN CHANTING "POLICE SI! "TUPAMAROS" NO" AND WERE FIRED
UPON FROM INSIDE UJC BUILDING. COMMUNIST PRESS INSISTS
JUP MEMBERS FIRED FIRST AND ATTEMPTED TO STORM UJC HEAD-
QUARTERS. ALL ACCOUNTS AGREE HEAVY EXCHANGE OF GUNFIRE

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RSDATE: October 27, 1971
ANALYSIS BRANCH

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TO : Department of State

INFO: Amembassy BUENOS AIRES
CINCSO FOR POLAD

FROM : Amembassy MONTEVIDEO

SUBJECT: Labor and the National Elections

REF : Montevideo A-165 of September 15, 1971

Introduction

The "Plan of Government" of the Frente Amplio electoral coalition includes something for everybody except, of course, the nefarious "oligarchy". High among the Frente's targets is the working man, and its promises to him include a redistribution of the country's wealth with higher wages for both the private and public sectors. Without divulging how it will obtain the necessary funds, the Frente says it will provide a better social security system, better health services, more low cost housing, and more jobs. How successful has the Frente been in selling its wares to the urban wage earner? This paper attempts to answer this question and others concerning the role of the labor movement in the November elections.

On the basis of soundings in the interior, we believe that the Frente Amplio will have only modest success in capturing the votes of wage earners of cities such as Paysandú, Salto, and Mercedes. The capital city of Montevideo would appear to be a different proposition at this point.

The CNT as a Political Campaigner

In earlier reports we doubted the existence of a "labor vote" which the Communist-controlled CNT labor confederation could "deliver" en masse to the Frente. We do not think that we are engaging in semantic

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sallies when we reassert that point, with the observation that there is a difference between "delivering the labor vote" and assiduously campaigning to secure the vote of wage earners. The latter represents, in our opinion, an accurate description of the current work of the CNT on behalf of the Frente Amplio.

In a very systematic manner the CNT has organized Frente Amplio groups in virtually all the factories, businesses, and government offices to which it has access. In addition to establishing these political organizations, CNT unions have made themselves available as platforms for Frente Amplio candidates. Probably the most effective work of the CNT in behalf of the Frente has been the person-to-person contact by CNT activists. They are noted for their persistence and are known to have visited workers in their homes to continue their proselytizing there.

Although it has become fashionable among opponents of the Frente Amplio to say that the Frente currently is losing ground in Montevideo, anti-Frente union leaders, when questioned about their particular industries, admit that the Frente is running strong in Montevideo. On the basis of admittedly impressionistic surveys, we would conclude that the Frente will probably draw a proportionately larger number of its votes in Montevideo from CNT-organized wage earners than from the rest of the city's population.

This is not to predict a clean sweep for the Frente Amplio among CNT members in Montevideo, who could number as high as 200,000. We know of two cases where attempts by the CNT to convert its affiliated unions into Frente campaign organizations have backfired. At the end of August, the Montevideo local of the CNT's primary school teachers federation (FUM) protested the transformation of their headquarters into a Frente center and disaffiliated from FUM-CNT. There is said to be dissatisfaction among members of the CNT's bank workers affiliate (AEBU) for this reason. Although democratic bank workers are attempting to exploit this dissatisfaction, it is not likely that locals of AEBU will in the near future disaffiliate from AEBU, as did the Montevideo school teachers from FUM.

Democratic Unions: No Direct Political Activities

Democratic unions grouped in the AIFLD-supported CUT federation and other independent unions have not been politically active as organizations. This stems both from a philosophy of trade unionism requiring a

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Page 3

separation of the labor and political roles, as well as a practical realization that activity on behalf of any one of the traditional parties would provoke division and discord within the unions.

Concerned that its lack of activity on behalf of the traditional parties might be interpreted as political surrender to the CNT, the Executive Board of CUT issued a statement on October 15 denouncing the pro-Frente campaigning of the CNT as further proof of the Communist central's "treason" and "exploitation" of the working class.

While unions outside of the CNT have not been politically active as organizations, many of their leaders have been heavily engaged in partisan activities on an individual basis. On several occasions, CUT has invited members of the Legislature to address conferences dealing with labor subjects such as social security. However, it has been careful to invite representatives from both the Colorado and Blanco parties.

Conclusion

The Frente Amplio's heavy reliance on the CNT has brought its campaign into the work place. The other parties have relied more on traditional forms of political activity which do not include organized campaigning at factories, business houses, and government offices. With this difference in strategy and given the self-imposed restrictions by democratic unions on their political activity, we believe that the work of the CNT in behalf of the Frente Amplio should prove to be successful among its membership in Montevideo. This is not a matter of the CNT's being able automatically to transfer its strong position in the labor field to the Frente. Rather it is the result of the highly organized and intensive work of CNT militants on behalf of the leftist political coalition.

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PAGE 01 MONTEV 02557 271406Z

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ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-26 H-02 INR-26 L-03 NSAE-00

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CINCSO FOR POLAD

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJECT: RESIGNATIONS AND DISSENTION FOLLOW NAMING OF ALTERNATE
PACHECO CANDIDATES

REF : MONTEVIDEO 2544 POL 14 UR

1. SUMMARY. PRESIDENT PACHECO'S DECISION ON HIS ALTERNATE
PRESIDENTIAL AND VICE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES HAS PROVOKED
SEVERE NEGATIVE REACTION IN RANKS OF HIS SUPPORTERS. SEVERAL
RESIGNATIONS HAVE ALREADY OCCURRED OVER WHAT SOME PRO-PACHECO
LEADERS FEEL WAS DIRECT INSULT BY PRESIDENT'S FAILURE TO CON-
SULT WITH THEM. ALTHOUGH THE OVERALL ELECTORAL LEAD OF THE
RULING COLORADO PARTY NOW BELIEVED NOT TO HAVE BEEN SIGNIFI-
CANTLY AFFECTED, THE FINAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE PRESIDENT'S
ACTION ARE NOT YET CLEAR.

2. PRESIDENT PACHECO'S DECISION ANNOUNCED OCTOBER 22 (REPTEL)
TO NAME MINAGRICULTURE BORDABERRY AND MINLABOR SAPELLI AS HIS
ALTERNATE PRESIDENTIAL AND VICE PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEES HAS

32

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Department of State

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 MONTEV 02557 271406Z

PROVOKED STORM OF PROTEST AND SEVERAL RESIGNATIONS IN RANKS OF UNR POLITICAL COALITION. IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING ANNOUNCEMENT OF PRESIDENT'S DECISION, VICE PRESIDENT ABDALA (WHO PREVIOUSLY INDICATED TO US THAT PRESIDENT INTENDED NAME HIM AS VICE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE) DECLARED HE HAD BEEN "DEFRAUDED" AND ANNOUNCED HIS RESIGNATION FROM UNR. ABDALA DECLARATION THEN FOLLOWED BY RESIGNATIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL HOPEFUL AND DIRECTOR OF PLANNING AND BUDGET LANZA AND CIVIL SERVICE DIRECTOR GALSA. CHIEF OF PRESIDENT'S INFORMATION OFFICE MARIO RENNA THEREUPON PRESENTED HIS OWN RESIGNATION AS DID AT MIDDAY TODAY (OCTOBER 26) SECRETARY PRESIDENCY GEORGI.

3. OPPOSITION TO BORDABERRY/GAPELLI SLATE APPARENTLY CAUSED BY SEVERAL FACTORS. FIRST, FACT THAT BORDABERRY IS NOT REPEAT NOT MEMBER OF COLORADO PARTY BUT RATHER ONE OF LEADERS OF "RURALIST" POLITICAL GROUP HAS PROVED VERY UNSETTLING TO SOME PRO-PACHECO COLORADOS. NOT ONLY IS BORDABERRY NOT MEMBER OF PARTY BUT FACT THAT RURALIST MOVEMENT WAS FORMERLY PART OF OPPOSITION BLANCO PARTY (BORDABERRY SERVED AS BLANCO "RURALIST" SENATOR IN EARLY 1960'S) IS RANKLING. DISSENTING UNR LEADERS ALSO PROVOKED THAT "CASA BATLLISTA" LEADER GLAUCO SEGOVIA HAS EMERGED AS KEY SPOKESMAN FOR PRESIDENT PACHECO ON THIS CRUCIAL ISSUE. SEGOVIA'S FACTION HAS NOT CONSISTENTLY SUPPORTED PACHECO ADMINISTRATION IN RECENT YEARS AND SEGOVIA HIMSELF VIEWED AS "JOHNNY-COME-LATELY", HAVING ONLY DECLARED HIS BACKING OF PRESIDENT TWO MONTHS AGO. ADDITIONALLY, SEGOVIA IS GENERALLY CONSIDERED NOT ONLY AS ONE OF PARTY'S CLEVEREST POLITICIANS BUT ALSO ONE OF ITS MOST UNSCRUPULOUS. UNR POLITICIANS WHO REVERE MEMORY OF PRESIDENT OSCAR GESTIDO (WHO PACHECO REPLACED UPON GESTIDO'S DEATH IN 1967) UPSET BY RECOLLECTION GESTIDO DUSTED SEGOVIA FROM MAYORSHIP OF MONTEVIDEO BECAUSE OF STRONG ALLEGATIONS OF LATTER'S CORRUPT PRACTICES. FINALLY, FACT THAT PRESIDENTIAL DECISION WAS TAKEN WITHOUT CONSULTATION AMONG THOSE POLITICIANS WHO HAVE BEEN MOST LOYAL TO HIM THROUGHOUT HIS TEMPESTUOUS ADMINISTRATION CONSIDERED DIRECT SLAP IN THE FACE.

4. EMBASSY OFFICERS LUNCHEONED WITH EX-PRESIDENTIAL PRESS SECRETARY RENNA TODAY. ACCORDING TO HIM, HE AND OTHER CLOSE PRESIDENTIAL ADVISERS, INCLUDING GEORGI AND ANCAP PRESIDENT BATLLE CORREA, FIRST LEARNED OF PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO NAME BORDABERRY BY HEARING SEGOVIA MAKE THE ANNOUNCEMENT FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL RESIDENCE IN A RADIO INTERVIEW. THE DECISION STUNNED

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Classification

Department of State

03

204324



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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 MONTEV 02557 271426Z

THEM FOR REASONS MENTIONED ABOVE. RENNA FELT THAT BORDABERRY'S SELECTION WOULD BE LARGELY UNACCEPTABLE TO LEADERSHIP OF PRESIDENT'S OWN UCB FACTION (OF WHICH RENNA IS SECRETARY).

5. IN RENNA'S VIEW, OVERALL POLITICAL EFFECT OF BORDABERRY SELECTION WOULD BE TO REDUCE THE MARGIN OF COLORADO PARTY'S VICTORY OVER BLANCOS. HE EXPECTS CONTINUING DISSENTION AMONG PRO-PACHECO FORCES FOR AT LEAST ANOTHER WEEK AND BELIEVES THIS WILL MAKE IT CLEAR TO ALL THAT CHANCES OF REELECTION AMENDMENT PASSING ARE VIRTUALLY NIL. HE EXPRESSED CONVICTION THAT MANY FORMER UCB VOTERS WOULD SIMPLY REFUSE TO VOTE FOR THE RURALIST BORDABERRY AND WOULD INSTEAD CAST THEIR VOTES FOR OTHER COLORADO CANDIDATES. HE EXPECTED THAT JORGE BATLLE AND THE THIRD COLORADO FRONT (SPECIFICALLY SENATOR FLORES MORA) WOULD BE CHIEF BENEFICIARIES OF THIS NORMAL "BATLLISTA" VOTE. ON BLANCO SIDE, HE THOUGHT SENATOR FERREIRA ALDUNATE WOULD BE BENEFICIARY OF UNDECIDED OR INDEPENDENT VOTERS WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY LEANED TOWARD REELECTION CAMPAIGN. HE FELT THESE INDEPENDENT VOTERS WOULD BE SWAYED AGAINST BORDABERRY BECAUSE OF HIS LARGE LANDHOLDINGS, HIS IDENTIFICATION WITH A MEDIOCRE TO POOR AGRICULTURAL POLICY, AND THE APPARENT CONNECTION OF SEGOVIA WITH HIS SELECTION. RENNA DID NOT BELIEVE "FRENTE AMPLIO" WOULD BENEFIT IN ANY MAJOR WAY FROM THIS SPLIT IN REELECTION RANKS. THROUGHOUT THE CONVERSATION, RENNA STRESSED INITIAL UNHAPPINESS OF UCB INTERIOR PARTY LEADERS WITH BORDABERRY SELECTION. HE FELT THAT MOST WOULD EVENTUALLY COME AROUND TO SUPPORT TICKET BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF AN ALTERNATIVE. HOWEVER, HE SAID THEY RECOGNIZED THAT THEIR DIFFICULTIES IN CONTROLLING THE VOTES OF THEIR ORGANIZATIONS HAD GREATLY INCREASED.

6. COMMENT: FOREGOING STRIKES US AS A REALISTIC PRELIMINARY REPEAT PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF POLITICAL IMPACT OF PRESIDENT'S DECISION. WE TOO WOULD EXPECT TRADITIONAL COLORADO VOTERS WHO ARE DISTURBED BY THIS SELECTION TO REMAIN WITHIN COLORADO PARTY. WE TEND TO AGREE THAT INDEPENDENT VOTERS WHO MAY PREVIOUSLY HAVE BEEN LEADING TOWARD THE REELECTION SLATE WOULD BE MORE LIKELY TO MOVE TOWARDS MODERATES SUCH AS FERREIRA AND BATLLE THAN TO "FRENTE AMPLIO". WE AGREE THAT IT WILL BE AT LEAST SEVERAL MORE DAYS BEFORE ELECTORAL EFFECTS OF PACHECO'S ACTION BECOME MORE CLEAR.

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 068

PAGE 01 MONTEV 2684 102031Z

44
ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 RSR-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-06 H-02 INR-06 L-03

NSAE-02 NSC-10 P-03 NSC-01 PRS-01 SS-14 USIA-12 AID-20

PC-24 NIC-01 EUR-14 IGA-02 /115 W

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FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 967
INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
CINCSO

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CINCSO FOR POLAD

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

DEPT PASS OPS

SUBJ: COMMUNIST PRESS CONTINUES ATTACKS ON
EMBASSY

REF: MVD 2672 POL 14 UR XR ORG CIA

1. COMMUNIST PARTY'S "EL POPULAR" IS CONTINUING ITS ALLEGATIONS OF U.S. EMBASSY INTERVENTION IN URUGUAY IN GENERAL AND THE ELECTIONS IN PARTICULAR. AFTERNOON EDITION OF "EL POPULAR" NOVEMBER 9 CARRIES FRONT PAGE BANNER HEADLINES "MR. ECHOLS DIRECTS IN THE POLICE HEADQUARTERS" ALONG WITH LARGE COLOR PICTURES OF THE HEADQUARTERS BUILDING AND THE EMBASSY. FULL TWO-THIRDS OF THE FRONT PAGE IS TAKEN UP BY THIS MATERIAL. PAGES TWO AND THREE CARRY HEADLINE "THE CHIEF OF THE UNITED STATES MISSION IN THE POLICE HEADQUARTERS IDENTIFIED". ARTICLE GOES ON TO NAME PUBLIC SAFETY ADVISOR LEE ECHOLS AND REHASHES OLD CHARGES THAT U.S. PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM IS CIA OPERATION INVOLVED IN ESPIONAGE AGAINST THE SOVIET EMBASSY (RECALLING 1969 WIRETAP

Montevideo 2684
11-10-71

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CONFIDENTIAL POL 14 UR

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Department of State 03

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 MONTEV 02680 101749Z

46

ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 NSC-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00 INR-06 NSAE-00

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FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 963
INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
CINCSO

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CINCSO FOR POLAD

SUBJ: VICE PRESIDENT BLASTS REELECTION MOVEMENT AND
PRESIDENT PACHECO

REF: MVD 2602

1. IN HIS LONG-AWAITED PUBLIC STATEMENT IN REACTION TO NAMING OF MINAGRICULTURE BORDABERRY AS ALTERNATE PACHECO CANDIDATE, VICE PRESIDENT ALBERTO ABDALA ON NOVEMBER 8 CHARGED PRESIDENT'S ACTION WAS "BETRAYAL OF THE COLORADO PARTY AND 'BATLLISMO'." IN STRONGLY WORDED RADIO ADDRESS, ABDALA TRACED HISTORY OF HIS OWN "MOVIMIENTO ESTRASECTORIAL", CLAIMING THAT IT HAD BEEN FOUNDED TO PROMOTE UNIFICATION OF VARIOUS SECTORS OF COLORADO PARTY. ABDALA CLAIMED THAT IT WAS ON THIS BASIS THAT HE AND PRESIDENT PACHECO HAD REACHED POLITICAL AGREEMENT TO JOIN FORCES IN ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN. ABDALA SAID HE WAS NOT UPSET WHEN PRESIDENT NAMED BORDABERRY AS HIS VICE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE ON "REELECTION" SINCE PRESIDENT HAD EXPLAINED TO HIM THAT NAMING OF BORDABERRY WAS NECESSARY TO ATTRACT VOTES OF BORDABERRY'S "RURALIST" FACTION INTO COLORADO PARTY. ADDITIONALLY, ABDALA ALLEGED PRESIDENT TOLD HIM THAT IN ANY CASE THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT PERMITTING REELECTION WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT PASS. IN HIS ADDRESS, ABDALA REPEATED LATTER STATEMENT STRESSING THAT PRESIDENT HIMSELF HAD

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28

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11-10-71

Authority

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58

CONFIDENTIAL POL 14 UR

Classification

Department of State

03

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 MONTEV 02680 101749Z

NO HOPE OF REELECTION. VEEP THEN DECLARED THAT HE HAD ACCEPTED PRESIDENT'S EXPLANATION "IN GOOD FAITH" AND UNDERSTOOD THAT IT WAS HIS DUTY TO ACCEPT THE PRESIDENT'S CHOICE. VEEP STATED THAT HE HAD NO HOPE OF REELECTION OR VICE PRESIDENTIAL CHOICE SHOULD AMENDMENT NOT PASS AND WOULD ALSO HEAD PRO-PACHECO UNR SENATE LISTS AS WELL. ABDALA CHARGED THAT PRESIDENT'S OCTOBER 12 DECISION TO NAME BORDABERRY AS PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE AND MINISTER LABOR SAPELLI AS VICE PRESIDENT CAME AS COMPLETE SURPRISE TO HIM AND OTHER UNR LEADERS. VEEP HEATEDLY CONDEMNED FACT THAT PRESIDENT'S POLITICAL FACTION NOW REPRESENTED BY EX-BLANCO SENATOR WHOSE GROUP HAD CONTRIBUTED TO DEFEAT OF COLORADO PARTY IN 1958 ELECTIONS. ABDALA CLOSED HIS REMARKS WITH STATEMENT RELEASING HIS FRIENDS AND FOLLOWERS TO VOTE FOR WHICHEVER OTHER COLORADO CANDIDATE THEY CHOSE IN ORDER TO ASSURE THE TRIUMPH OF THE PARTY AS WELL AS "A HEALTHY DEFEAT IN ALL THE REPUBLIC OF REELECTION FORCES".

2. COMMENT: THE VICE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT AND HIS EMPHASIS ON WHAT HE CLAIMED WAS PRESIDENT PACHECO'S OWN ASSESSMENT OF BLEAK PROSPECTS FOR REELECTION AMENDMENT WAS OBVIOUSLY CALCULATED TO DO MAXIMUM DAMAGE TO PRO-PACHECO FORCES. FACT THAT VEEP HAS RELEASED MEMBERS OF HIS MOVEMENT TO VOTE AS THEY PLEASE SEEMS TO INDICATE HE WILL NOT BE ACTIVE CANDIDATE FOR ANY OFFICE. AS WE HAVE REPORTED EARLIER, LIST OF THOSE POLITICIANS WHO HAVE NOW BROKEN WITH THE PRESIDENT OVER NAMING OF BORDABERRY INCLUDES NUMBER OF VERY WELL-KNOWN NAMES (MOST OF WHOM ARE NOT SUPPORTING JORGE BATLLE'S CANDIDACY). HOWEVER, WE CONTINUE DOUBT THAT ACTUAL NUMBER OF VOTES SHIFTING AWAY FROM PACHECO FORCES WILL BE SUBSTANTIAL. NEVERTHELESS, ANGRY DENUNCIATIONS BY SOME OF THOSE WHO HAVE SERVED THE PRESIDENT LONGEST AND MOST LOYALLY CAN HARDLY FAIL TO HAVE SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT. WITH LESS THAN THREE WEEKS FROM ELECTIONS, COLORADO PARTY APPEARS AS DIVIDED, SQUABBLING POLITICAL GROUP WHICH MAY MAKE IT LESS ATTRACTIVE TO UNDECIDED VOTERS. SUCH SHIFTS AS MAY OCCUR OUTSIDE RPT OUTSIDE COLORADO RANKS WILL IN OUR JUDGMENT GO TO THE OPPOSITION BLANCO PARTY. LATE OCTOBER GALLUP ON REELECTION AMENDMENT SHOWS IN MONTEVIDEO 23 PERCENT IN FAVOR, 57 PERCENT AGAINST, WITH 20 PERCENT UNDECIDED. IN INTERIOR, THESE PERCENTAGES ARE 24 PERCENT, 59 PERCENT AND 17 PERCENT. EXEMPT. ADAIR

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58

CONFIDENTIAL POL 14 UR

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Department of State 03

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 969

PAGE 01 MONTEV 02667 01 OF 02 091800Z

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ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-06 H-02 INR-06 L-03 NSAE-00

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FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0954
INFO AMEMBASSYBRASILIA
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
CINCSO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MONTEVIDEO 2667

CINCSO FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: THE ELECTIONS AS VIEWED FROM THE INTERIOR

REF: 1 MONTEVIDEO 2642 POL 14 UR XR POL 15-1UR

1. SUMMARY: THE ELECTIONS IN THE INTERIOR DEPARTMENTS APPEAR TO BE DEVELOPING ALONG TRADITIONAL LINES BETWEEN BLANCO AND COLORADO PARTIES. EMBASSY THINKS LOCAL ISSUES AND CANDIDATES

WILL PLAY SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN DETERMINING OUTCOME OF ELECTIONS THERE. OVERALL, BLANCO PARTY APPEARS TO HAVE SLIGHT LEAD IN INTERIOR DEPARTMENTS, WITH PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE FERREIRA ALDUNATE THE CLEAR FRONTRUNNER WITHIN THE PARTY. IN COLORADO PARTY, JORGE BATLLE'S "UNITY AND REFORM" FACTION MAY HAVE EDGE OVER REELECTION FORCES OF PRESIDENT PACHECO IN INTERIOR DEPARTMENTS. DESPITE A MAJOR EFFORT, COMMUNIST-DOMINATED "FRENTE AMPLIO" COALITION SEEMS AS YET TO HAVE MADE ONLY LIMITED HEADWAY IN THE INTERIOR OF THE COUNTRY. END SUMMARY.

2. EMBASSY OFFICERS HAVE BEEN VISITING INTERIOR DEPARTMENTS

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Montevideo 2667
11-9-71DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 949045



58

CONFIDENTIAL POL 14 UR

Classification

Department of State

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204324



23

Department of State

POL 14 UR
XR ORG CIA

Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MONTEV 02667 01 OF 02 091800Z

OF COUNTRY DURING PAST WEEKS, SEEKING ASSESS POLITICAL SENTIMENT THERE. OVER HALF OF URUGUAYAN ELECTORATE WILL CAST THEIR VOTES IN INTERIOR. MOST STRIKING IMPRESSION, AND ONE ENCOUNTERED IN ALL INTERIOR DEPARTMENTS, IS THAT 1971 ELECTION DEVELOPING ALONG TRADITIONAL LINES BETWEEN BLANCO AND COLORADO PARTIES. WE HAVE NOT REPEAT NOT ENCOUNTERED SENSE OF POLARIZATION AMONG CONTENDING POLITICAL FORCES WHICH IS EVIDENT IN MONTEVIDEO. TERRORISM AND "LAW AND ORDER" ARE OF SECONDARY IMPORTANCE IN THE INTERIOR, WITH THE ECONOMY, JOBS

AND OTHER LOCAL ISSUES THE ITEMS OF PRINCIPLE CONCERN. IN SHARP CONTRAST TO MONTEVIDEO, LOCAL POLITICAL PARTIES AND GOVERNMENT ENTITIES SEEM TO BE FUNCTIONING FAIRLY WELL. CITY STREETS ARE CLEAN AND IN GOOD REPAIR. PARKS AND PUBLIC BUILDINGS ARE WELL MAINTAINED. SCHOOLS ARE FUNCTIONING NORMALLY. THERE ARE VISIBLE SIGNS OF RECENT PROGRESS AND LITTLE OF THE AURA OF RUNDOWN SEEDINESS OF THE CAPITAL CITY. FOR THOSE MAJOR PROBLEMS STILL PLAGUING THE INTERIOR, MONTEVIDEO AND THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT ARE THE SCAPEGOATS. COMPLAINTS ABOUT THE FAILURE OF CENTRAL AUTHORITIES TO PAY THEIR "DEBTS" AND APPORTION REVENUES TO INTERIOR GOVERNMENTAL OFFICES ARE UNIVERSAL. VIEWED FROM THE INTERIOR, 1971 ELECTIONS APPEAR TO DIFFER LITTLE FROM THOSE IN YEARS PAST.

3. BASED ON OUR INTERVIEWS WITH LOCAL POLITICAL LEADERS, MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES, TRADE UNION FIGURES AND OTHERS, WE BELIEVE THAT LOCAL ISSUES AND CANDIDATES WILL PLAY A MUCH LARGER ROLE IN DETERMINING THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTIONS IN THE INTERIOR THAN IN MONTEVIDEO. IN SEVERAL DEPARTMENTS, FOR EXAMPLE, WE FOUND A CONSENSUS THAT THE PERFORMANCE OF PRESENT DEPARTMENTAL OFFICIALS DURING THEIR TERMS WOULD MATERIALLY EFFECT THE NOVEMBER ELECTION. WHERE LOCAL OFFICIALS HAVE PERFORMED WELL, THEIR FACTION AND PARTY WERE EXPECTED TO INCREASE THEIR VOTE. WHERE THEY PERFORMED POORLY, THEIR VOTE WAS EXPECTED TO DECLINE. IN CONTRAST TO MONTEVIDEO WHERE THE INFLUENCE OF THE TRADITIONAL POLITICAL "CLUB" SYSTEM HAS DIMINISHED IN RECENT YEARS, LOCAL POLITICAL LEADERS IN INTERIOR AREAS RETAIN THEIR ABILITY TO INFLUENCE THE OUTCOME OF ELECTIONS THROUGH LOCAL POLITICAL PACTS AND ALLIANCES.

4. WHEN 1966 ELECTION STATISTICS FOR THE INTERIOR ARE RECALCULATED TO ACCOUNT FOR THE SHIFT OF SENATOR MICHELINI'S "LIST

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58
CONFIDENTIAL POL 14 UR
Classification
Department of State NOV 7 1966 03 204324
POL 14 UR

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MONTEV 02667 01 OF 02 091800Z

99" GROUP FROM THE COLORADO PARTY TO THE "FRENTE AMPLIO", THE BLANCO PARTY EMERGES WITH A PLURALITY IN THE INTERIOR OF APPROXIMATELY 10,000 VOTES. IT NOW APPEARS THIS MARGIN WILL BE RETAINED, PERHAPS INCREASED IN THE NOVEMBER ELECTIONS. BLANCO POLITICIANS ARE HOPING TO EMERGE FROM THE INTERIOR WITH A 40-50,000 VOTE LEAD. WHILE THIS FIGURE MAY BE A LITTLE HIGH, IT IS WITHIN THE REALM OF POSSIBILITY. BLANCOS APPEAR TO LEADING IN THE DEPARTMENTS OF COLONIA, TACUAREMBO, SAN JOSE, CERRO LARGO, LAVALLEJA, FLORIDA, ROCHA, DURAZNO, TREINTE Y TRES AND FLORES. THEY ARE IN CLOSE RACES IN THE DEPARTMENTS OF SORIANO, CANELONES AND RIVERA (ALL WON BY THE COLORADOS IN 1966). THE DEPARTMENTS OF ARTIGAS, MALDONADO, PAYANDU, RIO NEGRO AND SALTO APPEAR SECURELY IN COLORADO HANDS. HOWEVER, EVEN IN THESE LATTER DEPARTMENTS, COLORADO MAJORITIES MAY BE SMALLER THAN IN 1966.

5. WITHIN THE BLANCO PARTY, SENATOR FERREIRA ALDUNATE'S CANDIDACY HAS A CLEAR EDGE OVER THAT OF RETIRED GENERAL AGUERRONDO. HOWEVER, AGUERRONDO DOES SHOW CONSIDERABLE STRENGTH IN SEVERAL DEPARTMENTS, INCLUDING COLONIA, CANELONES, RIVERA AND CERRO LARGO.

6. IN THE COLORADO PARTY, WE JUDGE THAT JORGE BATLLE'S UNITY AND REFORM FACTION HAS A SLIGHT EDGE IN INTERIOR OVER THE REELECTION FORCES OF PRESIDENT PACHECO. THIS ESTIMATE IS BASED ON VISITS MADE BEFORE EX-BLANCO SENATOR AND PRESENT AGRICULTURE MINISTER BORDABERRY WAS NAMED AS ALTERNATE CANDIDATE TO PRESIDENT PACHECO. WE WOULD EXPECT THE EFFECT OF BORDABERRY'S NOMINATION TO BE TO INCREASE BATLLE'S LEAD SOMEWHAT DUE TO DEFECTIONS OF SEVERAL INTERIOR "REELECTIONIST" LEADERS. THE BATLLE FACTION APPEARS TO HAVE SUPERIOR ORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP IN THE INTERIOR DEPARTMENTS.

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CONFIDENTIAL

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DECLASSIFIED
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CONFIDENTIAL POL 14 UR

Classification

Department of State

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Department of State TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 968

PAGE 01 MONTEV 02667 02 OF 02 091741Z

45
ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-06 H-02 INR-06 L-03 NSAE-00
NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-14 USIA-12 AID-20 PC-04
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 955
INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
CINCSO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 MONTEVIDEO 2667

CINCSO FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: THE ELECTIONS AS VIEWED FROM THE INTERIOR

REF : MONTEVIDEO 2640

7. DESPITE SUBSTANTIAL EXPENDITURES ON PROPAGANDA AND PUBLICITY, THE "FRETE AMPLIO" SEEMS TO HAVE MADE LIMITED HEADWAY IN THE INTERIOR. IN THE 1966 ELECTIONS, COMPONENTS OF THE PRESENT "FRETE AMPLIO" POLLED ABOUT 8.5 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL INTERIOR VOTE. SEVERAL FORMER MICHELINI AND PDC POLITICIANS IN THE INTERIOR HAVE REFUSED TO JOIN THE "FRETE AMPLIO", AND EITHER REMAINED WITHIN THE COLORADO PARTY, OR JOINED THE NEW "RADICAL CHRISTIAN UNION". IN THE DEPARTMENT OF SAN JOSE, FOR EXAMPLE, WHERE THE "FRETE" FORCES POLLED OVER 5,800 VOTES IN 1966, THE HIGH ESTIMATE FOR THE 1971 ELECTION IS 4,500 VOTES. WE ENCOUNTERED THE SAME PHENOMENON IN SEVERAL OTHER DEPARTMENTS. IN ONLY ONE DEPARTMENT, COLONIA, DID WE FIND AN ESTIMATE OF A DRAMATIC INCREASE IN "FRETE" STRENGTH - FROM 5,000 TO 10,000 VOTES. THUS, WE DO NOT EXPECT THE PROPORTION OF THE "FRETE" VOTE IN THE INTERIOR TO INCREASE SUBSTANTIALY THIS

Montevideo 2673

58

CONFIDENTIAL POL 14 UR

Classification

Department of State

03

204324

POL 14 UR
XR ORG CIA

Department of State TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MONTEV 02667 02 OF 02 091741Z

WHAT LOWER THAN THE 13 PERCENT SHOWN IN LATE OCTOBER GALLUP POLL. HOWEVER, GALLUP POLLS ONLY IN URBAN INTERIOR AREAS, NOT THE COUNTRYSIDE. IN VIRTUALLY EVERY DEPARTMENT WE VISITED, WE WERE TOLD THAT "FRENTE" STRENGTH IS CONCENTRATED IN THE UNIVERSITY-EDUCATED PROFESSIONALS, SECONDARY SCHOOL TEACHERS AND UNIVERSITY STUDENTS.

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Montevideo 2673
11-9-71

CONFIDENTIAL

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Authority NID 969042



58

CONFIDENTIAL POL 14 UR

Classification

Department of State

03

204324

POL 14 UR

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 MONTEV 02673 092126Z

85

ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 M-03 A-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-06 H-02 INR-06
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 AID-20 SIL-01 LAB-06 NIC-01 INRE-00 PSR-01 /106 W
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 FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 959
 INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
 AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
 AMEMBASSY RIO DE JANEIRO
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CINCSO FOR POLAD

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

DEPT PASS OPS

SUBJ: SEREGNI, PRO-"FRENTE" PRESS LINK U.S. TO
 ATTACKS ON "FRENTE" CANDIDATES

REF: A1 MVD-2662 AND B1 MVD-2616

ORG CIA XR POL 14 UR

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1. IN TEN-MINUTE NATIONWIDE RADIO AND TV ADDRESS EVENING
 OF NOVEMBER 8, "FRENTE AMPLIO" PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE LIBER
 SEREGNI LINKED U.S. AND BRAZILIAN "ADVISORS" TO WEEKEND
 ATTACKS ON HIMSELF AND "FRENTE AMPLIO" BUS CARAVAN (REFTEL A).
 OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH OF HIS ADDRESS AS FOLLOWS: BEGIN QUOTE
 THE AUTHOR OF THE MURDER OF THE YOUTH HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED.
 BUT IN THIS CASE IT IS NOT ENOUGH TO POINT OUT THE
 RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL. BEHIND HIM ARE THE TRULY GUILTY
 ONES WHO DIRECT THE JUP, AN ORGANIZATION WHICH HAS NOT
 HIDDEN ITS ULTRA-RIGHT CHARACTER. THEY DIRECT OTHER
 FASCIST PARA-POLICE GROUPS, CLEARLY ASSISTED BY

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 11-9-71

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 MONTEV 02673 092126Z

AMERICAN AND BRAZILIAN EXPERTS. THESE ARE THE INSTRUMENTS. THE TRULY GUILTY ONES ARE THE REPRESENTATIVES OF A REGIME WHICH IS SHAKEN AND WHICH IN ITS AGONY WANTS TO DRAG DOWN THE WHOLE COUNTRY. END QUOTE

2. ALSO IN COURSE OF SPEECH, SEREGNI CHARGED "FRENTE" CANDIDATES BEING ATTACKED BECAUSE IT OBVIOUS THAT PREVIOUS CLOSURE OF NEWSPAPERS, ARRESTS OF PARTY WORKERS, BOMBINGS OF POLITICAL CLUBS, ETC. WERE NOT SUFFICIENT TO STOP "FRENTE" MARCH TO VICTORY. HE ALSO DENOUNCED NON-LEFTIST PRESS AND CANDIDATES OF TRADITIONAL PARTIES FOR FAILURE TO REPUDIATE VIOLENCE AGAINST "FRENTE AMPLIO". HE PLEDGED TO CONTINUE CAMPAIGN OF "PEACEFUL DIALOGUE" WITH THE PEOPLE.

3. "FRENTE" PRESS TODAY (NOVEMBER 9) HEADLINES SEREGNI CHARGES. COMMUNIST PARTY'S "EL POPULAR" AMPLIFIES CHARGES WITH ARTICLE HEADLINED "CIA TEAM DIRECTS CAMPAIGN AGAINST FRENTE AMPLIO". ARTICLE GOES BEYOND EARLIER ATTACK ON EMBASSY PERSONNEL IN AFTERNOON TABLOID "EL ECO" (REFTEL B) AND CHARGES SPECIAL TEAM OF CIA AGENTS DIRECTING "PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE" AGAINST THE "FRENTE AMPLIO". ARTICLE ALLEGES RSO ANTHONY G. BARBIERI IS PANAMANIAN CITIZEN ATTACHED TO U.S. EMBASSY WHO HAS OFFICE IN POLICE HEADQUARTERS NEXT TO BRAZILIAN MEMBER OF "DEATH SQUAD". IT AGAIN NAMES USIS DIRECTOR GOULD AS CIA MEMBER RESPONSIBLE FOR MISINFORMATION AND FORMER LABOR ATTACHE IRWIN RUBENSTEIN AS RESPONSIBLE FOR ANTI-LABOR ACTIVITIES. ARTICLE ALSO IDENTIFIES RSO JEFFREY CUNNINGHAM AS "CIA AGENT", ALLEGING HE SON OF JAMES CUNNINGHAM, "FORMER DIRECTOR OF CIA ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES" IN URUGUAY WHO LEFT HIS "SON" IN URUGUAY TO CARRY ON WORK WHEN HE RETURNED TO WASHINGTON. IT ALSO REHASHES CIA ALLEGATIONS AGAINST FORMER EMBASSY OFFICERS HARRY CAHILL AND JOHN HENNESSY.

4. COMMENT: SEREGNI ATTACK IS FIRST TIME HE HAS PUBLICLY IDENTIFIED HIMSELF WITH CHARGES OF DIRECT U.S. INTERVENTION IN ELECTION. "EL POPULAR" ATTACK MOST VICIOUS AND SPECIFIC ATTACK ON EMBASSY BY THE PCU MOUTHPIECE IN RECENT YEARS. WE EXPECT ATTACKS OF THIS NATURE WILL CONTINUE THROUGHOUT THE PERIOD REMAINING BEFORE THE ELECTION.

EXEMPT.

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59

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Department of State

POL 14 UR
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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 MONTEV 02673 092126Z

85

ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 M-03 A-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-06 H-02 INR-06
 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-14 USIA-12
 AID-20 SIL-01 LAB-06 NIC-01 INPE-00 RSR-01 /106 W
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 FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 959
 INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
 AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
 AMEMBASSY RIO DE JANEIRO
 CINCSO

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CINCSO FOR POLAD

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

DEPT PASS OPS

SUBJ: SEREGNI, PRO-"FRENTE" PRESS LINK U.S. TO
 ATTACKS ON "FRENTE" CANDIDATES

REF: A1 MVD-2662 AND B1 MVD-2616

ORG CIA XR POL 14 UR

- POL 14 UR XR POL 13-8 UR XR POL 12 UR

1. IN TEN-MINUTE NATIONWIDE RADIO AND TV ADDRESS EVENING
 OF NOVEMBER 8, "FRENTE AMPLIO" PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE LIBER
 SEREGNI LINKED U.S. AND BRAZILIAN "ADVISORS" TO WEEKEND
 ATTACKS ON HIMSELF AND "FRENTE AMPLIO" BUS CARAVAN (REFTEL A).
 OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH OF HIS ADDRESS AS FOLLOWS: BEGIN QUOTE
 THE AUTHOR OF THE MURDER OF THE YOUTH HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED.
 BUT IN THIS CASE IT IS NOT ENOUGH TO POINT OUT THE
 RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL. BEHIND HIM ARE THE TRULY GUILTY
 ONES WHO DIRECT THE JUP, AN ORGANIZATION WHICH HAS NOT
 HIDDEN ITS ULTRA-RIGHT CHARACTER. THEY DIRECT OTHER
 FASCIST PARA-POLICE GROUPS, CLEARLY ASSISTED BY

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46

Montevideo 2673
11-9-71

204324



58

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Department of State
TELEGRAM

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IN-
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ACTION: Amembassy BUENOS AIRES
Amembassy MONTEVIDEO

EXDIS

Subject: Asst. Secretary Meyer Consultation with
Ambassador Adair

1. During ~~two day~~ visit to Buenos Aires November ~~17~~ 16-18 Asst. Secretary Meyer would like to meet in Buenos Aires with Ambassador Adair for brief discussion latest developments in Uruguayan election. Would appreciate it if Ambassador Adair in telegram to Washington and Buenos Aires would indicate whether this would be convenient, and if so, whether morning or afternoon of seventeenth ~~which block of~~ ~~time~~ would be ~~most~~ ^{more} suitable for him. Upon receipt that cable Buenos Aires should take this into account and advise ~~Mexico~~ ~~Montevideo~~ and Washington what scheduling arrangements can be made for this conversation.
2. If either Ambassador Adair's activities in Montevideo or Meyer schedule in Buenos Aires do not

DRAFTED BY:

ARA-LA/APU:WPStedman:mrc

DRAFTING DATE

11/8/71

TEL. EXT.

29469

APPROVED BY:

ARA - Mr. Meyer

CLEARANCES:

ARA - Mr. Crimmins
USOAS - Mr. Crigler ^{US in FC (subs)}
S/S - Mr. Miller ^{Room}

A/OPR * Mr. Baquet

S/S-S - Mr. Nadzo

CONFIDENTIAL

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204324

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

Department of State

TELEGRAM

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ACTION: Amembassy Buenos Aires, Montevideo

Page 2

permit this meeting, it may be possible ^{for} ~~to dispatch~~
member of Finch party ^{go} briefly to Montevideo for this
discussion.

GP-4

END

IRWIN

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Classification	CONFIDENTIAL		S/S 9	
Post	STATE		S/S - Screener 42, 43, 44	Dpty
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Date	11-9-71		S/S-O 11	Dpty
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PRINCIPALS				
S	✓	4	GEOGRAPHIC BUREAUS	
U	✓	3	AF	
J			ARA ✓✓ 4, 15	
D			EA	
M			EUR	
C	✓	10	NEA	
S/AL			OTHER AGENCIES	
S/CPR			White House ✓✓ 2, 3	
S/PC			Vice-President	
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P			USIA	
PM			OTHER	
SCI			S/S - S - Mr. Nadzo ✓6	
SY			11, 8, 16-22	

23



Department of State

TELEGRAM

POL 14 UR
POL 14 UR
XR POL 23-8 UR
XR POL 12 UR

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PAGE 01 MONTEV 02662 082121Z

85
ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 PM-06 NSC-10 SS-14 RSC-01 CIAE-00 OODE-00

INR-06 NSAE-00 P-03 USIA-12 PRS-01 NIC-01 RSR-01 /070 W
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FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 951
INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO
CINCSO

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CINCSO FOR POLAD

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJ: "FRENTE AMPLIO" CANDIDATES ATTACKED
IN INTERIOR

1. AS "FRENTE AMPLIO" CANDIDATES BEGAN THEIR FINAL CAMPAIGN IN INTERIOR OF COUNTRY THIS PAST WEEKEND, THEY ENCOUNTERED SERIES OF SERIOUS INCIDENTS IN DEPARTMENT OF ROCHA WHICH RESULTED IN DEATH BY GUNSHOT OF ONE CHILD, AND SLIGHT SCRATCH FROM KNIFE ATTACK TO PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE LIBER SEREGNI. INCIDENTS OCCURRED NOVEMBER 7. ELEVEN-YEAR OLD CHILD WOUNDED AND LATER DIED IN VILLAGE OF CASTILLO WHEN "FRENTE" BUS CARAVAN STOPPED AND STONED BY HOSTILE CROWD AS IT LEAVING CITY AFTER RALLY. IN COURSE OF FRACAS, SOMEONE FIRED SHOT WHICH WOUNDED CHILD INSIDE NEIGHBORING HOUSE. ACCORDING TO MOST OF LOCAL PRESS, IT NOT CLEAR WHETHER SHOT FIRED FROM CROWD OR FROM VEHICLES IN CARAVAN. PCU'S "EL POPULAR" ALLEGES SEVERAL SHOTS FIRED BY "FASCISTS" ATTACKING THE "FRENTE" CARAVAN. CARAVAN ALSO STONED IN TOWN OF LASCANO WHERE SEVERAL WINDOWS BROKEN IN CARAVAN BUSES.

2. IN CITY OF ROCHA, PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE SEREGNI ATTACKED BY KNIFE-WIELDING ASSAILANT AS HE PREPARED TO ENTER LOCAL THEATRE FOR

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(3)

Montevideo 2662
11-8-71



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PAGE 02 MONTEV 02662 082121Z

RALLY. SEREGNI RECEIVED SLIGHT SCRATCH IN CHEST AND ASSAILANT APPREHENDED BY BODYGUARDS. HE IS ALEJANDRO BLASCO, A NATURALIZED URUGUAYAN CITIZEN OF ARGENTINE BIRTH WHO WORKS IN PUNTA DEL ESTE CASINO. ACCORDING TO PUBLISHED POLICE REPORTS, BLASCO UNDER INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL AT TIME OF ATTACK.

3. COMMENT: "FRENTE" PRESS HAS BEEN ALLEGING PLOT TO ASSASSINATE SEREGNI FOR SEVERAL MONTHS. ABOVE INCIDENTS WILL UNDOUBTEDLY CONFIRM THESE FEARS IN MINDS OF "FRENTE" SUPPORTERS. THEY MAY ALSO CREATE SOME BACKLASH OF SYMPATHY FOR SEREGNI AMONG UNCOMMITTED VOTERS. "EL POPULAR" CHRGES GOU RESPONSIBLE FOR ATTACKS BECAUSE IT HAS NOT CRACKED DOWN ON RIGHTIST JUP YOUTH MOVEMENT AND OTHER "FASCIST" GROUPS. IT ALSO ALLEGES INTERIOR POLICE FAILING TO PROVIDE "FRENTE" WITH PROTECTION NECESSARY TO GUARANTEE FREE ELECTIONS. EXEMPT.
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TELEGRAM

POL 14 UR
XR POL 12 UR
XR POL 15-1 UR

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PAGE 01 MONTEV 02653 051702Z

45
ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 SSC-01 HEW-08 PM-06 NSC-10 SS-14 RSC-01
CIAE-00 DODE-00 INR-06 NSAE-00 P-03 USIA-12 PRS-01
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FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
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INFO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
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CINCSO FOR POLAD

SUBJ: MINISTER OF EDUCATION RESIGNS

REF: MVD 2640 - POL 14 UR XR POL 15-1 UR

1. A FURTHER FRACTURE IN RANKS OF PRESIDENT PACHECO'S POLITICAL FORCES DEVELOPED LATE YESTERDAY AFTERNOON (NOVEMBER 4) WITH ANNOUNCEMENT OF RESIGNATION OF MINISTER EDUCATION AND CULTURE PEDRO W. CERSOSIMO. CERSOSIMO RESIGNATION FROM PACHECO'S CABINET WAS FOLLOWED BY STATEMENT FROM HIM THAT HE HAD ALSO RESIGNED FROM PRESIDENT'S UNR POLITICAL COALITION.

2. IN PRESS INTERVIEW LAST EVENING, CERSOSIMO CONFIRMED THAT HIS RESIGNATION WAS RESULT OF PRESIDENT PACHECO'S DECISION TO REMOVE HIM FROM NUMBER ONE SPOT ON UNR'S LIST OF SENATORIAL CANDIDATES. THROUGHOUT PAST WEEK, THERE HAVE BEEN RUMORS THAT PRESIDENT WISHED TO MOVE CERSOSIMO FURTHER DOWN ON SENATE LIST IN FAVOR OF FINANCE MINISTER CARLOS FLEITAS. ACCORDING TO CERSOSIMO, HOWEVER, PRESIDENT HAD ASSURED HIM NOVEMBER 3 THAT HIS TOP POSITION WAS CONFIRMED. NOTWITHSTANDING, CERSOSIMO DECLARED THAT YESTERDAY AFTERNOON, UNR LEADER RAUMAR JUDE

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3

Montevideo 2653
11-5-71



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 MONTEV 02653 051702Z

INFORMED HIM OF PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO DROP HIM TO NUMBER FIVE ON LIST. CERSOSIMO REFUSED TO COMMENT ON HIS FUTURE PLANS WHICH HE SAID WOULD BE IN HANDS OF HIS OWN POLITICAL GROUP. HE DID, HOWEVER, DECLARE THAT HE WOULD PRESENT HIS CANDIDACY FOR NATIONAL DEPUTY IN THE DEPARTMENT OF SAN JOSE WHERE HE WAS ELECTED DEPUTY IN 1966. IRONICALLY, PRESIDENT IN ACCEPTING CERSOSIMO'S RESIGNATION NAMED FLEITAS AS INTERIM EDUCATION/CULTURE MINISTER.

3. COMMENT: THROUGHOUT PACHECO ADMINISTRATION, CERSOSIMO HAS BEEN ONE OF PRESIDENT'S MOST LOYAL AND UNWAVERING SUPPORTERS. THOUGH SOMEWHAT UNIMAGINATIVE AND PLODDING, HE NEVERTHELESS ACCEPTED WITHOUT COMPLAINT THE PRESIDENT'S CALL FOR HIM TO HEAD SUCCESSIVELY THE DIFFICULT MINISTRIES OF LABOR, INTERIOR AND FINALLY EDUCATION. ALTHOUGH CERSOSIMO'S POLITICAL ORGANIZATION IN SAN JOSE IS FAIRLY SMALL AND IT IS TRADITIONALLY A BLANCO STRONGHOLD, HIS DEPARTURE FROM THE UNR WILL PROBABLY MAKE LIST 15 PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE JORGE BATLLE THE MOST VOTED COLORADO IN THAT DEPARTMENT. CERSOSIMO'S RESIGNATION ALSO GIVES FURTHER EVIDENCE OF THE CONFLICTS AND INFIGHTING WITHIN THE UNR, AS WELL AS THE ABSOLUTE CONTROL WHICH PRESIDENT PACHECO MAINTAINS OVER IT. EXEMPT.
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Department of State

POL 14 UR
XR POL 15-1 UR

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 323

PAGE 01 MONTEV 02640 01 OF 02 041849Z

47

ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-06 H-02 INR-06 L-03 NSAE-00
 NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-14 USIA-12 AID-20 PC-04
 RSR-01 /098 W

R 041711Z NOV 71
 FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC 933
 INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
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 AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MONTEVIDEO 2640

CINCSO FOR POLAD

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJ: FINAL MONTH OF URUGUAYAN POLITICAL CAMPAIGN

REF: MVD 24361 2539 (NOTAL)

1. SUMMARY. WITH LESS THAN ONE MONTH REMAINING IN THE CAMPAIGN, THE COLORADO PARTY CONTINUES ITS OVERALL NATIONAL LEAD. IN INTERIOR AREAS OUTSIDE OF MONTEVIDEO, HOWEVER, WE NOW JUDGE THE BLANCO PARTY TO BE AHEAD. THE MONTEVIDEO RACE BETWEEN COLORADO CANDIDATES AND "FRENTE AMPLIO" FORCES CONTINUES TO BE CLOSE, THOUGH LATTER HAS SHOWN NO SIMILAR STRENGTH OUTSIDE THE CAPITAL CITY. CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT TO PERMIT THE RE-ELECTION OF PRESIDENT PACHECO STILL DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE SUFFICIENT SUPPORT TO BE ADOPTED. END SUMMARY

2. OVERALL ELECTORAL PICTURE - SINCE OUR LAST ELECTORAL ANALYSES (REFTELS), SEVERAL FACTORS HAVE COME TO LIGHT WHICH COULD HAVE BEARING ON ULTIMATE RESULT. FIRST, AFTER SERIES OF VISITS TO INTERIOR AREAS, WE ARE NOW OF OPINION THAT OPPOSITION BLANCO PARTY IS STRONGER THERE THAN OUR PREVIOUS ESTIMATES. IN CONTRAST

CONFIDENTIAL

Montevideo 2640
11-4-71

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MONTEV 02640 01 OF 02 041849Z

TO GALLUP FIGURES WHICH INDICATE SLIGHT COLORADO PARTY LEAD IN INTERIOR DEPARTMENTS, IT OUR JUDGMENT THAT BLANCO PARTY NOW LEADS THERE. WHERE BLANCO'S TOOK NINE INTERIOR DEPARTMENTS IN 1966, WE NOW ESTIMATE THEM TO BE LEADING IN TEN WITH CLOSE CONTESTS WITH COLORADOS IN THREE MORE (INCLUDING DEPARTMENT OF CANELONES WHICH HAS 10 PERCENT OF VOTE). SECOND, THESE VISITS ALSO LEAD US TO CONCLUSION THAT COMMUNIST-DOMINATED "FRENTE AMPLIO" COALITION HAS YET TO MAKE SIGNIFICANT IMPACT BEYOND 8 PERCENT OF VOTE WHICH "FRENTE" GROUPS RECEIVED IN INTERIOR DURING 1966 CONTEST. THIS ALSO CONTRAST TO GALLUP FIGURES WHICH PLACE "FRENTE" AT OVERALL 12 PERCENT IN INTERIOR DEPARTMENTS. THIRD, PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO NAME EX-BLANCO PARTY "RURALIST" BORDABERRY AS HIS ALTERNATE CANDIDATE CONTINUES TO BE OPPOSED BY SOME COLORADO POLITICIANS AND WILL RESULT IN LOWERING OF BORDABERRY VOTE IN FAVOR OF OTHER COLORADO CANDIDATES. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THIS OPPOSITION HAS YET DISPLACED BORDABERRY AS LIKELY "MOST VOTED" WITHIN COLORADO PARTY. HOWEVER, GAP BETWEEN HIM AND OTHER CANDIDATES, PARTICULARLY JORGE BATLLE, HAS NARROWED. WE SEE RELATIVE STRENGTHS OF CONTENDING POLITICAL FORCES AS FOLLOWS:

IN MONTEVIDEO "FRENTE AMPLIO" REMAINS STRONG AND RACE WILL BE CLOSE ONE BETWEEN IT AND COLORADOS. WE SUSPECT BLANCO PARTY, ESPECIALLY FERREIRA ALDUNATE, MAY BE MAKING SOME HEADWAY AMONG PREVIOUSLY UNDECIDED VOTERS. WE WOULD GIVE EDGE TO COLORADOS AS OF NOW. NATIONALLY, COLORADOS ARE ALSO LEADING WITH BLANCOS IN STRONG SECOND PLACE BECAUSE OF THEIR STRENGTH IN INTERIOR. FUROR OVER NAMING OF BORDABERRY HAS LOST SOME VOTES TO MOVEMENT FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT TO PERMIT RE-ELECTION OF PRESIDENT PACHECO. HOWEVER, RE-ELECTION MOVEMENT HAS PROBABLY LOST FEWER VOTES FROM THIS EPISODE THAN HAS THE BORDABERRY CANDIDACY. NUMBER OF VOTERS DECLARING THEMSELVES AS YET UNDECIDED HAS DROPPED SOMEWHAT BUT PROBABLY REMAINS IN 25-30 PERCENT RANGE. WE CONTINUE BELIEVE THAT MOST OF UNDECIDED VOTES WILL GO TO EITHER COLORADO OR BLANCO PARTY CANDIDATES.

3. COLORADOS AND THE BORDABERRY CANDIDACY - RUMBLINGS OF DISCONTENT CONTINUE TO BE HEARD IN COLORADO RANKS AS RESULT OF PRESIDENT PACHECO'S SELECTION OF MINAGRICULTURE BORDABERRY AS ALTERNATE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE TO REPRESENT HIS FORCES SHOULD RE-ELECTION AMENDMENT FAIL. VICE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE OF "THIRD COLORADO FRONT", SENATOR FLORES MORA, MADE STRONG ATTACK ON BORDABERRY CANDIDACY IN NATION-WIDE RADIO-TELEVISION ADDRESS

CONFIDENTIAL

23

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TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MONTEV 02640 01 OF 02 041849Z

NOVEMBER 1, CHARGING BORDABERRY IS "DOCILE" TOOL OF "LARGE ECONOMIC INTERESTS". SIMILAR ATTACKS CAN BE EXPECTED FROM VICE PRESIDENT ABDALA AND OTHER DISAFFECTED PACHECO SUPPORTERS AS CAMPAIGN PROCEEDS. PRESS NOVEMBER 4 CARRIES TEXT OF RESIGNATION OF RE-ELECTION FORCES' CANDIDATE FOR "INTENDENTE" OF DEPARTMENT OF TREINTA Y TRES IN PROTEST OVER PRESIDENT'S DECISION. THERE ARE UNCONFIRMED REPORTS OF SIMILAR ACTION BY PACHECO CANDIDATE FOR "INTENDENTE" OF DEPARTMENT OF CANELONES. LIST IS PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE JORGE BATLLE HAS INDICATED TO US HIS BELIEF THAT PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION OF BORDABERRY WILL ULTIMATELY RESULT IN SUCH LARGE DEFECTIONS TO HIM (BATLLE) AS TO MAKE HIM PARTY'S FRONT RUNNER. HOWEVER, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THIS HAS OCCURRED. SUCH EVIDENCE AS WE NOW HAVE INDICATES THAT BORDABERRY REMAINS THE STRONGEST COLORADO CANDIDATE. PRESIDENT PACHECO'S UNR POLITICAL COALITION CONTINUES TO CONCENTRATE ITS CAMPAIGN ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON PACHECO HIMSELF. AT RECENT RALLY AT WHICH HIS OWN CANDIDACY WAS FORMALLY PROCLAIMED, BORDABERRY WENT SO FAR AS TO STATE SEVERAL TIMES THAT "THE ONLY REASON WE ARE HERE TONIGHT IS TO SUPPORT THE RE-ELECTION OF PRESIDENT PACHECO". DESPITE THESE EFFORTS, HOWEVER, VOTER SUPPORT FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT WHICH WOULD PERMIT THE PRESIDENT'S RE-ELECTION APPEARS TO BE WELL SHORT OF THE NECESSARY MAJORITY NEEDED FOR APPROVAL. GALLUP AND OTHER OPINION SURVEYS SHOW SOME FIFTY PERCENT AGAINST AMENDMENT, WHILE TWENTY PERCENT NOT RESPONDING TO QUESTION.

CONFIDENTIAL
23

Pol 14 UR

Department of State

TELEGRAM



CONFIDENTIAL 318

PAGE 01 MONTEV 22640 02 OF 02 041834Z

47 ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-06 H-02 INR-06 L-03 NSAE-00
NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-14 USIA-12 AID-20 PC-04

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R 041711Z NOV 71
FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 934
INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO
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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 2 OF 2 MONTEVIDEO 2640
CINCSO FOR POLAD

4. BLANCO CAMPAIGN - FERREIRA ALDUNATE'S CAMPAIGN SHOWS NO SIGNS OF FALTERING, AS FERREIRA NOW HALFWAY THROUGH A MONTH-LONG "WHISTLE STOP" TOUR THROUGH INTERIOR. UNPUBLISHED GALLUP PROJECTIONS OF FERREIRA'S POPULARITY SHOWS HIM DRAWING OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF TOTAL BLANCO VOTE. ALTHOUGH VOTER APPEAL OF OTHER BLANCO CANDIDATE, GENERAL MARIO AGUERRONDO, CLEARLY MUCH LESS THAN THAT OF FERREIRA, AGUERRONDO FORCES DO HAVE IMPORTANT AREAS OF STRENGTH IN INTERIOR. FOR INSTANCE, FERREIRA FORCES THEMSELVES ADMIT THAT STRONG AGUERRONDO LOCAL LEADERS IN DEPARTMENTS OF COLONIA IS PERCENT OF VOTE, AND CANE LONES 110 PERCENT OF VOTE, WILL RESULT IN AGUERRONDO'S DRAWING A MAJORITY OF BLANCO VOTES THERE. HOWEVER, OVERALL BLANCO STRATEGY REMAINS ONE OF SEEKING TO MAXIMIZE ITS INTERIOR VOTE IN ORDER TO MAKE UP ITS MARGIN OF LOSS IN MONTEVIDEO. SEVERAL BLANCO POLITICIANS HAVE TOLD US THAT IF BLANCO PARTY CAN LOSE MONTEVIDEO BY NOT MORE THAN 35-40,000 VOTES, ITS INTERIOR VOTE WILL GIVE PARTY NATIONAL VICTORY. AS OF MOMENT, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT BLANCOS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO NARROW THE MONTEVIDEO RACE TO THAT EXTENT.

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POL 14 UR
XR POL 15-1UR



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MONTEV 02640 02 OF 02 041834Z

5. "FRENTE AMPLIO" - AS INDICATED ABOVE, WE CONTINUE SEE GREAT DISPARITY BETWEEN "FRENTE" STRENGTH IN MONTEVIDEO AND THAT IN INTERIOR AREAS. IN NONE OF INTERIOR DEPARTMENTS DOES "FRENTE" APPEAR TO BE APPROACHING VICTORY IN LOCAL RACES. IN AN EFFORT TO SHORE UP ITS CAMPAIGN THERE, "FRENTE" PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE SEREGNI IS ABOUT TO EMBARK ON CAMPAIGN TRIP THROUGHOUT INTERIOR CITIES. WE DOUBT, HOWEVER, THAT THIS EFFORT WILL RESULT IN ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGES ALTHOUGH MANY BLANCO AND COLORADO PARTY POLITICIANS BELIEVE "FRENTE" STRENGTH HAS PEAKED AND IS DECLINING SOMEWHAT IN MONTEVIDEO, WE HAVE NO HARD EVIDENCE WHICH WOULD SUSTAIN SUCH OPTIMISM, ON OTHER HAND, WE DO NOT SEE THAT "FRENTE" FORCES HAVE GAINED ANY APPRECIABLE VOTING STRENGTH HERE IN PAST TWO MONTHS.

6. A MORE DETAILED REPORT ON OUR IMPRESSIONS OF CAMPAIGN IN INTERIOR DEPARTMENTS WILL BE SUBMITTED SHORTLY. GP-3.
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CONFIDENTIAL

23



Department of State

POL 14 UR
XR POL 15-1 UR

TELEGRAM

23



Department of State

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 MONTEV 02623 021724Z

47
ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 INR-06 NSAE-00 P-03 RSC-01

USIA-12 PRS-01 NIC-01 AID-20 COM-08 E-11 LAR-06

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Montevideo 2623
11-2-71

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CINCSO FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: AIFLD: COMMUNIST DAILY CONTINUES ATTACK

REF: MONTEVIDEO 921-*wrongly* see 2616-ORG CIA
XR POL 14 UR

1. AS PROMISED IN OCTOBER 30 EDITION (REFTEL), COMMUNIST DAILY "EL ECO" PUBLISHED ARTICLE NOVEMBER 1 CONTINUING ATTACK ON US FOR INVOLVEMENT IN URUGUAYAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS. ARTICLE IS IN FORM OF INTERVIEW WITH EDUARDO BARU FODERE, FIRST PRESIDENT OF UDDEA (UNION OF ANCAP WORKERS NOW AFFILIATED TO AIFLD-SUPPORTED CUT LABOR FEDERATION). BARU ACCUSES FORMER AIFLD CPD JOHN CALDWELL AND ASSISTANT CPD HERNANDEZ OF DIRECTING PROGRAM DESIGNED TO PROMOTE "YELLOW" AND "DIVISIONIST" UNIONISM IN SERVICE OF US AND URUGUAYAN "OLIGARCHY". AIFLD ALLEGEDLY LAVISHED "DOLLARS AND TRIPS" ON UNSUSPECTING TRADE UNIONISTS SUCH AS BARU TO CORRUPT THEM. BARU, WHO NOW STATES HE IS WITH COMMUNIST-BACKED "FRENTE AMPLIO" POLITICAL COALITION, ACCUSES AIFLD OF HAVING SUPPORTED COLORADO DEPUTY FERNANDO ELICHIRIGOITY AND OTHER POLITICIANS IN SERVICE OF THE "OLIGARCHY". ELICHIRIGOITY ALLEGEDLY PLAYED ROLE IN CREATION OF UDDEA AND OTHER "YELLOW" UNIONS TO SERVE AS A POLITICAL "TRAMPOLINE".

2. COMMENT: IN ADDITION TO NAMING CALDWELL AND HERNANDEZ, BERTU ALSO IDENTIFIES SEVERAL PERSONS NOW IN LEADERSHIP POSITIONS

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PAGE 01 MONTEV 02616 012100Z

83

ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-06 H-02 INR-06 L-03 NSAE-00

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CINCSO FOR POLAD

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJ: COMMUNIST DAILY CHARGES SEVERAL EMBASSY OFFICERS
ARE "CIA AGENTS"1. IN ITS OCTOBER 30 EDITION, COMMUNIST AFTERNOON TABLOID
"EL ECO" FEATURES STORY NAMING SEVERAL CURRENT AND FORMER
EMBASSY OFFICERS AS "AGENTS OF THE CIA" WHO ARE "INTERFERING"
IN URUGUAYAN ELECTIONS.2. GROUP NAMED INCLUDES COL. JAMES SMITH, DEFENSE AND
NAVAL ATTACHE; COL. JOHN KOMP, ARMY ATTACHE AND LT. COL.
JAMES KEENAN, AIR ATTACHE. STORY STATES THAT THEY CHARGED
WITH MAINTAINING CONTACT WITH SENIOR URUGUAYAN MILITARY
OFFICERS AND "OF COURSE, UNDERTAKING ESPIONAGE". USIS
CHIEF DONALD GOULD IS INCLUDED WITH "NOTORIOUS AGENTS OF
THE CIA" AND IS CHARGED WITH HEADING THE EMBASSY'S "WHITE"
PROPAGANDA EFFORT. FORMER LABOR ATTACHE IRWIN RUBENSTEIN
IS ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN "DEDICATED TO FOMENTING DIVISIONS
IN THE URUGUAYAN LABOR MOVEMENT". FORMER COMMERCIAL ATTACHE
HARRY CAHILL AND FORMER POLITICAL OFFICER JOHN HENNESSY
BOTH DECLARED TO BE "LONG-TIME CIA AGENTS" AND RESPONSIBLE
FOR EMBASSY'S "GRAY" AND "BLACK" PROPAGANDA PROGRAMS.LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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Montevideo 2616
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PAGE 01 MONTEV 02602 292159Z

84
ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-06 H-02 INR-06 L-03 NSAE-00
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 AMEMBASSY RIO DE JANEIRO
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CINCSO FOR POLAD

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJ: NAMING OF ALTERNATE PACHECO CANDIDATE PROVOKES
 SECOND CABINET RESIGNATION

REF: MVD 2557 POL 14 UR XR POL 15-1UR

1. SUMMARY. TRANSPORT MINISTER CARLOS QUERALTO HAS
 RESIGNED FROM PACHECO CABINET IN PROTEST OVER PRESIDENT PACHECO'S
 NAMING OF MINAGRICULTURE BORDABERRY AS HIS ALTERNATE CHOICE FOR
 PRESIDENCY. WE NOW BELIEVE THAT EFFECT OF THIS RESIGNATION AND
 OTHERS FROM PRO-PACHECO FORCES WILL BE LIMITED TO VOTE SHIFTS
 INSIDE COLORADO PARTY. AS OF THE MOMENT, HOWEVER, THESE DO NOT
 APPEAR TO HAVE OVERCOME LEAD WHICH PACHECO SUPPORTERS HAVE HAD
 OVER OTHER COLORADO PARTY GROUPS. END SUMMARY.

2. IN WAKE OF PRESIDENT PACHECO'S DECISION TO NAME CURRENT
 MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE AND EX-BLANCO RURALIST SENATOR JUAN
 BORDABERRY AS HIS ALTERNATE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE, MINISTER OF
 TRANSPORT, COMMUNICATIONS AND TOURISM CARLOS QUERALTO RESIGNED

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PAGE 02 MONTEV 02602 292159Z

FROM PACHECO CABINET LATE AFTERNOON OCTOBER 28. QUERALTO'S RESIGNATION WAS EXPECTED AFTER COLORADO POLITICAL FACTION WHICH HE LEADS ISSUED STRONG DENUNCIATION OF BORDABERRY CANDIDACY ON OCTOBER 27. ALTHOUGH NO FORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT YET MADE, IT WIDELY BELIEVED THAT QUERALTO (WHO RECEIVED TWENTY PLUS THOUSAND VOTES AND ELECTED DEPUTY FROM MONTEVIDEO IN 1966) WILL SHIFT HIS SUPPORT TO COLORADO LIST IS PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE JORGE BATLLE. INTERIM REPLACEMENT FOR QUERALTO IN CABINET IS MINISTER OF DEFENSE GARCIA CAPURRO.

3. FOLLOWING HIS RESIGNATION LAST WEEKEND FROM PACHECO CABINET, EX-DIRECTOR OF PLANNING AND BUDGET AQUILES LANZA ALSO FORMALLY RESIGNED FROM PRO-PACHECO "NATIONAL REELECTION UNION" (UNRI) COALITION. IN HIS LETTER OF RESIGNATION, LANZA OBJECTED TO PRESIDENT'S FAILURE TO CONSULT WITH POLITICAL GROUPS SUPPORTING HIM ABOUT BORDABERRY CANDIDACY AND, LIKE QUERALTO, TO FACT THAT BORDABERRY NOT A MEMBER OF COLORADO PARTY. LANZA HAS NOT ANNOUNCED HIS FUTURE PLANS BUT ATTENDED BATLLE POLITICAL RALLY LAST EVENING. HE WAS REPLACED IN CABINET BY HEAD OF GOU'S WAGE-PRICE BOARD (COPRINI), COL. ANGEL SERVETTI.

4. VICE PRESIDENT ALBERTO ABDALA, WHO LIKEWISE RESIGNED FROM UNR OVER HIS UNCEREMONIOUS DUMPING BY PRESIDENT AS POTENTIAL VICE PRESIDENTIAL CHOICE, HAS NOT YET MADE FORMAL STATEMENT ON MATTER. HOWEVER, HIS PRIVATE SECRETARY YESTERDAY TOLD EMBOFF THAT ABDALA'S "LIST ONE MILLION" GROUP WILL ISSUE STRONG DENUNCIATION OF PRESIDENT'S ACTION SOMETIME TODAY (OCTOBER 29). STATEMENT WILL CLOSE WITH CALL FOR "MASSIVE VOTE" FOR LIST 15 CANDIDATE FOR MONTEVIDEO MAYOR, MINISTER PUBLIC WORKS PINTOS RISSO. ACCORDING TO ABDALA'S SECRETARY, PLANS ARE NOW TO LEAVE ABDALA SUPPORTERS FREE TO VOTE FOR WHICHEVER OTHER COLORADO PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE THEY CHOOSE. VICE PRESIDENT DOES NOT NOW PLAN TO PRESENT HIS OWN CANDIDACY FOR ANY OFFICE.

5. CONTRARY TO FIRST REPORTS, EX-SECRETARY OF PRESIDENCY HECTOR GIORGI DID NOT RESIGN BUT WAS FIRED FROM HIS POSITION IN PRESIDENT'S OFFICE. GIORGI WAS REPLACED BY FORMER PRESIDENTIAL SUB-SECRETARY CARLOS PIRAN, WHO HIMSELF HAD BEEN MENTIONED EARLIER AS POSSIBLE PACHECO CHOICE AS ALTERNATE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE.

6. COMMENT: AS SMOKE BEGINS TO CLEAR FROM FUROR CREATED

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PAGE 03 MONTEV 02602 292159Z

BY PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO NAME BORDABERRY, IT APPEARS THAT PRINCIPAL EFFECT WILL BE LIMITED TO VOTE SHIFTS WITHIN REPEAT WITHIN COLORADO PARTY. INITIAL BLANCO REACTION WAS TO VIEW SQUABBLE AS MAINLY INTERNAL COLORADO MATTER WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT BENEFIT FOR BLANCO PARTY CANDIDATES. WE NOT NOW ABLE TO JUDGE WHAT IF ANY EFFECT PRESIDENT'S ACTION HAS HAD ON STILL-LARGE GROUP OF UNDECIDED VOTERS. SO FAR AS COLORADO PARTY CONCERNED, IN ADDITION TO BATLLE, SENATOR FLORES MORA, VICE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE OF "THIRD COLORADO FRONT" LED BY SENATOR VASCONCELLOS, MAY BE OTHER MAIN BENEFICIARY. SENATOR CARLOS CIGLIUTTI AND DEPUTY ARTURO CUEVAS CACERES ARE EXPECTED TO DECLARE FOR FLORES MORA. CUEVAS, COLORADO LEADER IN DEPARTMENT OF FLORES, RECEIVED OVER 2,000 VOTES, ONE-THIRD OF THE PARTY'S TOTAL, IN THAT DEPARTMENT IN 1966. EX-MINISTER QUERALTO QUOTED IN PRESS AS SAYING THAT PRO-PACHECO LEADER IN DEPARTMENT OF TACAUREMBO TOLD HIM PRESIDENT'S DECISION WILL COST PARTY "AT LEAST 2-3,000 VOTES" THERE. HOWEVER, IT IS FAR FROM CLEAR HOW IMPORTANT THESE VOTE SHIFTS FROM BORDABERRY WILL ULTIMATELY BE. AS OF THIS TIME, WE DO NOT THINK THEY HAVE BEEN SO EXTENSIVE AS TO ALTER POSITION OF PACHECO FORCES AS DOMINANT GROUP IN COLORADO PARTY. EXEMPT.

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PAGE 01 MONTEV 02544 222130Z

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ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 PM-06 NSC-10 SS-14 RSC-01 AID-20 PC-04 CIA-04
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JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJ: PRESIDENT PACHECO APPROVES ALTERNATE ELECTORAL
 SLATE

REF: MVD 2532 AND 2525

POL 14 UR

1. SPOKESMAN FOR PRO-PACHECO UNR POLITICAL COALITION
 ANNOUNCED TODAY THAT PRESIDENT PACHECO HAS APPROVED NAMES
 OF MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE JUAN BORDABERRY AND MINISTER OF
 LABOR JORGE SAPELLI AS HIS ALTERNATE CHOICES FOR PRESIDENT
 AND VICE PRESIDENT SHOULD CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT PERMITTING
 HIS OWN RE-ELECTION NOT BE APPROVED.

2. ANNOUNCEMENT CAME THIS AFTERNOON (OCTOBER 22) AT PRESS
 CONFERENCE HELD IN PRESIDENT PACHECO'S RESIDENCE. IN
 PRESENCE OF OTHER UNR LEADERS, CHIEF OF "CASA BATLLISTA"
 LIST 515 FACTION, DR. GLAUCO SEGOVIA, READ STATEMENT
 REAFFIRMING UNR COMMITMENT TO RE-ELECTION OF PRESIDENT
 PACHECO AND DECLARING THAT VOTERS ALSO SHOULD HAVE
 OPPORTUNITY TO SUPPORT PACHECO'S OWN CHOICE TO REPLACE
 HIM UNDER CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM WHICH PROHIBITS

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PAGE 02 MONTEV 02544 222130Z

PRESIDENTIAL RE-ELECTION.

3. COMMENT: TODAY'S ANNOUNCEMENT ENDS A WEEK OF INTENSE SPECULATION AND RUMOR ON WHO PRESIDENT WOULD PICK AS HIS POLITICAL HEIR. PRESIDENT'S DECISION WILL COMBINE BORDABERRY, ONE OF LEADERS OF BENITO NARDONE'S NOW-DEFUNCT "RURALIST FEDERATION", WITH ANOTHER LONG-TIME PACHECO SUPPORTER, MINISTER SAPELLI, WHO WAS PRESIDENT OF CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION PRIOR TO HIS TAKING OVER MINISTRY TWO YEARS AGO. BIO INFORMATION ALREADY SUBMITTED ON BOTH THESE MEN. EXEMPT.
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PAGE 01 MONTEV 02539 221439Z

44
ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 RSR-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-06 H-02 INR-06 L-03
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 859
INFO CINCSO

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SUBJECT: RE-ELECTION AMENDMENT AND PACHECO CANDIDACY

REF : STATE 190143 POL 14 UR

1. FOLLOWING IN SAME NUMBERED SEQUENCE AS REFTEL ARE ANSWERS
TO QUESTIONS REGARDING MECHANICS OF VOTING FOR RE-ELECTION
AMENDMENT AND PACHECO CANDIDACY:

A - NO. IF RE-ELECTION AMENDMENT FAILS, THOSE WHO HAVE
VOTED ONLY FOR PACHECO WILL IN EFFECT HAVE CAST AN ILLEGAL
VOTE. SUCH VOTES WILL NOT BE COUNTED FOR ANY PARTY.

B - YES. ON BASIS OF PAST EXPERIENCE, IT APPEARS ALMOST ALL
URUGUAYAN VOTERS WILL UNDERSTAND NECESSITY OF SELECTING ALTER-
NATE CANDIDATE. SIMILAR SITUATION OCCURRED DURING 1966 CAM-
PAIGN WHEN VOTERS WERE CONFRONTED WITH FOUR NEW CONSTITUTIONS
CONTAINING VARIOUS ALTERNATE FORMS OF PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT.
HOWEVER, ON CHANCE THAT NONE OF THESE CONSTITUTIONS WOULD
PASS, VOTERS ALSO HAD TO SELECT ALTERNATE CANDIDATES FOR THEN-
EXISTING GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM, I.E., NINE-MAN NATIONAL COUNCIL
OF GOVERNMENT. DESPITE COMPLEXITY OF THIS PROCESS, NUMBER OF
VOIDED BALLOTS WAS NEGLIGIBLE. FURTHER, WE ARE NOW BEGINNING
TO SEE EXPLANATIONS IN PRESS OF HOW VOTERS SHOULD APPROACH RE-
ELECTION ALTERNATIVE AND EXPECT THAT THERE WILL BE STRONG
"EDUCATIONAL" EFFORTS IN CLOSING DAYS AND WEEKS OF CAMPAIGN.

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10-22-71



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PAGE 02 MONTEV 02539 221439Z

C - YES. IT MAY BE HELPFUL TO CONSIDER THE THEORETICAL EXAMPLE OF CHOICES AVAILABLE TO VOTER IF NATIONAL PLEBISCITE ON ONLY RE-ELECTION AMENDMENT WERE TO BE HELD PRIOR TO NOVEMBER 28 GENERAL ELECTIONS THEMSELVES. IF THIS OCCURRED, SUBSEQUENT GENERAL ELECTION CHOICES WOULD BE CLEAR. IF PLEBISCITE APPROVED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT, PACHECO LIST WOULD BE PRESENTED ON NOVEMBER 28TH. IF PLEBISCITE FAILED, PACHECO FORCES WOULD OBVIOUSLY HAVE TO PRESENT ALTERNATE CANDIDATE SINCE CURRENT PROVISIONS PROHIBITING PRESIDENTIAL RE-ELECTION WOULD HAVE BEEN SUSTAINED. THIS IS EXACTLY THE PROCESS WHICH WILL OCCUR ON NOVEMBER 28, BUT WITH PLEBISCITE AND GENERAL ELECTION BALLOT-ING OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. THOSE WHO VOTE FOR RE-ELECTION AMENDMENT AND PACHECO DO SO ON CHANCE THAT AMENDMENT WILL RECEIVE NECESSARY MAJORITY VOTE. HOWEVER, THEY ALSO HAVE OPTION OF CHOOSING ANY OTHER CANDIDATE OFFERED UNDER EXISTING SYSTEM WHICH PROHIBITS RE-ELECTION. ALTERNATE SELECTION COULD BE PACHECO'S DESIGNEE, ANOTHER COLORADO OR EVEN BLANCO OR "FRENTE AMPLIO" CANDIDATE.

2. VOTING PROCESS - ON NOVEMBER 28, VOTER WILL ARRIVE AT VOTING BOOTH AND BE HANDED OFFICIAL ELECTORAL ENVELOPE. HE THEN GOES TO PRIVATE ROOM AND PLACES BALLOTS OF HIS CHOICE IN ENVELOPE. IN CASE OF PRO-PACHECO VOTER, HE WOULD PLACE SLIP OF PAPER PRINTED "YES" IN ENVELOPE (SIGNIFYING VOTE FOR RE-ELECTION AMENDMENT), PLUS A LIST OF CANDIDATEE HEADED BY PRESIDENT PACHECO AND ALSO ANOTHER LIST OF CANDIDATES UNDER EXISTING SYSTEM WHICH DOES NOT PERMIT PACHECO TO SUCCEED HIMSELF, PER PARAGRAPH 3. VOTER THEN SEALS ENVELOPE AND PLACES IT IN BALLOT BOX AND HIS CIVIC CREDENTIAL IS STAMPED AS HAVING VOTED. LATTER IS TO CONTROL POSSIBILITY OF "DOUBLE VOTING" AS WELL AS TO INDICATE THAT CITIZEN HAS COMPLIED WITH OBLIGATORY VOTING LAW.

3. RE-ELECTION AMENDMENT AND PACHECO CANDIDACY HAVE SEVERAL EFFECTS UPON OTHER PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES. FOR PRO-PACHECO UNR FORCES, IT ALLOWS THEM TO RUN ON THE "COATTAILS" OF THEIR STRONGEST DRAWING CARD, THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME IN URUGUAYAN HISTORY THAT POLITICIANS BACKING AN INCUMBENT PRESIDENT WILL BE ABLE TO USE THIS CONSIDERABLE ADVANTAGE IN THEIR CAMPAIGN. IT ALSO ENABLES THIS GROUP TO DRAW

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PAGE 03 MONTEV 02539 221439Z

ON THE RESOURCES OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH FOR PUBLICITY AND OTHER PREQUISITES OF OFFICE TO SUPPORT THEIR OWN EFFORTS. OTHER COLORADO CANDIDATES, SUCH AS JORGE BATLLE AND VASCONCELLOS, ARE THUS DISADVANTAGED, SINCE FOR THE FIRST TIME THEY MUST OVERCOME THE HANDICAP OF RUNNING AGAINST AN INCUMBENT PRESIDENT WHOSE PERSONAL VOTER APPEAL IS STRONG. IN THE BLANCO PARTY, GENERAL MARIO AGUERRONDO'S EFFORTS TO SEEK VOTERS THROUGH HIS STRONG "LAW AND ORDER" IMAGE IS ALSO ADVERSELY EFFECTED. CONSERVATIVE, PRO-PACHECO COLORADOS WHO MIGHT HAVE SUPPORTED ONLY AGUERRONDO NOW HAVE THE OPTION OF ALSO VOTING FOR PRESIDENT PACHECO. THE PACHECO CANDIDACY, HOWEVER, IS TO SOME EXTENT AN ADVANTAGE FOR BOTH THE CAMPAIGN OF BLANCO SENATOR FERREIRA ALDUNATE AND THE "FRENTE AMPLIO". BOTH HAVE BASED THEIR CAMPAIGNS ON STRONG, DIRECT ATTACKS AGAINST PACHECO ADMINISTRATION'S PERFORMANCE DURING THE PAST FOUR YEARS. FOR THOSE WHO OPPOSE THIS PERFORMANCE, FACT THAT PACHECO HIMSELF IS CANDIDATE ENABLES THEM TO SHARPEN AND PERSONALIZE THEIR CAMPAIGN.

4. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT EVENTS OF PAST TWO WEEKS MAKE IT NECESSARY TO CHANGE OUR ASSESSMENT OF OVERALL COLORADO, BLANCO AND "FRENTE AMPLIO" STRENGTH SUBMITTED OUR 2436. LATE SEPTEMBER GALLUP SURVEY (NOT YET RELEASED) REVEALS FOLLOWING VOTER PERCENTAGES IN INTERIOR (ABOUT 55 PERCENT OF ELECTORATE) AND CAPITAL (ABOUT 45 PERCENT OF ELECTORATE): COLORADOS, 31 AND 27; BLANCOS, 28 AND 19; "FRENTE AMPLIO", 12 AND 22; RADICAL CHRISTIAN UNION, 8 AND 1. UNDECIDED AND NO REPLY GROUP HAS DROPPED TO 27 PERCENT IN INTERIOR AND 26 IN CAPITAL.

5. WE ARE FULLY AWARE THAT COMPLEXITIES OF URUGUAYAN VOTING SYSTEM RAISE MANY CONFUSING AND PERPLEXING QUESTIONS. WE WELCOME INQUIRIES SUCH AS REFTEL AND WILL ENDEAVOR TO CLARIFY ANY OTHER POINTS ON WHICH UNCERTAINTY MAY EXIST.

EXEMPT.
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PAGE 01 MONTEV 02525 211317Z

53

ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-06 H-02 INR-06 L-03 NSAE-00

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C O N F I D E N T I A L MONTEVIDEO 2525

CINCSO FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: IMPORTANT PRO-PACHECO RALLY CANCELLED

REF : MONTEVIDEO 2461 POL 14 UR XR POL 15-1 UR

1. FOR PAST TWO WEEKS UNR POLITICAL COALITION WHICH SUPPORTS PRESIDENT PACHECO AND CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT WHICH WOULD PERMIT HIS RE-ELECTION HAS GIVEN WIDE PUBLICITY TO RALLY SCHEDULED THIS EVENING (OCTOBER 20). UNR LAID GREAT STRESS ON IMPORTANCE OF RALLY SINCE IT WOULD MARK FORMAL PROCLAMATION OF PACHECO PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACY AND NAMING OF AGRICULTURE MINISTER BORDABERRY IN URN VICE PRESIDENTIAL SLOT. UNR ALSO INTENDED TO ANNOUNCE LISTS OF CANDIDATES FOR SENATE AND DEPUTIES AND PROCLAIM FORMER MAYOR OSCAR RACHETTI AS ITS CHOICE FOR MONTEVIDEO MAYOR. HOWEVER, WITHOUT EXPLANATION, UNR LAST NIGHT CANCELLED PLANS FOR OCTOBER 20 RALLY AND NOW ADVERTISING THAT MEETING WILL BE HELD OCTOBER 28.

2. ALTHOUGH NO OFFICIAL REASON GIVEN FOR CANCELLING OF TONIGHT'S PLANS, THERE IS WIDE SPECULATION HERE THAT UNR WAS UNABLE TO RESOLVE DIFFICULTIES IN SELECTING ITS SENATE AND DEPUTY CANDIDATES. CONTINUES SILENCE OF PRESIDENT PACHECO OVER HIS CHOICE OF PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE TO REPRESENT HIM SHOULD CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT PERMITTING HIS RE-ELECTION FAIL MAY ALSO BE FACTOR IN THIS DECISION. IN RECENT WEEKS,

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PAGE 02 MONTEV 02525 211317Z

SPECULATION HAS INCREASED THAT UN AMBASSADOR LEGNANI WOULD BE PACHECO'S CHOICE TO HEAD PRESIDENTIAL FORCES AND LEGNANI'S RETURN TO MONTEVIDEO WAS EXPECTED AT ANY MOMENT. HOWEVER, IN PAST FEW DAYS, LEGNANI HAS ISSUED SEVERAL PRESS STATEMENTS DENYING THAT HE HAS ANY PRESIDENTIAL AMBITIONS OR THAT PRESIDENT PACHECO HAS REQUESTED THAT HE HEAD TICKET. PRESS ALSO NOW CARRYING STORIES QUOTING FOREIGN MINISTER MORA TO EFFECT THAT MINISTRY HAD NO PLANS TO REQUEST LEGNANI'S RETURN IN COMING WEEKS, CLAIMING THAT PRESS OF UN BUSINESS INCLUDING CHIREP DEBATE WILL NECESSITATE HIS REMAINING IN NEW YORK.

3. COMMENT: LEGNANI'S STATEMENT FELL WELL SHORT OF FLAT REFUSAL TO ACCEPT PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION IF OFFERED BUT DID SERVE TO DAMPEN EXPECTATION THAT HE IS CLEARLY PRESIDENT'S HEIR APPARENT. NAMES OF PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARY GIORGI AS WELL AS MINAGRICULTURE BORDABERRY ONCE AGAIN RECEIVING INCREASED ATTENTION, BUT EVEN THOSE WITHIN UNR CLAIM THAT PRESIDENT HAS YET TO GIVE THEM ANY INDICATION OF HIS ULTIMATE DECISION. SINCE MOST POLITICAL OBSERVERS CONTINUE BELIEVE THAT PACHECO FORCES CONSTITUTE LARGEST GROUP IN COLORADO PARTY, THESE EVENTS SERVE ONCE AGAIN TO POINT OUT THAT WITH LESS THAN FORTY DAYS REMAINING IN CAMPAIGN, ONE OF ITS MOST IMPORTANT FACTORS REMAINS A MYSTERY. KEY QUESTION WILL BE WHETHER PRO-PACHECO FORCES WILL BE ABLE TO TRANSFER PRESIDENT'S APPEAL AND VOTING POWER TO AN ALTERNATE CANDIDATE. UNTIL THAT CANDIDATE NAMED, HOWEVER, NEITHER WE NOR ANY OTHER POLITICAL OBSERVERS HERE WILL BE ABLE TO MAKE ANY REASONABLE ESTIMATE OF HOW WELL THE PACHECO GROUP WILL DO WITHIN THE COLORADO PARTY OR WHAT EFFECT PACHECO ALTERNATE CANDIDATE WILL HAVE ON THE PARTY'S OVERALL VOTE. SINCE OFFICIAL CLOSING DATE FOR NAMING CANDIDATES IS NOVEMBER 8, PRESIDENT MAY HAVE DECIDED TO USE OCTOBER 28 RALLY NOT ONLY PROCLAIM HIS OWN CANDIDACY BUT THAT OF HIS ALTERNATE CHOICE AS WELL.

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ACTION: Amembassy MONTEVIDEO

SUBJECT: Re-election Amendment and Pacheco Candidacy

REFERENCE: (a) Montevideo A-56; (b) Montevideo A-152

1. Ref (a) and subsequent reports have given us good picture of how electoral process will work, but some questions, stemming from re-election amendment and Pacheco candidacy, remain -- as follows:
 - (a) If amendment fails, will votes of those voting only for Pacheco (i.e. those who do not also vote for an alternate) count in Colorado Party total?
 - (b) Assuming failure of amendment, and if votes for Pacheco not counted in Colorado Party total, will Pacheco voters clearly understand necessity of voting for alternate candidate, so that number of "lost" votes is minimal?
 - (c) Can one who votes for Pacheco also cast

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effective vote for non-Pachequista Colorado candidate (say Batlle) or Blanco candidate (say Aguerrondo), as opposed to official Pacheco alternate (assuming failure of amendment)?

2. Request you consult Electoral Court officials, if necessary, in order provide authoritative answers foregoing questions. (FYI: Uruguayan Embassy officials here have provided answers which they assume to be correct, but they have conflicting opinions, and readily admit not being able provide authoritative replies. END FYI). It would also be useful to have description of actual process by which voting on amendment, Pacheco candidacy, and alternate candidacy will take place, along lines page five, ref (a).

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3. In light of answers to above questions, would appreciate analysis effect of amendment and Pacheco candidacy on other Colorado and Blanco candidates, as well as overall Colorado, Blanco, and Frente Amplio strength. Picture would obviously be clearer if Pacheco alternate named, but general preliminary reading would be useful now.

END

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ACTION: Amembassy MONTEVIDEO

SUBJ: N.Y. Times Editorial on Uruguayan Elections

1. FYI is text of Oct. 13 New York Times editorial entitled "Uruguay: Perils of Division":
2. QUOTE: A coalition dominated by Marxist parties came to power in Chile last year with only 36.3 percent of the popular vote -- because the country's democratic forces were divided. Now another South American country with a deeply-rooted democratic tradition, tiny Uruguay, may be on its way down the same road.
3. President Jorge Pacheco Areco is seeking re-election Nov. 28 as vindication of his drastic, but so far inconclusive, measures to wipe out the Tupamaro guerrillas and to revive a stagnant, inflation-ridden economy. But for Mr. Pacheco even to qualify for another term voters must approve an amendment removing Uruguay's ban on re-election.
4. Jorge Batlle Ibanez, bearer of the most illustrious of Uruguayan political names, grand-nephew and son of

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Page 2

presidents, has now been nominated by another faction of Mr. Pacheco's Colorado party. Mr. Batlle once supported Mr. Pacheco but he and a great many other Colorados disapprove of the re-election attempt.

5. Thus, despite the threat of disintegration and chaos hanging over the country, both traditional democratic parties, the Colorados and Blancos, intend to play splinter politics as usual all the way to the ballot box; for in Uruguay both nominations and election are decided the same day. Meanwhile, all left-wing forces--including Communists, Trotskyists and radical Socialists--have formed the Frente Amplio (Broad Front), a coalition patterned after that of President Allende in Chile.

6. The Front has nominated a respected former general as its candidate and polls now forecast a close race among the three parties similar to the 1970 ^{contest} ~~context~~ in Chile. Although they scorn elections, the

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Page 3

Tupamaros are giving benign support to the Front.

7. Mr. Pacheco last year indicated he would resist any draft attempt and respect Uruguay's tradition against re-election. He may wish he had stuck to that line ~~and~~ if his candidacy proves divisive for Uruguayan democrats and brings another Marxist-dominated government to power in South America. UNQUOTE

~~XXXX~~
8. Comment: Unfortunately, NYT editorial indicates insufficient understanding of unique and complicated electoral Uruguayan electoral process, wherein total votes for party, and not individual candidate, determines outcome.

END.

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Department of State

POL 14 UR
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PAGE 01 MONTEV 02473 132201Z

84
ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 AID-20 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-06 H-02 INR-06 L-03
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AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
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CINCSO FOR POLAD

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY ANNOUNCES ITS CANDIDATES

REF : MONTEVIDEO 2436 POL 14 UR

1. URUGUAYAN COMMUNIST PARTY'S (PCU) POLITICAL ARM, "LEFTIST
LIBERATION FRONT" (FIDEL), HELD ITS FIRST CITY-WIDE RALLY IN
MONTEVIDEO

OCTOBER 8. PURPOSE OF MEETING WAS TO ANNOUNCE
FIDEL'S LIST OF CANDIDATES FOR SENATE, DEPUTIES, AND CITY COUN-
CIL WHO WILL RUN WITH "FRENTE AMPLIO" COALITION'S ALREADY-
ANNOUNCED CHOICES FOR PRESIDENT, VICE PRESIDENT AND MAYOR.

2. FIDEL'S CHOICES CONTAINED NO SURPRISES. ITS SENATE LIST
WILL BE HEADED BY VETERAN COMMUNIST SENATOR ENRIQUE RODRIGUEZ,
WITH EX-BLANCO SENATOR RODRIGUEZ CAMUSSO IN SECOND SPOT, IN
ACCORDANCE WITH AGREEMENT REACHED BETWEEN COMMUNISTS AND ROD-
RIGUEZ'S SMALL POLITICAL GROUP PREVIOUS WEEK (REFTEL). SAME
AGREEMENT PLACED RETIRED GENERAL ARTURO BALINAS, WHO HEADS

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48

Montevideo 2473
10-13-71



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 MONTEV 02473 1322017

GROUP OF "FRENTE" INDEPENDENTS, IN NUMBER FOUR POSITION IN FIDEL SENATE LIST. FIDEL'S PRESIDENT AND LONG-TIME COMMUNIST LUIS BONAVITA WILL HEAD FIDEL'S LIST OF CANDIDATES FOR CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES, WITH PCU FIRST SECRETARY RODNEY ARISMENDI IN SECOND POSITION.

3. AS IS EXPECTED AT ALL FIDEL MEETINGS, RALLY WAS WELL-PLANNED AND ORGANIZED. HOWEVER, ALTHOUGH PCU'S DAILY "EL POPULAR" CLAIMED "OVER 100,000" IN ATTENDANCE, CAREFUL PERSONAL CHECK BY EMBASSY OFFICERS ON SCENE REVEALED NO MORE THAN 11,000 ACTUALLY SHOWED UP. SINCE PCU IS GENERALLY CREDITED WITH BEING ABLE TO DELIVER 15,000 OF ITS FAITHFUL ON ANY GIVEN OCCASION, OCTOBER 8 RALLY MUST HAVE FALLEN SOMEWHAT SHORT OF PARTY'S EXPECTATIONS.

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CONFIDENTIAL 234

PAGE 01 MONTEV 02461 082136Z

88
ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-06 H-02 INR-06 L-03 NSAE-00
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AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
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C O N F I D E N T I A L MONTEVIDEO 2461

CINCSO FOR POLAD

SUBJ: MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE NAMED AS PRESIDENT PACHECO'S
VICE PRESIDENTIAL RUNNING MATE

REF: MVD 2436 POL 14 UR

✓ GOU MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE AND LIVESTOCK JUAN MARIA BORDABERRY CONFIRMED TO PRESS OCTOBER 7 THAT HE HAD ACCEPTED PRESIDENT PACHECO'S INVITATION TO BE VICE PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEE ON PACHECO'S "RE-ELECTION" VOTING LIST AT NOVEMBER 28 GENERAL ELECTIONS. BORDABERRY, WHO HAS HEADED AGRICULTURAL MINISTRY FOR PAST TWO YEARS, IS ONE OF LEADERS OF NOW-DEFUNCT RURAL FEDERATION, POLITICAL MOVEMENT OF THE 1950'S WHICH WAS LED BY DECEASED RURALIST LEADER BENITO NARDONE. BECAUSE "RURALISMO" IS NO LONGER NATIONALLY-ORGANIZED POLITICAL FORCE AND MOST RURALIST LEGISLATORS ARE NOW MEMBERS OF BLANCO PARTY, BORDABERRY WILL NOT BRING SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL POWER OF HIS OWN TO PACHECO SLATE. THIS HOWEVER IS RELATIVELY UNIMPORTANT SINCE PRESIDENT HIMSELF WILL BE SLATE'S PRINCIPAL DRAWING CARD.

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Department of State

POL 14 UR
TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 MONTEV 02461 082136Z

2. AT SAME TIME, PRESIDENT PACHECO'S NATIONAL RE-ELECTION UNION (UNR) ANNOUNCED PLANS FOR RALLY OCTOBER 20 TO PROCLAIM FORMALLY PACHECO/BORDABERRY CANDIDACIES, AS WELL AS THAT OF FORMER MAYOR OSCAR RACHETTI, WHO WILL BE UNR'S CHOICE FOR SECOND TERM IN MONTEVIDEO. ACCORDING TO PRESS, UNR'S CANDIDATES FOR SENATOR AND DEPUTIES MAY ALSO BE ANNOUNCED AT THAT TIME, WITH VICE PRESIDENT ALBERTO ABDALA RUMORED TO BE HEADING SENATE LIST. LATTER IS INTERESTING IN THAT TENDS TO CONFIRM RECENT STORIES OF RECURRENCE OF DIFFICULTIES BETWEEN PACHECO AND ABDALA. PREVIOUSLY, ABDALA HAD TOLD US HE CONVINCED THAT HE WOULD BE PACHECO'S VICE PRESIDENTIAL RUNNING MATE AND POSSIBLY MIGHT EVEN HEAD ALTERNATE PACHECO LIST TO BE PRESENTED IN CASE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT TO ALLOW PACHECO'S RE-ELECTION FAILS TO RECEIVE VOTER APPROVAL.

3. AID OFFICIALS WHO HAVE WORKED CLOSELY WITH HIM CONSIDER BORDABERRY AS BEST AGRICULTURAL MINISTER OF PACHECO ADMINISTRATION. HOWEVER, THEY ALSO POINT OUT HE HAS LITTLE MANAGERIAL ABILITY AND HAS GENERALLY BEEN POOR ADMINISTRATOR OF THE SPRAWLING AGRICULTURAL MINISTRY. HE HAS SHOWN LITTLE GRASP OF NEED FOR AGRICULTURAL PLANNING OR THE ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURAL AFFAIRS. AT SAME TIME, HE HAS BEEN VERY FRIENDLY, COOPERATIVE AND OPEN WITH EMBASSY OFFICIALS.

4. COMMENT: AS INDICATED REFTEL, BECAUSE FEW POLITICAL LEADERS BELIEVE RE-ELECTION AMENDMENT WILL SUCCEED, MAJOR CONCERN IN UNR RANKS CONTINUES TO BE ON PRESIDENT'S EVENTUAL DESIGNATION OF HIS ALTERNATE CANDIDATE FOR PRESIDENT. BORDABERRY'S NAME HAS FIGURED AMONG "DARK HORSES" AND IT POSSIBLE TO INTERPRET PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO NAME HIM TO VICE PRESIDENTIAL SLOT ON RE-ELECTION SLATE AS METHOD OF GIVING BORDABERRY "BONA FIDES" AS PACHECO'S POLITICAL HEIR, PAVING WAY FOR HIS LATER DESIGNATION AS PACHECO'S ALTERNATE CANDIDATE. THIS WOULD BE A LONG SHOT BUT WE HAVE ALREADY NOTED PRESIDENT'S DELIGHT WITH SPRINGING SURPRISES EVEN ON HIS CLOSEST FRIENDS. AT SAME TIME, HOWEVER, PRESS CONTINUES ASSIGN GREAT IMPORTANCE TO IMMINENT RETURN OF U.N. AMBASSADOR LEGNANI WHO HAS FIGURED AS FRONT-RUNNER AMONG POSSIBLE PACHECO ALTERNATES. GP-3.

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23



Department of State

POL 14 UR

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 872

PAGE 01 MONTEV 02436 01 OF 02 062108Z

92
ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 AID-20 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-06 H-02 INR-06 L-03
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MONTEVIDEO 2436

CINCSO FOR POLAD

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJECT: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN URUGUAYAN POLITICAL CAMPAIGN

REF : MONTEVIDEO 2239 *POL 23-8 UR*
x R POL 29 UR x R POL 14 UR

1. SUMMARY - WE CONTINUE BELIEVE THAT RELATIVE STRENGTHS OF THREE MAJOR CONTENDING POLITICAL PARTIES IN URUGUAYAN PRESIDENTIAL RACE REMAIN AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED, WITH BLANCO PARTY AND "FRENTE AMPLIO" TRAILING COLORADO PARTY NATIONWIDE AND COLORADOS AND "FRENTE" IN TIGHT RACE FOR MAYORSHIP OF MONTEVIDEO WITH SLIGHT EDGE TO COLORADOS. HOWEVER, BLANCO CAMPAIGN HAS SHOWN MARKED INCREASE IN PAST MONTH. OPINION SURVEYS INDICATE THAT NUMBER OF UNDECIDED VOTERS REMAINS HIGH, PERHAPS ONE-THIRD OF TOTAL VOTE. IT OUR IMPRESSION "FRENTE AMPLIO" HAS NOT ADDED SIGNIFICANTLY TO ITS VOTING STRENGTH IN PAST TWO MONTHS. PRESIDENT PACHECO HAS NOT YET ANNOUNCED HIS CHOICE OF ALTERNATE CANDIDATE BUT THIS EXPECTED BEFORE END OF MONTH. UNLIKE MONTEVIDEO, INTERIOR AREAS CONTINUE SHOW STRONG PREFERENCE FOR TRADITIONAL PARTIES WITH "FRENTE" YET TO MAKE SIGNIFICANT IMPACT

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10-6-71



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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 MONTEV 02436 01 OF 02 062108Z

THERE.

2. (A) COLORADO PARTY - REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL POLITICAL FACTIONS (INCLUDING "FRENTE AMPLIO") HAVE TOLD US THAT THEY FEEL PRESIDENT PACHECO'S POPULAR SUPPORT HAS NOT BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTED BY MASS PRISON BREAK OF MLN/"TUPAMARO" TERRORISTS SEPTEMBER 6. INITIAL GLOOM EXPRESSED BY PRESIDENT'S OWN UNR FACTION NOW REPLACED WITH OPTIMISM THAT PRESIDENT HAS EMERGED FROM INCIDENT STRONGER THAN EVER. ALL HERE, INCLUDING PACHECO OPPONENTS WHO SHAKE THEIR HEADS IN WONDERMENT OVER THIS DEVELOPMENT, EXPLAIN THAT BECAUSE OF MAGNITUDE OF ESCAPE, PUBLIC HAS EVIDENTLY DECIDED THAT PRESIDENT WAS "BETRAYED" FROM WITHIN HIS OWN ADMINISTRATION AND THEREFORE NOT PERSONALLY TO BLAME. PRESIDENT'S STRONG, FIGHTING SPEECH ON SEPTEMBER 11 (REFTEL) APPARENTLY REINFORCED THIS REACTION. THEREFORE, PRO-PACHECO FORCES HAVE GONE FORWARD WITH BASIC THEME OF THEIR RE-ELECTION CAMPAIGN, "PACHECO OR CHAOS". UNR EFFORT, HOWEVER, SUFFERING FROM SERIOUS DRAWBACK IN THAT DUE TO CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION, PACHECO HIMSELF UNABLE TO APPEAR AT RE-ELECTION RALLIES OR TAKE ACTIVE ROLE IN CAMPAIGN, THUS DEPRIVING UNR OF ITS MAIN DRAWING CARD. BECAUSE OF THIS, UNR LEADERS ARE SHOWING INCREASING IMPATIENCE OVER PRESIDENT'S CONTINUED SILENCE ABOUT HIS CHOICE OF ALTERNATE CANDIDATE TO REPRESENT HIM, SHOULD CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT TO PERMIT HIS RE-ELECTION NOT RECEIVE NECESSARY MAJORITY VOTE. EVEN RE-ELECTION LEADERS ADMIT THAT CHANCES OF PASSAGE THIS AMENDMENT CONTINUE TO BE REMOTE. GUESSES ON POSSIBLE ALTERNATE NOW CENTERING ON U.N. AMBASSADOR AUGUSTO LEGNANI, WHO EXPECTED TO RETURN TO MONTEVIDEO SOMETIME NEXT WEEK. HOWEVER, GIVEN PRESIDENT'S PENCHANT FOR SPRINGING SURPRISES AND POSSIBILITY THAT HE MAY WISH TO MAINTAIN DIRECT CONTROL OF HIS FACTION'S POLITICAL ACTIVITIES DURING NEXT TERM, IT COULD BE THAT HE WILL SELECT SOME RELATIVELY OBSCURE FIGURE FROM WITHIN UNR RANKS TO REPRESENT HIM. IN ANY CASE, UNR POLITICIANS BELIEVE THAT PRESIDENT WILL ANNOUNCE HIS CHOICE BEFORE END OF THIS MONTH. IT REMAINS OUR IMPRESSION THAT PACHECO FACTION IS PRESENTLY STRONGEST GROUP IN COLORADO PARTY.

2. (B) PRINCIPLE RIVAL TO PRESIDENT'S UNR GROUP, JORGE BATTLE'S LIST 15 (UNITY AND REFORM) FACTION HELD NATIONAL CONVENTION OCTOBER 2-3. AS PREDICTED, CONVENTION SELECTED BATTLE AS ITS PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEE, WITH LONG TIME AND RESPECTED COLORADO POLITICIAN RENAN RODRIGUEZ IN VICE PRESIDENTIAL SLOT. CURRENT

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MONTEV 02436 01 OF 02 062108Z

MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS WALTER PINTOS RISSO NAMED AS LIST 15 CANDIDATE FOR MAYOR OF MONTEVIDEO. BATLLE'S PRINCIPLE PROBLEM REMAINS ONE OF BROADENING BASE OF HIS APPEAL BEYOND RANKS OF LIST 15 ORGANIZATION. IN THIS REGARD, RODRIGUEZ WILL BE HELPFUL IN ATTRACTING OLDER, TRADITIONAL "BATLLISTA" VOTERS WITHIN COLORADO PARTY, BUT PROBABLY WILL NOT HAVE SIGNIFICANT APPEAL AMONG INDEPENDENTS. PINTOS RISSO HAS EFFECTIVE IMAGE AS "BUILDER" AND THEREFORE MORE APPEAL TO INDEPENDENTS AND UNDECIDED VOTERS. UNDER COMPLEX URUGUAYAN LAW, IN EFFECT TWO ELECTIONS

WILL OCCUR SIMULTANEOUSLY ON NOVEMBER 28: ONE FOR PRESENT CONSTITUTION WHICH PROHIBITS PRESIDENTIAL RE-ELECTION, OTHER BASED ON PROSPECT THAT RE-ELECTION REFORM WILL PASS. THOSE WISHING SUPPORT PRESIDENT PACHECO WILL BE ABLE TO VOTE FOR HIM ON CHANCE THAT RE-ELECTION AMENDMENT MIGHT BE APPROVED AND AT THE SAME TIME SELECT ALTERNATE TO HIM SHOULD AMENDMENT FAIL. BATLLE STRATEGY WILL BE AIMED AT CONVINCING THOSE WHO SUPPORT RE-ELECTION OF PRESIDENT TO ALSO VOTE FOR HIM AS ALTERNATE RATHER THAN THE CANDIDATE PACHECO WILL NAME. IF SUCCESSFUL, BATLLE COULD EMERGE AS COLORADO PARTY FRONT RUNNER. HOWEVER, WE THINK IT CLEAR AT THIS POINT THAT HE HAS A DIFFICULT, UPHILL FIGHT TO WAGE.

2. (C) THE COLORADO PARTY'S "THIRD FRONT", HEADED BY SENATORS VASCONCELLOS AND FLORES MORA, CONTINUES ITS SEARCH FOR SUPPORT AMONG TRADITIONAL COLORADO "BATLLISTA" RANKS. TELEVISION APPEARANCES BY BOTH MEN IN PAST MONTH HAVE BEEN MOST EFFECTIVE USE OF THIS MEDIUM BY ANY POLITICIANS TO DATE, BUT "THIRD FRONT" DOES NOT SERIOUSLY CHALLENGE DOMINATION OF PARTY BY PRO-PACHECO AND BATLLE FORCES. HOWEVER, "THIRD FRONT" CAMPAIGN IS IMPORTANT TO PARTY IN PREVENTING ANY FURTHER LEAKAGE OF TRADITIONAL, LIBERAL COLORADO VOTE TO "FRENTE AMPLIO". RETIRED GENERAL JUAN RIBAS' SMALL "MOVIMINETO RENOVADOR" IS CONTINUING ITS SURPRISINGLY LARGE PUBLIC RELATIONS CAMPAIGN BUT ITS VOTER APPEAL REMAINS SLIGHT.

3. BLANCO PARTY - IT NOW APPEARS THAT OPPOSITION BLANCO PARTY WILL PRESENT NO MORE THAN TWO CANDIDATES FOR NOVEMBER ELECTIONS. SENATOR WILSON FERREIRA ALDUNATE'S "POR LA PATRIA" COALITION AND RETIRED GENERAL MARIO AGUERRONDO, RUNNING WITH OLD-LINE BLANCO ALBERTO HEBER, FERREIRA CONTINUES CAMPAIGNING VERY HARD AND HAS DRAWN WELL AT ALL RALLIES. NOTABLE BLANCO EVENT OF THE

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 MONTEV 02436 01 OF 02 062108Z

PAST MONTH HAS BEEN MARKED UPSURGE IN CAMPAIGN AND PUBLIC INTEREST IN AGUERRONDO. AGUERRONDO EFFORT HAS AT LAST GOTTEN OFF GROUND AND IS BEGINNING TO DEMONSTRATE SOLID SUPPORT IN INTERIOR AREAS. HIS KICK-OFF RALLY IN MONTEVIDEO OCTOBER 1ST WAS ENTHUSIASTIC AND WELL-ATTENDED BY MAINLY WORKING CLASS CROWD ESTIMATED AT TWELVE THOUSAND. AGUERRONDO'S SURGE IS DUE IN PART TO RECENT ANNOUNCEMENT OF SUPPORT FOR HIS CANDIDACY BY HIGHLY RESPECTED BLANCO LEADER ALBERTO GALLINAL WHO PLANS TO PRESENT HIS OWN LIST OF SENATOR AND DEPUTY CANDIDATES UNDER AGUERRONDO'S BANNER.
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CONFIDENTIAL

23



Department of State

POL 14 UR

POL 14 UR

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 906

PAGE 01 MONTEV 02436 02 OF 02 062122Z

92

ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 AID-20 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-06 H-02 INR-06 L-03
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 INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 MONTEVIDEO 2436

CINCSO FOR POLAD

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJECT: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN URUGUAYAN POLITICAL CAMPAIGN

REF : MONTEVIDEO 2239

ADDITIONALLY, AS "LAW AND ORDER" CANDIDATE, AGERRONDO PROBABLY WAS ONLY ONE TO PROFIT FROM MASS "TUPAMARO" PRISON BREAK AMONG BLANCOS WHO FORMERLY LEANED TOWARD PRESIDENT PACHECO BECAUSE OF LATTER'S FIRM PUBLIC ORDER STANCE BUT ARE DISAPPOINTED WITH ITS LACK OF RESULTS. ALTHOUGH OF THE TWO BLANCO CANDIDATES, FERREIRA IS STILL IN OUR OPINION AHEAD BY UNDETERMINED AMOUNT, MORE IMPORTANT IS FACT THAT BLANCOS NOW HAVE TWO STRONG CONTENDERS. FOR FIRST TIME, SOME BLANCOS ARE NOW TALKING SERIOUSLY ABOUT CHANCES OF PARTY WINNING NOVEMBER CONTEST.

4. "FRENTE AMPLIO" - GAP BETWEEN PROPAGANDA EFFORTS OF "FRENTE AMPLIO" COALITION AND OTHER POLITICAL PARTIES HAS NOW DIAPPEARED. SINCE ITS NATIONWIDE VOTER CANVAS ON AUGUST 25, "FRENTE'S" CAMPAIGN GIVES IMPRESSION OF HAVING LEVELED OUT, PROBABLY RE-

CONFIDENTIAL

Am. 14 UR

Pol 14 UR



Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MONTEV 02436 02 OF 02 062122Z

SERVING ITS FORCES FOR FINAL MAXIMUM EFFORT WHICH WILL END WITH GIAT RALLY ON NOVEMBER 26 AT LEGISLATIVE PALACE. IT IS OUR IMPRESSION THAT "FRENTE AMPLIO" HAS NOT ADDED SIGNIFICANTLY TO ITS VOTING STRENGTH IN THE PAST 6-8 WEEKS. "FRENTE" LEADERS CONCENTRATING ON DRAWING UP THEIR INDIVIDUAL VOTING LISTS FOR SENATORS AND DEPUTIES AND ARE NOW STARTING THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAMPAIGNS. ON OCTOBER 8TH, COMMUNIST PARTY'S FIDEL FACTION WILL HOLD RALLY TO PRESENT ITS ENTIERESLATE. ON OCTOBER 2, EX-BLANCO SENATOR RODRIGUEZ CAMUSSO ANNOUNCED COALITION WITH FIDEL AND WILL PROBABLY OCCUPY THE NUMBER TWO SPOT ON ITS SENATE LIST. RETIRED GENERAL BALIRAS AND HIS GROUP OF "FRENTE" INDEPENDENTS LIKEWISE HAVE DECLARED FOR COMMUNIST FIDEL FACTION. NEITHER OF THESE REPRESENTS MORE THAN FEW THOUSAND VOTES. DIFFICULTIES WITHIN "FRENTE DEL PUEBLO" (FP) FACTION (PDC AND EX-COLORADOS) WILL PREVENT THAT GROUP FROM RUNNING COMMON LIST OF CANDIDATES. INSTEAD, EX-COLORADO LEADERS SENATORS MICHELINI AND ROBALLO WILL PRESENT THEIR OWN FP SLATE, WHILE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC LEADER JUAN TERRA WILL HEAD ANOTHER FP LIST. "FRENTE AMPLIO" CONTINUES TO SUFFER FROM TRADITIONAL PARTY ATTACKS CHARGING IT IS DOMINATED BY COMMUNIST PARTY AND SYMPATHETIC TO TERRORISM. EFFECTIVENESS OF THESE ATTACKS AND MOST RECENT GALLUP SURVEY SHOWING SLIGHT FALLING OFF IN "FRENTE" SUPPORT HAS CAUSED MOST COLORADO AND BLANCO PARTY LEADERS TO HAVE CONVINCED THEMSELVES THAT "FRENTE" STRENGTH HAS DECREASED IN RECENT WEEKS. CAS REPORTS NOW INDICATE THAT "FRENTE" LEADERS THEMSELVES ARE REVISING DOWNWARD SOME OF THEIR EARLIER, MORE OPTIMISTIC PREDICTIONS. HOWEVER, IF REPEAT IF ANY DECLINE HAS OCCURRED, IT MAY WELL BE TEMPORARY RATHER THAN PERMANENT, THUS RECOVERABLE BY THE "FRENTE" IN ITS FINAL CLOSING USH. KEY QUESTION OF COURSE IS HOW "FRENTE AMPLIO" VOTE WILL DIVIDE BETWEEN MONTEVIDEO AND INTERIOR. IF MOST OF 250-300,000 VOTES NOW CONCEDED THEM ARE IN MONTEVIDEO, "FRENTE" STANDS CHANCE OF WINNING THE MAYOR'S RACE IN CAPITOL.

5. RADICAL CHRISTIAN UNION (URC) - MORE CONSERVATIVE MEMBERS OF PDC WHO SPLIT WITH THAT GROUP OVER ITS DECISION TO JOIN "FRENTE AMPLIO" HAVE NOW FORMALLY ESTABLISHED THEMSELVES AS SEPARATE POLITICAL PARTY, URC. EARLIER NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN URC AND BLANCO PARTY LEADERS AIMED AT INCORPORATING URC INTO BLANCO RANKS APPEAR TO HAVE FAILED. URC HAS JUST ANNOUNCED ITS OWN SEPARATE NATIONAL SLATE HEADED BY DANIEL PEREZ DEL CASTILLO. URC CONTINUES TO SEE ITS ROLE IN CAMPAIGN AS MAINLY "EDUCATION",

CONFIDENTIAL

23



POL 14 UR

POL 14 UR

Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MONTEV 02436 02 OF 02 062122Z

1. E. CONVINCING PDC VOTERS PARTICULARLY IN INTERIOR AREAS TO SUPPORT IT RATHER THAN PDC, WHICH IT CHARGES HAS BECOME TOOL OF COMMUNIST PRTY.

6. UNDECIDED VOTES - CRITICAL FACTOR IN THIS CAMPAIGN CONTINUES TO BE EVENTUAL DECISION BY CURRENTLY UNDECIDED AND INDEPENDENT VOTERS. ACCORDING TO AUGUST GALLUP SURVEY, UNDECIDED VOTE NOW RUNNING AT APPROXIMATELY 36 PERCENT OR DOUBLE THE LEVEL AT SAME POINT IN 1966 CAMPAIGN. WE EXPECT SOME DECREASE IN LEVEL OF UNDECIDED VOTE BY END OF THIS MONTH SINCE MOST CURRENT UNCERTAINTIES WILL BY THEN BE RESOLVED. PACHECO'S ALTERNATE WILL AT LAST BE KNOWN, BATLLE'S CAMPAIGN WILL HAVE MOVED INTO HIGH GEAR, AND AGUERRONDO WITH GALLINAL'S SUPPORT WILL CLEARLY HAVE ESTABLISHED HIMSELF AS MAJOR CANDIDATE. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT BULK OF THIS UNDECIDED VOTE WILL EVENTUALLY GO TO EITHER BLANCO OR COLORADOS BUT CANNOT AT THIS TIME PREDICT WITH ANY CERTAINTY WHAT THESE PERCENTAGES WILL BE.

7. MONTEVIDEO - AS MENTIONED ABOVE, "FRENTE AMPLIO" STRENGTH IS CLEARLY IN MONTEVIDEO DEPARTMENT. LEADERS OF TRADITIONAL PARTIES ARE PRINCIPALLY CONCERNED ABOUT EVENTUAL "FRENTE" SHOWING HERE, RATHER THAN NATIONWIDE. INCREASED SUPPORT FOR BLANCO PARTY CAMPAIGN HAVE CREATED TWO SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT ABOUT EFFECT OF STRONG BLANCO EFFORT IN CAPITAL. ONE VIEW HOLDS THAT SUCCESSFUL BLANCO CAMPAIGN WOULD BE AT EXPENSE OF COLORADOS, THUS EN-

HANCING "FRENTE'S" CHANCE OF WINNING TIGHT THREE-WAY RACE. OTHER VIEW IS THAT BLANCO GAINS IN MONTEVIDEO WILL BE PRINCIPALLY MADE BY FERREIRA ALDUNATE AND THAT HE MAY WELL HAVE MORE APPEAL TO POTENTIAL "FRENTE" VOTERS THAN TO COLORADOS. WE BELIEVE COLORADO PARTY CONTINUES TO HOLD LEAD IN MONTEVIDEO RACE BUT WISH WITHHOLD JUDGMENT AS TO WHICH OF ABOVE TWO OPINIONS ARE CORRECT UNTIL LATER IN CAMPAIGN.

8. INTERIOR - OUR INITIAL SERIES OF VISITS TO INTERIOR CITIES HAS REVEALED CONSIDERABLY DIFFERENT ATMOSPHERE AND VOTER LINEUP THAN IN MONTEVIDEO. OUR OVERWHELMING IMPRESSION NOW IS THAT TRADITIONAL PARTIES REMAIN VERY STRONG IN INTERIOR AREAS WHICH CONSTITUTE ABOUT 50 PERCENT OF ELECTORATE, AND THAT "FRENTE AMPLIO" HAS YET TO MAKE SUBSTANTIAL IMPACT THERE.

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 AMEMBASSY RIO DE JANEIRO
 CINCSO

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CINCSO FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: BLANCO CANDIDATE RELEASES PLATFORM

1. BLANCO PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE WILSON FERREIRA ALDUNATE RELEASED HIS PROPOSED PROGRAM OF GOVERNMENT AT LARGE MONTEVIDEO STREET RALLY EVENING OF SEPTEMBER 17. PLATFORM IN THE FORM OF 44-PAGE PAMPHLET ENTITLED "OUR COMMITMENT TO YOU" AND OPENS WITH SIX-PAGE STATEMENT OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY WHICH IS HIGHLY NATIONALISTIC AND, FOR A POLITICAL CAMPAIGN DOCUMENT, FAIRLY REALISTIC. AT ONE POINT, THIS SECTION NOTES THAT GOVERNMENT PLANS AND PROGRAMS WILL BE OF LITTLE VALUE UNTIL URUGUAYANS DROP TRADITIONAL "COMPLACENT HOPE" OF BEING RESCUED BY OUTSIDE DEVELOPMENTS WHICH, WITHOUT ANY EFFORT ON THEIR PART, WILL MIRACULOUSLY PROVIDE HIGH STANDARDS OF LIVING. IT ALSO CALLS UPON ALL URUGUAYANS TO ACCEPT THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES, AND MAKE THE SACRIFICES NEEDED TO ASSURE WELL-BEING OF THE "NATIONAL COMMUNITY".

2. IN ITS SPECIFICS, THE PLATFORM CALLS FOR NATIONALISTIC FOREIGN POLICY, LAND REFORM, NATIONALIZATION OF BANKING INDUSTRY, MORE EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME, ACTIVE PROGRAM

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TO CREATE EMPLOYMENT, INCREASED INVESTMENTS IN PUBLIC WORKS, PUBLIC HOUSING AND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM, TAX REFORM, AND, IN THE SOCIAL FIELD, REFORMS TO EDUCATION, SOCIAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC HEALTH. AS COULD BE EXPECTED OF POLITICAL DOCUMENT, PLATFORM CONTAINS SOMETHING FOR EVERYONE AND IS VAGUE ON HOW MANY OF ITS PROGRAMS WOULD BE FINANCED. HOWEVER, AS POLITICAL DOCUMENT, IT COMPARES FAVORABLY TO THE "FRENTE AMPLIO" "THIRTY POINT PLAN OF GOVERNMENT" WHICH IS MORE RADICAL AND LESS SPECIFIC. THE FERREIRA PLATFORM IS BASICALLY REFORMIST DOCUMENT AND MORE RADICAL SOLUTIONS PROPOSED, I.E., LAND REFORM AND NATIONALIZATION OF THE BANKING HAVE BROAD APPEAL TO URUGUAYAN PUBLIC. AS NOTED IN OUR CASP, THE BANKING INDUSTRY IS WIDELY DISLIKED AND DISTRUSTED, ITS NATIONALIZATION WOULD BE A POPULAR MOVE, AND WE EXPECT OTHER POLITICIANS TO JOIN FERREIRA, THE "FRENTE AMPLIO" AND THE "THIRD COLORADO FRONT" IN ADVOCATING SUCH ACTION.

3. RALLY WAS FERREIRA ALDUNATE'S SECOND VENTURE INTO MONTEVIDEO AND, LIKE THE FIRST, WAS WELL ATTENDED (ESTIMATED 10,000 PERSONS) DESPITE BAD WEATHER THROUGHOUT DAY AND HEAVY RAINS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING AND FOLLOWING RALLY ITSELF.

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TO CREATE EMPLOYMENT, INCREASED INVESTMENTS IN PUBLIC WORKS, PUBLIC HOUSING AND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM, TAX REFORM, AND, IN THE SOCIAL FIELD, REFORMS TO EDUCATION, SOCIAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC HEALTH. AS COULD BE EXPECTED OF POLITICAL DOCUMENT, PLATFORM CONTAINS SOMETHING FOR EVERYONE AND IS VAGUE ON HOW MANY OF ITS PROGRAMS WOULD BE FINANCED. HOWEVER, AS POLITICAL DOCUMENT, IT COMPARES FAVORABLY TO THE "FRENTE AMPLIO" "THIRTY POINT PLAN OF GOVERNMENT" WHICH IS MORE RADICAL AND LESS SPECIFIC. THE FERREIRA PLATFORM IS BASICALLY REFORMIST DOCUMENT AND MORE RADICAL SOLUTIONS PROPOSED, I.E., LAND REFORM AND NATIONALIZATION OF THE BANKING HAVE BROAD APPEAL TO URUGUAYAN PUBLIC. AS NOTED IN OUR CASP, THE BANKING INDUSTRY IS WIDELY DISLIKED AND DISTRUSTED, ITS NATIONALIZATION WOULD BE A POPULAR MOVE, AND WE EXPECT OTHER POLITICIANS TO JOIN FERREIRA, THE "FRENTE AMPLIO" AND THE "THIRD COLORADO FRONT" IN ADVOCATING SUCH ACTION.

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 AMEMBASSY RIO DE JANEIRO
 AMEMBASSY ROME
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CINCSO FOR POLAD

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJECT: URUGUAYAN BISHOPS' DECLARATION ON UPCOMING ELECTIONS

1. URUGUAYAN EPISCOPAL CONFERENCE, COMPOSED OF THE TEN CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ISSUED PUBLIC DECLARATION SEPTEMBER 15, AFFIRMING CATHOLICS COULD IN GOOD CONSCIENCE VOTE FOR ANY OF THE THREE "LEMAS" OR PARTIES PARTICIPATING IN NOVEMBER 28 GENERAL ELECTIONS. WHILE STATEMENT SPECIFICALLY CAUTIONS CHRISTIANS AGAINST VOTING FOR "MARXIST IDEOLOGY" AND "ATHEIST MATERIALISM", IT POINTS OUT THAT GIVEN URUGUAY'S COMPLEX ELECTORAL SYSTEM, IT IS POSSIBLE TO VOTE FOR A PARTY "LEMA" WITHOUT SUPPORTING A MARXIST FACTION OR "SUB-LEMA" WITHIN IT. DECLARATION REPRESENTS PROPAGANDA GAIN FOR THE "FRENTE AMPLIO" WHICH FROM THE FIRST HAS REPRESENTED ITSELF AS COALITION OF MARXISTS AND CHRISTIANS. DECLARATION WAS APPROVED BY EIGHT OF TEN BISHOPS VOTING, WITH CONSERVATIVE BISHOPS CORSO OF MALDONADO AND VALAGUAR OF TUCUAREMBO IN OPPOSITION.

2. OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH NINETEEN READS AS FOLLOWS: "IN URUGUAY, ACCORDING TO EXISTING LEGISLATION, THE PARTY "LEMAS" ARE NOT

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NECESSARILY MONOLITHIC, BUT INCLUDE SECTORS OR "SUB-LEMAS" INFLUENCED BY DIVERSE IDEOLOGICAL CURRENTS, LIBERALISM, NATIONALISM, POPULARISM, PERSONALISM, HUMANISM, CHRISTIANITY, SOCIAL DEMOCRACY, ETC. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THIS PLURALISTIC CHARACTER OF THE "LEMAS" AND AMBIGUITY WHICH THIS IMPLIES, AND LOOKING AT IT SOLELY FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE FAITH, WE DO NOT FIND SUFFICIENT REASONS EITHER TO RECOMMEND (WHICH IS BEYOND OUR COMPETENCE) OR TO EXCLUDE AS ILLICIT, A VOTE FOR ANY OF THE "LMEAS" (WE ARE NOT REFERRING TO THE "SUB-LEMAS") WHICH ARE BEING OFFERED TO THE CITIZENS IN THIS YEAR'S ELECTION".

3* STATEMENT WAS HERALDED IN THE PRO-"FRENTE AMPLIO" PRESS AS GREEN LIGHT FROM THE BISHOPS FOR CHRISTIANS TO VOTE FOR "FRENTE" CANDIDATES. IT WAS ATTACKED EDITORIALY BY NON-"FRENTE" PRESS AS TENDING TO CONFUSE VOTERS ON THE NATURE OF THE "FRENTE AMPLIO".

4* COMMENT: THE BISHOPS DECLARATION WILL MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR TRADITIONAL BLANCO AND COLORADO PARTIES TO PORTRAY "FRENTE AMPLIO" AS NO MORE THAN FRONT DOMINATED OF COMMUNIST PARTY. HOWEVER, SIGNIFICANCE THIS POINT SHOULD NOT BE OVERSTRESSED. URUGUAYAN CATHOLIC CHURCH HAS TRADITIONALLY PLAYED MARGINAL ROLE IN URUGUAYAN POLITICS SINCE JOSE BATLLE Y ORDOÑEZ ESTABLISHED SECULAR STATE AT TURN OF THE CENTURY. IT IS PROBABLE THAT CHURCH EXERTS LESS POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INFLUENCE IN URUGUAY THAN IN ANY OTHER SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRY. HOWEVER BISHOPS' ACTION COULD HAVE SIGNIFICANCE IN AN ESPECIALLY CLOSE ELECTION.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L MONTEVIDEO 2282

CINCSO FOR POLAD

SUBJ: RESULTS OF INTERNAL ELECTIONS IN COLORADO "UNITY
AND REFORM" FACTION

REF: A-169 POL 14 UR

1. FOR PAST SEVERAL MONTHS, COLORADO PARTY LEADER JORGE BATLLE AND HIS LIST 15 "UNITY AND REFORM" FACTION HAVE BEEN CONDUCTING INTERNAL ELECTIONS TO CHOOSE NEW FACTION AUTHORITIES. EFFORT CULMINATED WITH LIST 15 ELECTIONS IN MONTEVIDEO SEPTEMBER 12TH. INITIAL RESULTS ANNOUNCED BY BATLLE FORCES INDICATE THAT SOME 206,000 VOTERS IN THE CAPITAL PARTICIPATED IN THIS INTERNAL CONTEST. VOTE COUNT HAS CONTINUED THROUGHOUT THIS WEEK WITH LIST 15 CLAIMING THAT OVER 360,000 HAVE VOTED IN THIS CAMPAIGN ON A NATIONAL BASIS.

2. BATLLE HAS USED INTERNAL ELECTIONS AS (A) METHOD OF RE-ACTIVATING HIS POLITICAL MACHINE (B) DEVICE TO GIVE NEW MILITANT SUPPORTERS AN OPPORTUNITY TO SHOW THEIR VOTER APPEAL AND (C) AWAKEN VOTER INTEREST IN OVERALL LIST 15 POLITICAL CAMPAIGN. MONTEVIDEO EFFORT ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT TO BATLLE PERSONALLY, SINCE IT HAS WIDELY BEEN HELD HERE THAT HIS POLITICAL FORTUNES WERE IRREVOCABLY DAMAGED BY RUMORS OF HIS "INFIDENCIA", I.E. THAT HE ILLEGALLY PROFITED FROM ADVANCE KNOWLEDGE OF APRIL 1968 DEVALUATION. ALTHOUGH LIST 15 IS

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PAGE 02 MONTEV 02282 201455Z

PRESIDENTIAL TICKET WILL NOT BE FORMALLY NAMED UNTIL FACTION CONVENTION OCTOBER 2-3. BATLLE PERSONALLY LED THE INTERNAL ELECTION EFFORT AND UNDOUBTEDLY BELIEVES LARGE TURNOUT REPRESENTED VINDICATION FOR HIMSELF PERSONALLY IN LIGHT "INFIDENCIA" RUMORS.

3. LIST 15'S OPPONENTS OF COURSE QUICK TO CHARGE THAT INTERNAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN INVOLVED CONSIDERABLE "BALLOT STUFFING" AND "DOUBLE VOTING" AND THAT NO REAL CONTROL MAINTAINED ON THOSE PARTICIPATING. BATLLE HIMSELF MADE CLEAR THAT ELECTIONS WERE OPEN TO ALL VOTERS, BLANCOS AND COLORADOS. HE INDICATED TO EMBOFFS DURING LUNCHEON AT DCM RESIDENCE SEPTEMBER 17 THAT PROBABLY NO MORE THAT 140,000 OF MONTEVIDEO TOTAL WERE CERTAIN VOTES FOR LIST 15 AT NOVEMBER 28 GENERAL ELECTION. (ACCORDING TO CAS SOURCES, SENIOR LIST 15 POLITICIANS FEEL THAT MONTEVIDEO INTERNAL VOTE REPRESENTED HARD CORE OF 80,000 LIST 15 SUPPORTERS.) BATLLE VOTE IN 1966 ELECTIONS WAS 82,000 MONTEVIDEO AND 216,000 NATIONALLY.

4. COMMENT: REGARDLESS OF ACTUAL VOTE TOTAL, WE BELIEVE BATLLE HAS SUCCESSFULLY USED INTERNAL ELECTIONS TO CARRY OUT FIRST PHASE OF ACTIVATING HIS POLITICAL CAMPAIGN. BATLLE INDICATED CONSIDERABLE PERSONAL SATISFACTION TO US ABOUT RESULTS OF THIS PHASE AND EAGERNESS TO MOVE ON TO OCTOBER 2-3 CONVENTION AT WHICH NATIONAL TICKET WILL BE ANNOUNCED. WE HAVE CONFIRMED HE WILL NAME WELL-KNOWN CONSERVATIVE COLORADO RENAN RODRIQUEZ AS HIS VICE PRESIDENTIAL RUNNING MATE AND CURRENT PUBLIC WORKS MINISTER PINTOS RISSO AS LIST 15 CANDIDATE FOR MONTEVIDEO MAYOR. RODRIQUEZ WILL BRING TO BATLLE TICKET SUPPORT OF INFLUENTIAL COLORADO DAILY "EL DIA". BATLLE TOLD US HE BELIEVES AS OF NOW HE HAS "GOOD CHANCE" FOR NOVEMBER VICTORY BUT RECOGNIZES THAT POLITICAL FORCES OF PRESIDENT PACHECO THUS FAR HOLD OVERALL LEAD WITHIN COLORADO PARTY. MEMCON FOLLOWS. GP-3. ADAIR

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TO : Department of State

INFO: Amembassy BUENOS AIRES, BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO,
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CINCSO FOR POLAD

FROM : Amembassy MONTEVIDEO

SUBJECT : Political Platform of the Frente Amplio

REF : Montevideo A-43 ARA

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Enclosed is an unofficial translation of the "Plan of Government" which the Frente Amplio's Presidential candidate, Liber Seregni, announced at an Uruguayan Independence Day rally on August 25.

Although the statements of Frente spokesmen since the party's formation appear to have taken on a more militant and radical tone, this document appears somewhat more moderate than the "Programmatic Base" which appeared in February (Montevideo A-43) as the coalition's statement of common purposes. It restates more specifically what actions a Frente government would take, but some significant elements of the earlier statement do not appear and its rhetoric is more subdued.

The Plan leaves out references to general economic planning and the possibility of widespread nationalizations, although it repeats pledges to take over the banking and export sectors and to fix prices. In the area of foreign policy, the Plan omits attacks on the Organization of American States and the Latin American Free Trade Area, as well as its earlier promise to require reinvestment of the earnings of foreign companies. The new document repeats previous pledges to renegotiate the nation's external debt and renounce Letters of Agreement with the International Monetary Fund. The Frente also states its determination to cancel international petroleum agreements and to restore diplomatic and cultural relations with Cuba. One notable omission is in the Plan's failure to make any reference to the political or electoral system envisioned; the earlier Programmatic Base supported the notion of a "plurality of political parties".

L Encl: as stated

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Drafted by: m/m
POL: MCMcLean:fmContents and Classification Approved by:
Ambassador C. W. Adair, Jr.

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UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

PLAN OF GOVERNMENT OF THE FRENTE AMPLIO

Presented August 25, 1971 by
Presidential Candidate, Gen. Liber Seregni

Restoration of Individual Rights

1. We will restore individual rights by canceling the Emergency Security Measures and re-instituting full liberties, rights and constitutional guarantees.

Defense of National Sovereignty - Obtaining Economic Independence and
Initiating the Process of Structural Transformation

2. We will renounce the Letters of Agreement signed with the IMF and any other agreements which undermine national sovereignty.
We will re-negotiate foreign debts in order to postpone their payment and eliminate oppressive terms. If we are unsuccessful, we will take suitable unilateral measures.

We will cancel fuel contracts which place ANCAP in a subservient position before the imperialist trusts.

We will follow an active policy which will enable us to respond to the requirements of development, striving to attain self-sufficiency in energy supplies.

3. We will maintain diplomatic, commercial and cultural relations with all countries, and especially with Cuba, the only Latin American country with which they are (now) interrupted.

4. We will take control of private banking, using present legislation, while nationalization measures are enacted. This will ensure a selective and supervised credit policy, which meets the needs of the main lines of production in agriculture and industry and places credit within reach of small and medium-sized producers and businessmen. In this way, national savings will be used to best advantage, assuring the effective elimination of banking and semi-banking channels.

We will apply and extend the State's insurance monopoly.

5. We will establish a state monopoly of foreign currency in order to assure better understanding and more adequate utilization, thereby favoring needed production and consumption, taking foreign exchange completely away from the speculators and barring capital flight.

6. Using present laws, we will take control of all export enterprises (packing plants, refrigerated warehousing, and warehouses for wool and other commodities) as a first step toward the nationalization of foreign trade. This will insure the total use in the country of foreign currency generated by exports and better maintenance of prices, and will encourage early negotiations with other countries, in order to increase foreign trade on the basis of mutual benefits, including the use of bilateral agreements.

7. We will immediately start the process of rural reform by proposing suitable laws. Prior to their passage, we will use the National Colonization Institute law, placing small and medium-sized producers on the board of this Institute, assuring their continuity on the land and providing technical assistance through the University of the Republic which will benefit both the producers and the country. Within 120 days we will propose the passage of a law on rural rents which will take particular account (of the needs of) tenants and landlords of modest means. In the meanwhile, rural evictions will be suspended. We will establish a process of land redistribution and will promote a system of cooperatives among small and medium-sized producers and rural workers.

We will establish fixed prices for the principal agricultural and livestock products, assuring their maintenance through State purchases. We will assure credits and cash payments, with special attention to small and medium-sized producers.

We will take special steps to end the smuggling of livestock and wool.

8. We will press for the creation of a State (merchant) fleet, giving priority to the purchase of tankers and refrigerated vessels. We will develop the National Merchant Marine.

Redistribution of Income

Measures of income redistribution, in addition to their social objectives, will stimulate the economy by increasing domestic consumption and thereby allowing the use of available but unutilized capacity in the different productive sectors, especially in industry. This policy will contribute to increases in employment and production. These measures will be:

9. We will increase wages and salaries in the private sector, both urban and rural, and (also) in the public sector to restore purchasing power at least to the level existing before the wage freeze, all this to be done through agreements with labor organizations and within the framework of economic planning. We will repeal the COPRIN (wage-price) law and create a National

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Salaries Board. The main objectives with regard to income will be the establishment of a minimum national salary, a more just salary policy for all sectors based on the principle of equal work and equal pay for men, women and young people, and the improvement of marriage and family allowances.

10. We will pay the debt which the Social Security Bank owes to its retired members through a system of quotas beginning April 1972.

We will increase minimum retirement pay, freeze the highest pensions, eliminate the system of privileges, and improve special pensions. We will reorganize the social security system in order to speed up processing and make possible pre-retirement payments, especially for those beneficiaries over 60 years of age.

A very strict control will be established to insure compliance with the obligations due the Social Security Bank by applying penal sanctions to the large enterprises which delay payments to the Bank for their personnel.

11. We will immediately adjust the mechanisms of fiscal administration in order to achieve an effective collection system, especially for taxes on high incomes and capital accumulation.

A radical reform will be started in the tax system in order to achieve a progressive distribution of national income and encourage the development of productive activities.

12. Applying the law of consumption goods, we will protect the purchasing power of the population and ensure an adequate supply of popular products by establishing and controlling prices and eliminating parasitical intermediaries. To this end, we will immediately set up organizations of popular control, staffed by producers and consumers.

Making the Right to Work Effective

The effectiveness of the right to work will result from an agricultural policy which will assure the continuity of the small and medium-sized producer on the land and increased production and productivity, by stimulating and intensifying industrial development as a result of increased exports and domestic consumption, by the implementation of a public works plan, and by the establishment of new sources of work.

To this end:

13. We will promote the full use of existing plants in the basic industries (packing plants, textiles, hides, metal works, and others).

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We will encourage development of new industries, especially fishing and its by-products. We will encourage prospecting and the exploitation of our subsoil riches.

14. We will accelerate the use of the national housing law, especially those provisions which have the greatest social interest. We will facilitate and stimulate housing construction by neighborhoods, giving priority to subsidy systems, cooperatives and mutual help groups, and regulating price of land to be used for housing construction to eliminate speculation.

Improvement of Social Welfare

Improvement of social welfare will result from the measures which create sources of work and redistribute income. But these must be complemented by other specific measures, since the task of national liberation and development requires all the energies of our people and it is necessary to remove all existing privileges in the areas of health, education and public housing.

15. While National Health Insurance is set up, we will improve health service to the population through a reorganization of the Ministry of Public Health and the initiation of a program to coordinate all preventive medical measures and health assistance in the country.

16. We will install clinics for maternal-child care in suburbs and villages, using the offices of state agencies and social institutions or constructing adequate facilities. We will give preference to medical assistance to the rural areas.

We will rationalize and improve the supply of medicines, lowering their cost and encouraging their production by public institutions.

17. We will see that children who have not finished their education return to school.

We will carry out a literacy campaign with the active and voluntary participation of educators, students and the population in general.

We will promote the passing of laws to solve the institutional problems of primary and secondary education and physical culture.

We will promote physical education, setting up playing fields in each suburb and village and making contracts with private sports clubs so that the National Physical Culture Commission can make use of present installations.

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18. We will seek passage of a law for the communication media to protect the national labor force, to guarantee objective information, and to assure the defense of national culture and the equitable availability of space for all political, labor, cultural, and religious organizations.

We will promote and protect a national book-publishing industry. We will create a state publishing house, mainly dedicated to printing teaching texts and works of national writers.

19. We will see that every child has one-half liter of milk per day. We will provide the necessary funds to assure to every school child his cup of milk and other food, clothing, shoes, books and stationery, as well as medical and dental care.

We will restructure the Child Counsel in all its activities and will reform its administration. We will fight the exploitation of child labor.

We will set up a children's vacation colony at the presidential (weekend) residence in Estancia Anchorena.

20. Together with the municipalities and with the participation of the people, we will develop community centers providing libraries, cultural meeting halls, nurseries, kindergartens, food distribution facilities, laundries and other services. We will increase the number of free public dining rooms throughout the country through the National Food Institute.

21. Within 120 days of taking over the Government, we will endeavor to pass a rent law which will take care of the needs of leasees and owners with low incomes; meanwhile, all evictions will be cancelled. We will reduce taxes payable by owners of small holdings and will provide compensation for those who might suffer loss due to low rents.

22. We will assure efficient transport for all dwellers in suburbs and villages near Montevideo. We will put into effect a plan of reorganization for AFE (State railroads) and PLUNA (State airline) to assure adequate services.

The Institution of Peace in the Country

Measures to procure economic independence, to initiate required structural changes, to re-distribute income in favor of the poorer people, and to generate employment, as well as measures to improve social welfare and popular representation are the main elements of a new development process which involves the establishing of peace in the country, thus eliminating the socio-economic causes of violence.

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This implies simultaneous implementation of the following measures:

23. We will restore to their places of work with all their rights those released, suspended, or transferred because of persecution measures, with full payment for sanctions and economic losses.
24. We will present a law of amnesty to liberate all political prisoners, so that they may return to legal political life in all sectors of society. We will fully restore the right of political asylum.
25. We will re-orient the Police Department to its civil and predominantly preventive character, taking away from the police its role in (controlling) popular demonstrations. Communications and transport facilities (now) used for repressing the population will be diverted to meeting health, education and other social needs.

Popular Participation and Reform of Public Administration

Implementation of all the measures cited above will require a continual participation by the people to build a new society and also to enhance the morality of public service.

This participation and moral reform will take multiple forms with various mechanisms:

26. On March 1, we will name the Board of the Social Security Bank to include delegates of the most representative organizations of retired people, workers and managers.
27. On the same date we will nominate directors for the autonomous (state) bodies and decentralized services to include elected representatives of the workers of these organizations. The same criteria will apply in the case of Primary and Normal Educational Councils and other similar bodies.
28. We will institute a policy which cancels privileges and achieves economies in the conduct of Government. We will eliminate all kinds of remuneration for elected, political and personally-appointed posts which creates situations of special privilege.
29. We will re-structure the Diplomatic Service, both in its administration and its political offices, to make it an efficient instrument for defending the political and economic interests of the Republic.

Authority NND 969045

30. No person can be a candidate of the Frente Amplio without presenting a public, sworn declaration of income and estate; a similar system will be set up for nominations for positions of trust. We will create legal measures to avoid any conflict between public duties and private interests, as well as the use of public posts for personal gain.

These initial measures are a political commitment publicly taken by the Frente Amplio as a starting point for its Plan of Government.

Great efforts and sacrifice will be required to attain these targets, not only by those in Government but also by the people. This effort and sacrifice are the price which must be paid to achieve structural changes capable of creating a firm basis for prosperity for the nation and welfare for its people.

The Frente Amplio understands that the active participation of the people through base committees, unions and other organizations constitute the guarantee of fulfillment of this Plan and of (their) control of the governors who must carry it out.

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ORIGIN/ACTION

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25

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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A-169

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TO : Department of State

INFO: Amembassy BRASILIA, BUENOS AIRES, RIO DE JANEIRO, SANTIAGO, CINCSO

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATERS/AN
ANALYSIS BRANCH

DATE: Sept. 14, 1971

FROM : Amembassy MONTEVIDEO

SUBJECT: The Uruguay Election Campaign - 75 Days to Go

REF :

CINCSO FOR POLAD

SUMMARY

Uruguay's electoral campaign has at long last moved into high gear, with all major political alliances now complete and most presidential candidacies announced. Violence breeding counter-violence, fear and uncertainty has increased in recent months and "law and order" has become the number one campaign topic. The Administration of President Pacheco has suffered several serious reverses in the public order field, but the President appears more determined than ever that elections will be held as planned. In the ruling Colorado Party, Pacheco's own political group and Jorge BATLLE's List 15 faction are now the major contenders. Blanco presidential hopeful FERREIRA Aldunate holds a clear lead over his party rival, General AGUERRONDO. The Communist-backed Frente Amplio coalition continues its hard-hitting, well-financed campaign, but has yet to overtake either of the traditional parties on a national basis. At this point, the Colorado Party appears to have the overall lead, but the crucial period of the campaign will probably not begin before mid to late October. END SUMMARY.

Pacheco Administration

With less than three months remaining in the political campaign which will culminate in general elections on

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☐ In ☐ Out

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Clearances:

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RC: Mr. Wilson (draft) for

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Ambassador C.A. Adair, Jr.

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Page 2 of A-169
MONTEVIDEO

November 28, the Administration of President Jorge PACHECO finds itself sorely beset on all sides. Its twin planks of economic stabilization and the maintenance of law and order have suffered a number of reverses which have severely affected the GOU's prestige at home and abroad. The most spectacular of these were of course the July and September mass escapes by imprisoned MLN-Tupamaro terrorists. Also disturbing is the sharp increase in political violence in recent months. Student/police clashes have resulted in injuries to both sides and two student deaths. A rightist student was shot to death in a Frente Amplio political club. There is an almost daily series of bomb attacks and shootings by groups of the left and right, and a marked increase in labor political militancy which several times has paralyzed all commercial activity in Montevideo.

Nevertheless, the President continues to show an implacable determination to confront these public order problems head-on. A number of new security measures have been adopted, the most important of which was a decree on September 9 transferring the primary responsibility for the GOU's anti-terrorist fight from the police to the Armed Forces. In both his public and private statements, President Pacheco grimly restates his commitment to hold the November 28 elections at all costs. Nearly every Government announcement since the second mass escape of imprisoned terrorists on September 6 has underscored this determination. General disheartenment over recent events has produced some individual demands for a presidential coup d'etat. However, as of this moment, no discernable coup organization has developed and the President now gives every evidence of seeking to avoid such action.

The Government's success in preserving a relatively peaceful electoral climate in which elections can proceed unimpaired will to some extent depend upon terrorist plans. Some intelligence information indicates that the MLN organization intends to mount a major effort to interrupt the campaign and create doubts about the validity of its result. In their recent communiques, however, the Tupamaros deny any such intention and instead demand that the Pacheco Administration re-establish full civil guarantees to insure

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that the people's "revolutionary voice" will be heard. Terrorists may well take a middle course. They could continue violent attacks in the weeks ahead, aimed particularly at embarrassing and weakening the Pacheco Administration's prestige. Such a course would strike at the President's hope for a large pro-Government vote as a public vindication of his policies, but would stop short of a direct attack on the electoral process itself. Terrorist intentions in this regard will only become clear as November approaches.

Colorado Party

At the time of the September 6 prison break, we believed that the Colorado Party had an overall lead in the campaign and a narrow edge over the Frente Amplio in Montevideo. Although the mass escape lessened the credibility of pro-Pacheco campaign efforts, we continue to think this assessment is correct.

The past three months have seen a clarification of much of the previous confusion in Colorado ranks. All major Colorado factions have committed themselves to presidential candidates and three general political forces have emerged: an "official" group supporting the re-election of Pacheco or the election of his yet to be designated heir; a "semi-official" group which continues to give overall backing to the Administration but supports the List 15 "Unity and Reform" faction and its leader Jorge BATLLE; and an "opposition" group headed by Senators VASCONCELLOS and FLORES Mora which opposes the Pacheco Government's policies across the board.

1. Pachequistas - Any lingering doubt about the President's attitude toward efforts to amend the Constitution to permit his re-election were removed in his August 25 Independence Day speech in which he gave the re-election movement the green light. Pro-Pacheco forces, grouped in the "National Re-Election Union" - UNR, immediately began their national publicity campaign on the theme "Pacheco or Chaos". A UNR coordinating commission headed by Vice President ABDALA was named to oversee the re-election campaign. Unfortunately for them, a second

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 4 of A-169
MONTEVIDEO

mass terrorist escape occurred shortly thereafter. This appears to have damaged the appeal of the UNR's effort to portray the re-election of the President as the only alternative to violence and terrorism. How seriously this will effect the UNR's search for votes is not now clear, but the initial reaction by UNR leaders to news of the escape was to term it a political "catastrophe" for their efforts.

Even before the prison break, however, these same leaders were expressing private doubts that they could convince the necessary majority of the voters (approximately 800,000) to support their re-election amendment. Nevertheless, the President remains silent on his choice of an alternate candidate to represent him should the re-election fail. Speculation continues to center on U. N. Ambassador LEGNANI, Vice President Abdala, Interior Minister SENA, Planning Director LANZA, Ambassador to Argentina LACARTE Muró and a host of lesser lights. Regardless of pressure on him for an early decision, the President recently indicated to the Ambassador that he will not name an alternate until late in the campaign so as not to appear to have lost hope in his own re-election.

2. List 15 and Jorge Batlle - The first phase of List 15's campaign ended on September 12 with the completion of internal elections throughout the country to choose the faction's new leaders. Batlle seized upon this device earlier in the year as a means of kindling public interest in List 15 and reactivating its national political machinery. This technique has obviously served Batlle forces very well - in nearly every department, List 15 groups have generated substantially more votes than the faction received in 1966. Batlle has personally led this internal campaign and undoubtedly believes that its success represents a personal triumph for him. He also probably considers that attacks charging he illegally profited from advance knowledge of the 1968 devaluation, the infidencia, have not seriously effected his public standing.

The next phase of List 15's campaign will point to its national convention September 24-26 at which the

CONFIDENTIAL

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Page 5 of A-169
MONTEVIDEO

faction's presidential ticket will be approved and its basic platform announced. Batlle will doubtless head the ticket. However, he also must broaden the base of List 15's voter appeal to have any serious hope of emerging as the Party's most voted candidate. To this end, he offered his vice presidential slot to both ex-Blanco Party Rocha Movement chief Alberto GALLINAL and popular Blanco politician Benito MEDERO. However, both refused. Now, there is speculation that Batlle is making a similar offer to a long-time, respected Colorado Party figure, Renán RODRIGUEZ. Rodriguez would bring to the Batlle ticket conservative, older Colorado voters as well as their prestigious El Dia daily newspaper. Similarly, Batlle's hope to present Public Works Minister PINTOS Risso as his candidate for mayor of Montevideo is aimed at capitalizing on Pintos Risso's solid and well-publicized reputation as a "doer" and "builder".

3. Third Colorado Front - Senator Manuel FLORES Mora and his List 17 group have now joined Senator Amilcar VASCONCELLOS' List 315 to form the "Third Colorado Front". This Front is composed of those Colorados who have consistently opposed the Pacheco Administration. Ideologically, its positions are those of the Party's modern founder, Jose BATLLE y ORDONEZ. The Third Front offers programs of old-time social and economic liberalism, emphasizing the State's role in all economic institutions. With this, it seeks to stake out the liberal batllista left of the Party and thus competes with the Frente Amplio for the votes of non-Marxist liberals. We do not see the Third Front as a major contender within the Colorado Party, but to the extent that it can hold the Party's traditional left-wing, it will prove a very definite asset to the overall Colorado position.

4. Others - Although retired General Julio RIBAS' small Movimiento Renovador is mounting an impressive public relations campaign, we doubt that his voter appeal extends beyond his own tiny band of very conservative, "hard-line" followers. He has picked up no support from other Party political organizations. The rumored imminent proclamation of Senator Juan L. PINTOS as a presidential hopeful is no more than a

CONFIDENTIAL

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Page 6 of A-169
MONTEVIDEO

device to retain his Senate seat.

Blanco Party

Blancos continue to place great stress on the political importance of Party unity, as yet unaffected by the personal campaigns of its two major candidates. They believe that this contrasts favorably in the public mind with the divided Colorado Party and builds the credibility of the Blancos as an attractive alternate to Colorado power. Nevertheless, they continue to suffer from a historic drawback - there are simply fewer Blanco voters than Colorados, and thus Blancos must attract independent and anti-Pacheco votes to win in November. Blanco strategy is based on closing the gap with Colorados in Montevideo (which presumes a strong Frente showing at the expense of Colorados) and making up any losses in the capital in interior departments where they traditionally run well. To date, we do not think this strategy has advanced the Blanco Party beyond second place in the nation and it could run third in Montevideo, behind both the Colorados and Frente Amplio. The Blancos remain, however, a very definite national contender.

1. Ferreira Aldunate - The presidential campaign of Senator Wilson FERREIRA Aldunate rests on three main supports - his own Por La Patria group; the Rocha Movement led by his vice presidential running mate, Senator Carlos PEREYRA; and Senator Washington BELTRAN's List 400 faction. Ferreira has also picked up a number of defectors from groups supporting General AGUERRONDO, as well as a scattering of Christian Democratic clubs in interior areas who disapprove of the PDC's decision to join the Frente Amplio. Ferreira's well-organized campaign has stressed both honesty in government and the need for social peace. On this latter point, he has hammered away on the need for more effective application of existing laws, rather than reliance on presidentially-decreed security measures. He charges such decrees curtail civil liberties, yet are ineffective in dealing with terrorist violence, using recent mass terrorist prison breaks as examples. Ferreira's campaign appearances both in Montevideo and the interior have been highly successful and his radio/television expenses probably now approach those of the Frente Amplio. However, his supporters, who are enthusiastic about the results thus far obtained, concede that their major handicap

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is the poor showing made to date by the Party's "law and order" candidate, General Aguerrondo. They fear that Aguerrondo is not attracting sufficient votes of his own to assure an overall Blanco victory.

2. Aguerrondo/Heber - The Aguerrondo/Heber campaign continues to concentrate on interior voters, although it is mounting a sizeable radio/television effort in the capital. Aguerrondo does not yet appear to have broadened the base of his appeal to independents and undecided Blancos. However, he may be able to capitalize on the Pacheco Administration's inability to put an end to terrorism (again, as characterized by the prison escapes). Such support would come from voters whose primary concern is "law and order" and who have become disenchanted with the President. We have found Aguerrondo unenthusiastic about politics in general and campaigning; he appears content to let his vice presidential choice, Alberto Heber, act as his political spokesman, a role Heber accepts with gusto. We have also heard continuing rumors about disagreements in the Aguerrondo/Heber camp. If their campaign continues to fail to catch fire, the emergence of a third Blanco candidate remains a possibility. Retired Blanco chief Alberto Gallinal appears now to have definitely rejected such a role for himself.

Frente Amplio

Since our A-143 of August 10, the major event in the Frente Amplio's campaign occurred on August 25 (Independence Day), when its supporters undertook a nationwide voter canvass and announced the details of the Frente's "Program of Government". CAS sources indicate Frente leaders were generally satisfied with this effort which, according to PDC sources, involved some 10,000 party workers. The Frente continues to concentrate the bulk of its campaign in Montevideo and is relying upon its neighborhood "base committees" to generate enthusiasm and new adherents. CAS reports show that Frente leaders continue to see a definite possibility of winning Montevideo's mayoralty race and have some hopes of gaining the presidency if they can redouble their efforts in the interior. However, it is our impression that popular support for the Frente has remained at a relatively constant level for the past month or so and that it has not found new support in significant numbers. Frente rallies are well-attended and enthusiastic, but our observation indicates a substantial proportion of its rank-and-file are either university age adults

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 8 of A-169
MONTEVIDEO

or pre-voting age secondary school students.

Although the Frente Amplio continues to present itself as a broad, democratic cross-section of the Uruguayan people, it appears increasingly in fact as a radical worker-student alliance, directed in large measure by the Communist Party (PCU) and influenced to some extent by those sympathetic with the terrorist battle against the GOU. In the public eye, "democratic" elements in the Frente, such as the Christian Democrats and ex-Colorado Party groups, have been submerged in this more radical trend. The GOU and the traditional parties have been effective in exploiting this situation by charging that "Frente Amplio" is simply another way of saying "Communism and violence". Frente supporters complain of considerable harassment by police and "fascist bands" in the interior. The Pacheco Administration has been quick to temporarily close Frente newspapers and periodicals whenever their provocation reaches levels deemed unacceptable.

Frente presidential hopeful General SEREGNI continues his steady round of appearances and speeches at public rallies, supported by a continued strong public relations campaign. Two new Frente daily newspapers have just opened - Ahora (non-PCU Marxist) and Eco (PCU afternoon tabloid), plus a new weekly, SUR, and other miscellaneous publications of smaller Frente groups. CAS sources report that the Frente spent US \$40,000 (at the official rate) on publicity alone for its August 25 program.

There are reports of friction among Frente Amplio groups, although not serious enough to threaten the breakup of the Frente before the elections. This friction apparently exists within the PDC/ex-Colorado Frente del Pueblo coalition, as well as between the PCU and socialist groups, over the positioning of candidates on voting lists for the Senate and House. This may result in each group presenting its own separate list of candidates for these offices, thus exacerbating relations between these groups and damaging the Frente's image as a unified political force.

Conclusions

As we noted earlier in the year, "law and order" was expected to emerge as a major issue in the campaign. So far as the political candidates are concerned, it is now the

CONFIDENTIAL

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Page 9 of A-169
MONTEVIDEO

issue, transcending all others in importance and public attention. Economic recovery and development are less mentioned now, though opinion surveys place them high on the list of public concerns. All groups, political and otherwise, seem to have agreed that the best way out of the nation's difficulties will be through elections on November 28. President Pacheco appears increasingly determined to oblige and thus far has steadfastly rejected suggestions that he postpone or dispense with the electoral contest.

The most recent Gallup survey (for August, as yet unpublished) which showed the Colorado Party regaining the lead in Montevideo (24% Colorado, 21% Frente Amplio, 18% Blanco) also indicated a continuing large number of undecided voters, in the range of 30-35%. At this point, we do not see this undecided vote as splitting evenly on a national basis between the three contending forces - we think it more likely to divide principally among the Blanco and Colorado Parties. We based this judgment on past electoral history, as well as from some initial analysis we have done on surveys of voter reactions to issues other than straight candidate preference, such as attitudes toward violence, the performance of the GOU and the President, economic problems and solutions, etc. This appears to indicate on first reading that the views of those as yet undecided about specific candidates more closely coincide on these other issues with opinions expressed by declared Blancos and Colorados, rather than with those of Frente Amplio supporters.

We have often, more often than we wished, cautioned against making any final judgments now on the ultimate electoral result. We do so because every political source with whom we are in contact has warned that the decisive period in the campaign is still well ahead of us. We continue to see small signs of a Colorado victory, with Pacheco and Batlle forces the major contenders, although further serious miscues by the GOU could alter this. Blancos have yet to demonstrate that they have closed the electoral gap, especially in Montevideo. The Frente Amplio must find new issues with which to belabor the Government and the traditional parties if it is to repeat its remarkable voter surge of April - June. From our vantage point, November 28 is still a distressingly long way off.

Group 3 - downgraded at 12-year
intervals; not automatically
declassified.

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CONFIDENTIAL 641

PAGE 01 MONTEV 02239 141642Z

52

ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 AID-20 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PH-06 H-02 INR-06 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-14 USIA-12 SY-03

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FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
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INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
AMEMBASSY RIO DE JANEIRO
CINCSO

C O N F I D E N T I A L MONTEVIDEO 2239

CINCSO FOR POLAD

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

DEPT PASS OPS

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT ADDRESSES NATION ON SECURITY SITUATION

1. PRESIDENT PACHECO SEPTEMBER 11 ADDRESSED THE NATION ON RADIO AND TELEVISION NETWORK FOR 15 MINUTES TO GIVE HIS RESPONSE TO MASS ESCAPE OF TUPAMAROS FROM PRISONS AND SUBSEQUENT RELEASE OF KIDNAPPED BRITISH AMBASSADOR GEOFFREY JACKSON. SPEAKING FORCEFULLY AND WITH GREATER EMPHASIS AND ANIMATION THAN IS HIS CUSTOM, PACHECO MADE THE FOLLOWING SIX POINTS:

A. CONDUCT OF GOVERNMENT: PRESIDENT STATED THAT HE FELT MORE RESPONSIBLE THAN EVER FOR DIRECTION OF THE NATION AND RESOLVED TO RENEW HIS "ARDOR" TO PROVIDE SOLUTIONS. HE SAID "FROM NOW ON AND MORE THAN EVER, I AND ONLY I WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DIRECTION, THE DECISIONS, AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF GOVERNMENT".

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CONFIDENTIAL

23

Montevideo 2239
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CONFIDENTIAL 926

PAGE 01 MONTEV 02218 01 OF 02 092229Z

82

ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-06 H-02 INR-06 L-03 NSAE-00

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INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
AMEMBASSY RIO DE JANEIRO
CINCSO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MONTEVIDEO 2218

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

CINCSO FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: THE GREAT ESCAPE - A PRELIMINARY POLITICAL ASSESSMENT

1. SUMMARY: THE MASS ESCAPE OF MLN/"TUPAMARON" PRISONERS ON SEPTEMBER 6 HAS SHAKEN URUGUAYAN PUBLIC TO DEGREE UNKNOWN IN RECENT YEARS. DISGUST, ANGER, BEWILDERMENT AND FEAR SEEM TO BE MOST COMMON ELEMENTS IN REACTION OF GENERAL PUBLIC. AMONG SENIOR GOVERNMENTAL LEADERS, THERE IS ALSO OUTRAGE THAT URUGUAY'S IMAGE IN INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS BEEN FURTHER DISMIRCHED AND NATIONAL PRIDE TRAMPLED UPON. AS EXPECTED, PRO-MLN STUDENTS ARE JUBILANT. GOVERNMENT, POLICE AND ARMED FORCES ARE DISHEARTENED AND DISCONCERTED. VIRTUALLY EVERYONE OUTSIDE IMMEDIATE CIRCLE OF PRESIDENTIAL ADVISERS BLAMES GOVERNMENT FOR GROSSEST NEGLIGENCE (INCLUDING COLORADO PARTY PRESS) AND DEMAND COMPLETE INVESTIGATION. THESE, OF COURSE, ARE INITIAL REACTIONS AND EMOTIONS WILL DOUBTLESS COOL WITH PASSAGE OF TIME AND AS POLITICAL EXIGENCIES ARISE. IN OUR JUDGMENT, OPPOSITION BLANCO PARTY WILL BE PRINCIPLE POLITICAL BENEFICIARY OF THIS INCIDENT. MLN COUP MUST BE CONSIDERED SIGNIFICANT SETBACK TO POLITICAL FORTUNES OF PRISIDENT PACHECO, HIS RELECTION

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Montevideo 2218
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3